Problems of Communism

BOOK REVIEWS

John H. Maurer

Janusz Bugajski

Maxine Pollack

Anita Chan

MARCH-APRIL 1988



"New Thinking" on Security

Gerhard Wettig

Eastern Europe & the Third World

Bartłomiej Kamiński & Robert W. Janes

Drug Abuse in the Soviet Union

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NOTES

Reforms and Civil Society in the USSR

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Problems of Communism

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MARCH-APRIL 1988 VOL XXXVII

Problems of Communism (ISSN 0032-941x) is a bimonthly publication providing analyses and significant information about the contemporary affairs of the Soviet Union, China, and comparable states and political movements. Views of contributors, as well as geographic boundaries and names, do not necessarily reflect the policies of the United States Government.

On all editorial matters, communications should be addressed to: The Editors, *Problems of Communism,* US Information Agency, United States of America, 301 4th Street SW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA. Telephone (202) 485-2230.

On subscriptions, communications should be addressed to: The Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402, USA, preferably using the subscription form provided at the back of this issue. Outside the United States, please address inquiries to the Public Affairs Section, Embassy of the United States of America.

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An annual index for *Problems of Communism* appears in the November-December issue (No. 6) of each year except in the case of the first three volumes, which are covered in a combined index in the November-December issue (No. 6) of Vol. III. Material from the journal is also indexed in *ABC POL SCI, Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales (all Sections), Current Contents, Economic Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, Index to US Government Periodicals, International Political Science Abstracts, Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences Citation Index, Social Sciences Index, Strategic Studies Reference Guide,* and *United States Political Science Documents.*

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Cover: An illustration in the Soviet humor magazine *Krokodil* contrasts Soviet "new thinking" and Western "old thinking." Reprinted with permission from *Krokodil* via Sovfoto.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

"New Thinking" on Security and East-West Relations

Gerhard Wettig

Ever since Mikhail Gorbachev propounded the "new thinking," Soviet officials have attempted to apply it to the area of foreign policy. They have called for a new, "all-human" approach aimed at resolving the "global problems" facing mankind, foremost the danger of nuclear destruction. This has had particular ramifications in the sphere of international security. Soviet officials have denounced the Western concept of nuclear deterrence as a threat to the whole world and have accused the United States and its allies of perpetuating the risk of a nuclear war between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries by refusing to give up reliance on the nuclear deterrent.

Economic Rationale for Eastern Europe's Third World Policy

Bartłomiej Kamiński and Robert W. Janes

Attempts to view East European relations with the Third World as being totally subservient to or being pursued in defiance of the Soviet Union miss the point. As economics has become more important in these relations, one finds that, even though the similar economic structures and modernization strategies of East European countries and their related dependency on the Soviet Union for key resources generally dictate similar behavior toward the Third World, there is greater diversity and more pursuit of self-interest. Eastern Europe remains structurally confined in pursuing ties with the Third World, but the Soviet Union itself can no longer ignore the economic costs to East European countries of their use as Soviet political surrogates there.

Drug Abuse in the Soviet Union

John M. Kramer

As the Soviet Union, under the impetus of *glasnost'*, begins to explore some of its social pathologies, there is growing public acknowledgment of a significant incidence of drug abuse there. The published analyses of drug abuse show little understanding for addicts, although one encounters recommendations that personal drug abuse be decriminalized. The problem of the illegal drug trade—which also exists within the USSR—has apparently spurred the Soviet Union to be more candid about its problems and to join international efforts to control drug trafficking.

Notes

Reforms and Civil Society in the USSR

James P. Scanlan

The policy of openness in the Soviet Union, which is part of a broader attempt to democratize public life, has raised the question whether the Soviet Union can become a state where individual freedoms are held inviolate and powerful social organizations act as a check on the actions of government. Several factors make the development of a "civil society" unlikely. Perhaps most important among them is that Marxist theory views individual rights as growing out of social relationships rather than being intrinsic to the individual. Such a relative and instrumental conception of rights assures that their scope will continue to be defined by the Soviet state.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

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The Private Sector in East European Agriculture

Nancy J. Cochrane

In recent years, East European communist governments have made a number of positive gestures toward the private agricultural sector which have resulted in improved efficiency and output. These measures have surfaced not only in Poland and Yugoslavia, where private farming still dominates agriculture, but in other, more "socialized" states, where it has been more marginal. Regimes still fail to make good on promises of improved inputs, and private farmers remain distrustful of entering into contracts with the socialized sector. Indeed, should the food situation ease, there is little guarantee against reversion to more restrictive policies regarding private agriculture.

Books

The Lessons of Arms Control

John H. Maurer

Looking at arms control from a historical perspective can be helpful in reaching an informed judgment as to whether arms control negotiations actually constrain military competition or merely channel it into the acquisition of weapons systems that are not easily limited by negotiation. While a case can and has been made for both views, most analysts of the arms control process agree that, at the very least, it reduces uncertainty about the adversary's plans for acquiring weapons.

East European Dissent: Impasses and Opportunities

Janusz Bugajski and Maxine Pollack

Three broad interpretations, which can be characterized as "positivist," "negativist," and "potentialist," have emerged among the political opposition in Eastern Europe regarding Gorbachev's impact on developments in their own countries. Although these interpretations may overlap and shift over time in response to what happens in Moscow, reforms in the Soviet Union increasingly influence the policies and strategies adopted by dissident groups in Eastern Europe.

Looking Back on the Chinese Cultural Revolution

Anita Chan

It has been 22 years since the Cultural Revolution erupted and 12 years since Mao died, yet a literary depiction or social-scientific analysis of the Cultural Revolution that genuinely elucidates what happened has yet to be published in China. While official intervention has played a part in this, China's intellectuals—young, middle-aged, and old—have also preferred not to delve too deeply into the nightmare that was the Cultural Revolution. A combination of residual fear, unwillingness to face their own past, a sense of patriotic responsibility, literati stoicism, discretion, and a search for harmony all have played a role in shaping a climate of self-censorship.

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"New Thinking" on Security and East-West Relations

Gerhard Wettig

Ever since Mikhail Gorbachev expounded the principles of "new thinking" at the 27th Congress of of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in February 1986, advocacy of "new thinking" has figured prominently in Soviet statements on foreign policy. The argument put forth in these statements is that "global problems" affecting all of mankind, have to be addressed and resolved. The most pressing among them is the threat of nuclear war, since it jeopardizes human survival. Soviet officials emphasize the need for a common effort to avert this global danger and profess a willingness both to accord priority to the "all-human" goal of saving mankind and to adopt an above-class approach in striving for that goal. They urge Western countries to do the same.

Do these general postulates have any ramifications? They do, especially in the area of international security where, Soviet officials say, military parity no longer represents a viable guarantee of peace. Addressing the 27th CPSU Congress, Gorbachev denounced nuclear deterrence as a threat to all countries and peoples, thereby creating the impression that the existence of nuclear weapons implied an automatic risk of nuclear war. He also argued that it was fundamentally amoral to make the populations of entire countries "nuclear hostages." Underlining that global nuclear destruction was a definite possibility as long as the two blocs continued to confront each other with nuclear armaments, he proceeded to blame "imperialism," that is, the United States and its allies, for perpetuating this situation by refusing to forsake nuclear deterrence.[1]

Under the aegis of "new thinking," Soviet officials have begun working toward a restructuring of interstate relations. They now argue that international security must be viewed from the angle that all countries are interconnected by "mutual dependence," and that therefore mutual cooperation is a necessity. They maintain that such cooperation should pertain not only in the areas of economics and technology, but in security as well. Emphasizing that no state is in a position to ensure its own security by unilateral effort and military defense, they conclude that all countries must join in an effort to seek solutions through political means. All these postulates are subsumed by the Soviets under the slogan of "common security," which Gorbachev has borrowed from the vocabulary of the Palme Commission.[2]

The General Secretary's advocacy of "new thinking" implies a fundamental revision of the traditional Marxist-Leninist doctrine as it applies both to the political and the military areas of international security. Soviet leaders, from Lenin to Chernenko, have always viewed the USSR and the Western capitalist states as political centers caught in a relationship of antagonism and struggle. If "class conflict" is to be replaced now by commonality and cooperation, this would amount to a renun-

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[1] *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 26, 1986.

[2] The Palme Commission or the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues was launched in Vienna on September 13, 1980. It was a predominantly social democratic and left liberal group with a membership consisting mostly of politicians from various parts of the world, for example, Olof Palme of Sweden (chairman), Egon Bahr of West Germany, Gro Harlem-Brundtland of Norway, David Owen of Great Britain, Joop den Uyl of the Netherlands, Cyrus Vance of the United States, Alfonso Garcia-Robles of Mexico, and Georgiy Arbatov of the Soviet Union. Its purpose was to conduct research and publish studies on such issues as the SALT process, negotiations on medium-range missiles in Europe, and problems connected with the verification of nuclear and conventional arms limitation agreements.

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ciation or, at minimum, a relativization of the previous "class approach" and "class perspective." "Peaceful coexistence" would no longer mean a specific form of anti-Western struggle. In the military domain, the concepts of "reliable security" and "reliable defense," implying the need for reliable capabilities to destroy the Western adversary in case of war, would have to be abandoned. Ultimately, a restructuring of East-West relations in all spheres would ensue.

To be sure, the General Secretary has not publicly addressed these details. It is common practice in the Soviet Union for the highest man in the Kremlin to avoid being too specific. Concretization of general concepts is generally left to other figures in government in order that the man at the top may have political leeway to reinterpret policy, should it prove necessary. Therefore, this article will analyze statements addressing the military aspect of international security by Gorbachev's trusted aides and advisers, especially those of Politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev, Minister of Defense Dmitriy Yazov, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, and Central Committee Secretary Anatoly Dobrynin, as well as those of *Pravda* editor Viktor Afanas'yev, chief of the Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, General Aleksey Lizichev, and the top functionary for West European affairs in the International Department, Vadim Zagladin

In order to shed light on the political substance of "new thinking," this article will specifically look at the statements directed at a domestic audience, particularly the party cadres in the Soviet Union. While it may be expedient for the Soviet Union to project a desired image at Westerners that is at variance with actual Soviet intentions, the Kremlin cannot afford to mislead its cadres on whom the implementation of the intended policies depends. The cadres must have correct information if they are to conduct themselves correctly.

Revising Nuclear Deterrence

At the center of Gorbachev's "new thinking" is the postulate that nuclear weapons must be eliminated. It stands in direct contradiction to the Western postulate that nuclear armaments provide a deterrent to war, since no power can afford to initiate a war that might turn nuclear. According to the Soviets, however, it is precisely the escalatory potential inherent in nuclear deterrence that constitutes a deadly threat. Soviet officials base this judgment on the assumption, hardly ever made explicit, that the unbridgeable antagonism underlying East-West relations can indeed lead to war, and that, therefore, war has to be accepted as an ever-present possibility in East-West relations. This assumption, which also leads to the Soviet definition of "reliable defense," is clearly at variance with the Soviet propaganda claim that a world "liberated from nuclear weapons" would be altogther free from violence. Moreover, although no Western country would mind renouncing nuclear deterrence if Gorbachev would offer another basis for safely preventing war and eliminating military pressure in East-West relations, the fact is that, despite claims to the contrary, the General Secretary has not actually presented an alternative.

Soviet politicians and spokesmen describe their solution to the nuclear threat in a number of ways. Among these is the statement that the size of forces and armaments must be limited to the needs of "sufficient defense." They have conceded that military asymmetries between the Warsaw Pact and NATO exist and call for their elimination. They advocate nuclear disarmament on the basis that security should be guaranteed primarily by political, rather than military means. Along similar lines, they demand that the offensive potential be eliminated, and only preparations for defense be permitted. Although they emphasize that their country accords priority to preventing war, they underline that they are fully pabilities to ward off agression should war be imposed on the Soviet Union. What is important to them, however, is that such defense be non-nuclear. In the end, they conclude that both the task of war prevention and that of defense in case of war are in full harmony with each other: a strong defensive might be the best possible means to deter an aggressor.[3] Let us look at these arguments in more detail.

The principle of sufficiency. Ever since Gorbachev first advocated the idea of "reasonable, sufficient defense" at the 18th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions in February 1987,[4] the Soviet policy line that has emerged has posited that a country's military forces should not exceed the requirements for its "sufficient" defense. This formula is reminiscent of President Richard Nixon's concept of "military sufficiency" in the early 1970's. Yet,

[3]Soviet views on issues of international security, voiced unofficially in the ongoing discussion, are more varied. Today, there appear to be three schools of thought in the Soviet Union in the emerging debate on deterrence: the "radical reformers," who seek genuine accommodation to the principle of military sufficiency and non-offensive defense; the military pragmatists, who feel that a military solution to security should not be overlooked and maintain that a Soviet offense should remain as a contigency plan; and the innovators of propaganda, who use the new vocabulary for its potential impact on the Western public. This essay, however, will only address those statements and arguments that have been translated into the official Soviet position on these issues.

[4]*Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1987.

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Nixon's concept extended to US nuclear weaponry, which, the President felt, could be maintained at a lower level than the USSR's arsenal as long as mutual nuclear deterrence was upheld. Such a rationale cannot, however, be ascribed to General Secretary Gorbachev, who vehemently rejects the notion of nuclear deterrence and limits the discussion of deterrence to conventional weapons only.

What, then, is the Soviet criterion of sufficiency? So far, Gorbachev and his aides have not said directly how much military potential they deem sufficient for the USSR's defense. They have, however, made some statements that are relevant to this question. For example, in 1987, the Secretary General himself stated that "the military equilibrium" must be "preserved at the level of reasonable sufficiency."[5] His statement implied that such an equilibrium had already been achieved, and that, therefore, the existing correlation of military forces had to be maintained. Although Gorbachev also acknowledged that a number of asymmetries existed, he argued that these were to be found on both sides, and could and had to be corrected. The implication was that, on the whole, the military forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO were approximately equal; hence, in order to maintain this equilibrium, if either side were to undertake a disproportionately large reduction of its forces in some particular sector, the other side would have to match these cuts with reductions elsewhere in its military forces.

Gorbachev's line of argumentation was echoed and expanded upon by other Soviet spokesmen, with the exception of Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev—who was altogether unwilling to concede military asymmetries.[6] The most authoritative and detailed statement came from Defense Minister Yazov, who made explicit what the General Secretary had only hinted at: the existence of some disproportions on both sides did not necessarily "undermine the general military equilibrium." As an example of such disproportions, Yazov cited the Warsaw Pact's advantage over the West in tanks (as Brezhnev had already done), and NATO's superior numbers in bombers, artillery and anti-tank systems.[7] He gave the impression, however, that if such disproportions were to be eliminated, it was the West that would have to cut more of its military potential.

The premise that correction of military asymmetries had to be undertaken by both sides led the Soviets to conclude that reductions can be agreed upon solely on the basis of reciprocity. Hence they postulated that NATO would automatically cut its military forces to meet any sacrifice in forces undertaken by Warsaw Pact countries in order that the correlation of military forces could be maintained at a lower level.[8] In keeping with this philosophy, the Soviets have described their underlying goal to be one of optimizing the relationship to be established between production and defense needs.[9]

Still, the Soviets emphasized that the importance of keeping a correlation in military forces has by no means been diminished.[10] This seemed to contradict previous assertions that security should be based increasingly on political, not military, means. Seen in the context of Soviet dialectics, however, there is no contradiction. As the Soviets have expressly stated, there is "no reliable alternative to political measures in the realm of security," although the "military component" continues to retain its full "importance in the cause of guaranteeing the security of the two conflicting sides," "certain changes" notwithstanding.[11] They understand the presumed "shift in thought and action in the international arena" to mean that "presently, it is no longer possible to guarantee security by perfecting the shield and sword;" what is needed instead is a diplomacy of disarmament.[12] This conclusion fits in well with the repeated Soviet statements that international security must be based on an East-West arms reduction and on a reorganization of the interstate system that would permanently put aside a confrontational posture by the two sides, and that security must be all-encompassing.

Considering the explanations offered by Soviet spokesmen, it would seem that the Kremlin's concept of security does not imply a departure from the traditional emphasis on military power. The Soviets stress that military factors have to be seen in an essentially political context. They feel that political relations, notably arms negotiations, can both make the maintenance of military power less costly and help to bring about appropriate changes in the international system. At the same time, appeals to strengthen the vigilance and the fighting power of military forces are as frequent today as they were in the past. This seem to indicate that the Soviets essentially view negotiations as a means of relieving the

[5]*Pravda*, Apr. 11, 1987.

[6]Sergey Akhromeyev, "The Great Victory," *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), May 9, 1987.

[7]Dmitriy Yazov, "On the Military Balance of Forces and Missile-Nuclear Parity," *Pravda*, Feb. 8, 1988.

[8]Yevgeniy Primakov has elaborated with great clarity on this view in "The New Philosophy of Domestic Politics," *Pravda*, July 10, 1987. See also Yazov, loc. cit., and Yazov's speech as reported in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Aug. 8, 1987; Petr Lushev, "Guarding the Achievements of the Revolution," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'* (Moscow), No. 8, 1987, pp. 67–68.

[9]Primakov, loc. cit.

[10]P. Skorodenko, "Military Parity and the Principle of Reasonable Sufficiency," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* (Moscow), No. 10, 1987, p. 16.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Akhromeyev, "The Great Victory."

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burden of armament without detriment to their military power relative to the West.

An alarming phenomenon is the crucial emphasis placed on the need for instant combat readiness. The Soviets now argue that the present stage of development in military technology makes a sudden attack by the enemy possible. Thus, while it was possible in earlier periods to allow for some time to put troops on a war footing, Soviet troops must now be in a constant state of readiness for war.[13] Underlying these arguments is a military concept that the Soviets have made operational during the past five years, namely, the TVD's (*teatry voyennykh deystviy*, or military groupings that comprise all the services in a given theater under unified wartime command) that anticipate wartime organization in peacetime so that no conversion to combat requirements will be necessary in the event of war. Today, the largest TVD is the TVD West under Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, which extends from the Northern Arctic Sea to Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

A defensive military posture. Since the late 1970's, the political Left in large parts of Western Europe, most notably in West Germany, has increasingly espoused the idea of limiting military capabilities to defensive war. It has argued that preparedness for defense alone would provide for mutual East-West security, since neither side would be able to jeopardize the other's existence, but would be assured that it could defend itself in the event of being attacked (which would be most unlikely in objective terms but might be subjectively perceived as possible).

The Warsaw Pact professed formally its willingness to adopt this idea in its East Berlin Declaration of May 29, 1987, in which it postulated that military forces should be so structured as to allow for only defensive action. In doing so, the Warsaw Pact appeared to imply that its military potential was already limited to defensive measures, or at the very least, the Eastern forces would be in

[13]See, for example, Lushev, "Guarding the Achievements . . . ," p. 14; A. Gribkov in an interview in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Sept. 25, 1987; Yazov, "Restructuring in the Work of Military Cadres," *Voyenno-istoricheskiy Zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 7, 1987, p. 5.

Mikhail Gorbachev with Wojciech Jaruzelski during the May 1987 Warsaw Pact Summit in East Berlin.

—Bossu/Sygma.

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the future. The question raised by the Declaration was whether NATO would also be willing to adopt a defensive posture. Pressing for such an outcome, the Warsaw Pact proposed a diplomatic dialogue designed to ensure that structural defense prevailed in Europe.

The Warsaw Pact's proposal was based on an earlier statement by Gorbachev calling for a reduction of conventional weapons by both sides for the express purpose of "excluding the possibility of a sudden attack."[14] The General Secretary, however, was not the first to speak out publicly in favor of such reductions. Earlier, Marshal Akhromeyev had advocated military cuts, whose extent would be dictated by a mutual resolve to allow only for conventional armaments that fulfilled the requirements for sufficient defense; nuclear weapons were to be altogether eliminated.[15] Neither Gorbachev nor Akhromeyev, however, explained how the principle of military defense was to be implemented in practice. During the subsequent public discussion, two different views on that subject emerged.

On the one hand, there was the traditional view that the USSR's military orientation is defensive because of the socialist nature of the country, which guarantees by definition that all policies promoted by that state are peaceful and defensive. According to adherents of this view, it is Western "imperialism" that continually threatens the USSR with military aggression; hence, should a war break out, its obvious cause will be "imperialism's" aggressive intentions against which the Soviet Union will be merely defending itself. Moreover, regardless of which kind of military action the USSR will see fit to pursue in the situation, it will strictly serve the purpose of defending the socialist homeland.[16] However, as Defense Minister Yazov concluded, the principle of defense does not imply a "passive character" of military operations.[17] One of his deputies added that the USSR had to "meet all forms and kinds of armed struggle that might be employed by the adversary."[18] Clearly, the traditional Soviet emphasis on a strategic theater offensive in the interests of defending the homeland continues to be upheld by this group, but now it is done so in the name of both the principle of military defense and Gorbachev's "new thinking."

On the other hand, there emerged the view that defense is defined in military, as opposed to political, terms. Thus, for example, two Soviet authors without official standing were granted permission to discuss the benefits of strategic defense in an article on the Battle of Kursk of 1943.[19] Moreover, Akhromeyev's deputy, Marshal Makhmut Gareyev, was allowed to raise the question of how military operations should be conducted and to speak at an international press conference in favor of defensive operations as "the Soviet forces' basic mode of action in repelling aggression." Gareyev called for "zones of reduced armament concentration" designed to deny both sides the "means and conditions for sudden attack and for development of offensive action."[20] At one point, Defense Minister Yazov also sided with the idea that the principle of defense had to be put into practice by appropriate military measures. To this end, he advocated the elimination of military asymmetries.[21]



Soviet Army Chief of Staff Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev addressing a news conference in Moscow in January 1988; in the background a chart illustrates a three-phase Soviet project for nuclear disarmament.

—Reuters/Bettman Newsphotos.

[14] *Pravda*, Apr. 11, 1987.

[15] *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Feb. 12, 1987.

[16] Ibid.; Lushev, "Guarding the Achievements . . . ," p. 69; Akhromeyev, "The Great Victory"; Yazov, "The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact—a Doctrine for Defending Peace and Socialism," *Pravda*, July 27, 1987.

[17] Yazov, "The Military Doctrine. . . ."

[18] Lushev, "Guarding the Achievements. . . ," p. 66.

[19] A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov, "The Battle of Kursk in Light of the Contemporary Defensive Doctrine," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* (Moscow), No. 8, 1987, p. 32.

[20] Statements by Makhmut Gareyev at a press conference of the Foreign Ministry as reported in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, June 23, 1987.

[21] Yazov, *Pravda*, July 27, 1987.

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The import of both Gareyev's and Yazov's suggestions lies in the kind of military change they recommend. According to an assessment by NATO's military experts, realization of such proposals would have the effect of enhancing, not reducing, the offensive capabilities of Warsaw Pact forces. For example, if NATO were to give up its alleged military advantage in fighter bombers, anti-tank weapons and other military systems, as well as to accept naval parity in the North Atlantic, the Warsaw Pact could well see an improvement in its chances for initiating a successful offensive in the European theater, even if the Eastern forces were to have fewer tanks than they do now. Furthermore, Gareyev's and Yazov's suggestions include a greater Soviet emphasis on instant combat readiness which, after all, is an essential condition for launching a sudden attack.

Reliable defense. In the wake of Gorbachev's "new thinking," the principles of sufficiency and defense are equated with "reliable security" and "reliable defense." In the pre-Gorbachev period, these same formulas clearly stood for a concept that reserved for the USSR the capability to wage war. At that time, Soviet officials argued that the Soviet Union, if threatened by military aggression from the West, had to face the contingency of a East-West war, and, therefore, had to be prepared for it. They maintained that security had to be "reliable," i.e., to be assured even in the event of war with the Western adversary. They drew three practical conclusions from this premise:

- The Western enemy had to be stopped at the borders of the Warsaw Pact countries and had to be instantly pushed back into the depth of its own territory; therefore, a strategic offensive in the European theater was necessary.
- The "aggressor's aggression" had to be terminated by destroying the aggressor; hence, Soviet military superiority was required in the European theater.
- The Soviet homeland had to be spared from massive destruction, if military victory in the battlefield was to make sense; hence, NATO had to be denied the deterrent option of nuclear escalation.

Open advocacy by the Soviets of the need to guarantee "reliable" security by developing a military capability to wage war against NATO and to remove the US presence in Western Europe fully corresponded to the military measures taken by the Soviet Union since the mid-1960's. The USSR sought both military superiority and offensive capability in Europe, while its war planning was designed for conventional operations and for a maximum assurance that NATO would not make use of its nuclear weaponry.[22]



Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov speaking on the INF treaty.

--Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

Under the aegis of Gorbachev's "new thinking," does the term "reliable" presently used convey a different meaning? Although it may, a definitive answer demands analysis of recent official explanations concerning the practical requirements for "reliable security" and "reliable defense." The first to set the tone of official Soviet pronouncements on the subject was Defense Minister Yazov, who declared that, in the event of war, the enemy must be given a "devastating response." Feeling that sufficient capabilities for the purpose were available, he warned the USSR's potential adversaries not to test Soviet strength. Interestingly enough, the Defense Minister appeared to make a distinction between the kind of response that would ensue in case of a conventional war and the kind that would follow in case of nuclear aggression. His harsh pronouncement on devastating the enemy apparently applied strictly to the contingency of a conventional war in Europe. In case of a nuclear con-

[22]Phillip A. Petersen and John G. Hines, "The Conventional Offensive in Soviet Theater Strategy," *Orbis* (Philadephia), Fall 1983, pp. 695–739; John G. Hines/Phillip A. Petersen/Notra Trulock III, "Soviet Military Theory from 1945–2000: Implications for NATO," *The Washington Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Fall 1986, pp. 117–37; Michael McGwire, *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1986, pp. 13–66, 379–405.

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frontation, however, Yazov foresaw "unacceptable damage" for the aggressor.[23]

The character of military actions in the event of war is occasionally spelled out in greater detail in official writings. For example, as already noted, Yazov specifies that operations should not be "passive" but should correspond to Lenin's teachings on defending the revolution.[24] In Soviet terminology, this means that military action is not to be only defensive but offensive as well. Others say that military operations should be "decisive" and "active,"[25] and that the Warsaw Pact forces have to be prepared to strike "with extraordinary decisiveness."[26] Indeed, the ultimate Soviet goal in war is basically defined as "smashing" the Western enemy.[27]

Such statements seem to indicate that the pre-Gorbachev theory, which held that the USSR had to have sufficient military capabilities to destroy the Western opponent on his own territory, continues to be espoused under the rubric of Gorbachev's "new thinking." This conclusion is supported by the fact that, to date, there is no discernible change in the orientation of the Soviet military, which continues to direct it efforts toward acquiring military superiority and offense options against NATO forces. If the General Secretary also supports this orientation, as one may assume, then it follows that the reason why he stepped up the Kremlin's anti-nuclear campaign is because he views the USSR's chances of exploiting its advantage in Europe in terms of conventional military potential as hinging on how successful the Soviets are in depriving NATO of its options to counter any Soviet threat by nuclear escalation.

Additional insight into how the Soviet leadership views the West's nuclear escalatory power can be found in its reaction to the INF agreement of December 8, 1987. Both the General Secretary and his Foreign Minister have hailed the accord as a political instrument that substantially downgrades both NATO's nuclear option and the US presence in Europe.[28] The Kremlin considers such an achievement as crucial for making war in Europe wageable again. This conclusion has been confirmed by Gorbachev himself when he argued that, in contrast to conventional weapons, which can be instrumentalized for political purposes, nuclear arms are "irrational."[29] In other words, the Soviet leadership realizes that, as long as Western nuclear deterrence continues to exist, the Soviet Union cannot use war, or the threat of war, as an instrument of policy because this would risk nuclear war. The Soviet desire to do away with NATO's deterrence can therefore be interpreted as an attempt to reintroduce the factor of East-West war into international relations.

Since the Soviet leadership has traditionally viewed the correlation of forces as determining international relations, it is highly likely that, in their perception, being able to risk war constitutes a crucial political factor in those relations. If the Soviet Union were to become capable of fighting a war in Europe without undue risk to itself and with a prospect of military success, while NATO could not, then the implied threat alone of physically destroying Western Europe would become sufficient to alter decisively the political relationship between East and West in favor of the Soviet Union. Under such circumstances, the Kremlin would be able to exert political pressure on the West Europeans by intimating that a war-threatening situation would arise if Soviet wishes were disregarded. West Europeans could become increasingly dependent on Soviet approval of their policies. It should be noted that Soviet spokesmen make occasional references to Lenin's prediction that victory can, and should, be achieved "through renunciation of the use of force."[30]

The Soviet concept of deterrence. The Kremlin had traditionally stressed the need for "reining in imperialism." Under the aegis of "new thinking," this term is being increasingly replaced by "constraint" or "deterrence" of the aggressor (*sderzhivaniye agressora*). Since the word "sderzhivaniye" is also used to describe the Western concept of nuclear deterrence, some Western observers have concluded that the Gorbachev leadership adheres to more or less the same idea of war prevention as NATO. What these observers fail to note is that the word "aggressor" as used by the Soviets continues to be synonymous with the Western alliance. Therefore, constraining or deterring the aggressor today

[23]Yazov, "Military Doctrine. . . ."

[24]Ibid.

[25]G. Kostev, "Our Military Doctrine in the Realm of Political Thought," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 17, 1987, p. 14.

[26]See the interview with Gribkov in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Sept. 25, 1987.

[27]Akhromeyev, "The Great Victory"; Kostev, "Our Military Doctrine," p. 11.

[28]Gorbachev's address to the CC Plenum on February 18, 1988, as published in *Pravda*, Feb. 19, 1988; "The First Real Result of Restructuring," an editorial in *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, No. 2, 1988, pp. 3–5. The English language version published in *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 2, 1988, is totally different and does not contain the remarks quoted. Arkadiy Shevchenko, who was a high official in the Soviet foreign ministry, has said that the foreign minister himself edits *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*; see his *Breaking With Moscow*, New York, Knopf, 1985.

[29]Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroyka i Novoye Myshleniye dlya Nashey Strany i Dlya Vsego Mira* (Restructuring and New Thinking for Our Country and For the Entire World), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1987, pp. 143–44.

[30]A. Akhtamzian, "The Historic Experience of Socialist Countries in the Struggle for the Resolution of Basic Problems in World Politics," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, No. 1, 1987, p. 59.

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means precisely the same thing as did "reining in imperialism" in the past. In both cases, deterrence is directed exclusively against the West.

The fundamental difference between the Soviet concept of deterrence and NATO's idea of war prevention lies in the fact that deterrence is defined by the Soviets as unilateral, not mutual, since allegedly only the West can be the aggressor. As Akhromeyev put it, "the forces of the Warsaw Pact are presently one of the principal factors that constrains the aggressive designs of the reactionary circles of imperialism and that is a guarantor of international security."[31] The Soviets maintain that this deterrent must be a conventional one, since no useful political purpose can be served by "irrational" nuclear weapons. They hint on occasion that the best possible deterrent is having the capacity to destroy the aggressor in the event of war. Therefore, their official axiom has become making the Soviet forces as powerful as possible to ensure maximum anti-Western deterrence: "The higher their [i.e., Soviet troops] preparedness for combat, the lower is the likelihood that the aggressor will decide to embark on a nuclear adventure."[32]

"Imperialism" is seen by the Soviets as forcing the USSR to strengthen its military potential so that it is at the level of sufficiency necessary for repelling an aggression because "nothing would have protected the Socialist Community and mankind as a whole from another world war."[33] Indeed, it is the official viewpoint that the USSR's military strength prevents the "imperialists" in the West from making war and jeopardizing mankind's existence.

Restructuring the International System

In the political realm, the lead term in the Soviet vocabulary is "common security." According to this concept, all countries are to enjoy security on the basis of a new international order that would ensure that such principles of international law as non-intervention and respect for sovereign rights be universally observed. The Soviets maintain that practical implementation of "common security" must be sought within the framework of a "system of all-encompassing security," that is, a system which includes all countries and extends to all spheres of mutual interest. The creation of such a system is presented by them as being particularly imperative in Europe. Let us also look at these arguments in detail.

[31]Akhromeyev, "The Great Victory."
[32]Lushev, "Guarding the Achievements . . . ," pp. 66–68.
[33]Skorodenko, "Military Parity . . . ," p. 15.

The all-encompassing security system. Expressing concern over the international situation, which it considers to be dangerous—at least in principle—given the confrontationist structure of East-West relations, the Soviet leadership has propounded a new solution to the situation, a "system of all-encompassing security," notably in Europe. The creation of such a system would be tantamount to fulfilling the Soviet demand, recurring since 1954, that a "system of European security" or a "system of collective security" be established in Europe. It would imply an elimination of both the US presence and NATO cohesion with the consequence, thought natural by the Soviets, that the USSR's power would extend to all of Europe. In the Kremlin's perception, the ultimate result would be a decisive shift in the correlation of world forces that would pave the way for an end to US influence in many parts of the world.

Seeking to attract support for their plans from the West Europeans, Gorbachev and his aides have been talking about a "common European home." When asked what this means in practice, particularly with respect to the European-American relationship, they either decline to answer, or else speak in evasive terms. Observers who tend to see Soviet policies in a positive light usually interpret this imprecision as an indication that Soviet officials have not yet clarified this new idea in their own minds. Others, however, are inclined to think that Soviet views are being deliberately expressed in veiled terms; that, in fact, the Kremlin is sending its Western European audience an emotional anti-US and anti-NATO message, purposely hidden behind the concept of a "common European home" so as to avoid outright criticism and rejection of it. Their interpretation of Soviet goals seems to be more consistent with what the Soviet leadership apparently hopes to achieve through its own version of defense and deterrence, namely, neutralizing Western Europe under the auspices of all-Europeanism so that the West can finally be deprived of the political foundation on which its military security on the continent rests.

Security and the class perspective. In the autumn of 1987, Gorbachev began promoting the idea of de-ideologizing "interstate relations."[34] Although this seems to apply only to inter-governmental exchanges, since Gorbachev also refers to the "societal" dimension of international relations, some effort at pragmatic and non-antagonistic behavior appears to have been made.

This impression is strengthened by continuous Soviet assertions that an "all-human" approach must take precedence over others in policy-making. Indeed, Soviet

[34]Gorbachev, op. cit., p. 146.

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spokesmen maintain that all Kremlin policies are now governed by this approach and that the West should follow suit. Thus, in the international security sphere, they point out that the USSR's effort to "liberate" the world from nuclear weapons and to eliminate the danger of a nuclear holocaust corresponds to the interests of all mankind, irrespective of class position and political persuasion; by contrast, NATO's decision to maintain a strategy that is based on the availability of the nuclear option is in conflict with the all-human need to get rid of nuclear arsenals.

Their argument is that NATO's strategy is dictated by "class blindness" and "class hatred,"[35] that the West purportedly sacrifices peace to anti-Sovietism by promoting nuclear deterrence. Soviet policies, however, are alleged to be fully consonant with the requirements of peace, and peace corresponds to the highest class interests of socialism. "Imperialism," they conclude, appears incapable of "reaching such an all-human and high level."[36]

There is an interesting nuance in this portrayal. On the one hand, Soviet officials maintain that their commitment to peace through the elimination of the nuclear factor from East-West relations goes beyond class considerations. On the other hand, they present this very commitment as serving the class interest that the Soviet Union promotes in its struggle against the West. As one author puts it, the issue of peace is linked to a "huge class potential for explosion," since it provides a basis on which a "struggle against the criminal war policy of imperialism" can be waged. Socialism, which rejects war by virtue of its social nature, is the principal supporter of peace and the only political force capable of solving the problem of human survival. Consequently, the problem of human survival can be only solved through a "solution of the contradiction between the forces of peace and the forces of war," i.e., through a struggle between the Soviet camp and the West. Naturally, the author displays confidence that the outcome will be in the USSR's favor, and assigns to Soviet diplomacy the task of finding a "solution to the problems of international security."[37]

The underlying premise is that the Kremlin's policies provide the only possible hope of protecting mankind from nuclear disaster. It is derived from the Marxist-Leninist axiom that the world is inexorably progressing toward socialism. Accordingly, the West is blamed for seeking "to eternalize its rule and to oppose the progressing course of history,"[38] i.e., for seeking to maintain its political existence against the onslaught of pro-Soviet forces. Since anti-Western political change is accepted as an inevitable trend of history, Western leaders are accused of resorting to military force to stem the tide of social change in a convulsive effort at self-preservation. Clearly, then, the West is the source of all wars. Moreover, given the military strength and the favorable geostrategic position of the USSR and its allies, the West's hopes of preventing socialist countries from neutralizing its use of military means in support of its class interests rest on nuclear weapons. Hence, NATO's strategy of nuclear deterrence is stigmatized as a class policy which must be denounced as a "policy of confrontation" fraught with extreme danger for all mankind, given "the possibilities and the character of today's weapons."

Thus, Soviet logic implies that struggles against the West, for socialist class interests, and for the survival of mankind necessarily become one and the same. Hence the Soviets conceive of the resolution of global problems on which Gorbachev now focuses his attention as being part of the process of the struggle against the West. At the same time, they attempt to exploit the political potential of forces in the West which press for the inclusion of global problems on the political agenda of their countries, since these forces are seen as allies in the Soviet campaign against the United States and NATO. Claiming that socialism is mankind's only hope of survival, they attempt to persuade the Western public that the "solution of social problems" must also be seen as a crucial "step to the solution of all-human problems" because the "revolutionary struggle of the working class" is also the "way to solving problems concerning the fate of all mankind."[39]

Soviet spokesmen expressly point out that global problems, most notably those of nuclear weapons and their perilous consequences, cannot be considered outside of social and class relations since these problems have class reasons, i.e., they are linked to the alleged vices inherent in the Western system. This argument posits that an "abyss" exists "between imperialism and the majority of the planet's population," and

[35]*Dmitriy Luzhkov, "The Difficult Lessons of New Thinking," Sovetskaya Rossiya,* Jan. 9, 1987.

[36]See Eduard Shevardnadze's address to the 27th CPSU Congress on March 1, 1986, as published in *Pravda,* Mar. 2, 1986.

[37]The quotes are from N. Yermoshkin, "Peaceful Coexistence—the Universal Norm of International Relations," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn',* No. 5, 1987.

[38]The quotation are taken from Shevardnadze's address to the 27th CPSU Congress on March 1, 1986. The underlying concept can be deduced both from this speech and Gorbachev's speech before the same Congress on February 25, 1986.

[39]Vadim Zagladin, "Programmatic Goals of the CPSU and Global Problems," *Voprosy Istorii* (Moscow), No. 2, 1986, p. 7 (an official commentary on the CPSU Party Program drafted in preparation for the 27th CPSU Congress).

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Participants of the International Forum "For a Nuclear-Weapons-Free-World, For the Survival of Humanity" listening to Mikhail Gorbachev in the Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow on February 16, 1988.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

that this abyss provides a compelling incentive for the people in the West to become involved in the "struggle against imperialism, and for peace and social progress."[40] Giving priority to above-class interests consists of maintaining that the class approach of their position is above-class. Hence, in practical terms, de-ideologizing interstate relations as postulated by "new thinking" has come to mean that the rationale behind NATO's nuclear deterrent, i.e., political and military self-preservation, must be discarded because it is an ideological expression of bourgeois class interest. Soviet appeals for a common front against NATO's policies, however, must be seen as non-ideological and be taken at face value. Such a protrayal is, of course, highly ideological in and of itself, and the Soviet leadership is well aware of this, as is indicated by its rejection of "naked pragmatism,"[41] its admission that "new thinking" has a class character,[42] and its call for an "ideologically pure" handling of foreign policy.[43]

Interdependence. Gorbachev's thesis that a class and an above-class approach in Soviet policies are identical is rooted in Lenin's idea of interdependence. Gorbachev does not understand the term to mean simply that East and West depend on each other and hence should develop a cooperative relationship; instead, he propounds the "concept of an interconnected and interdependent, a contradictory and simultaneously an essentially holistic world" which can "either rise together or perish together."[44] His definition of interdependence includes the Marxist-Leninist axiom that East and West are caught in a "contradictory," i.e., irrecon-

[40]"The Milestone Achievement of Contemporary Marxist-Leninist Thought (Part I)," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 6, 1986, pp. 12–13. Parts II–IV appear in Nos. 7–9 respectively.

[41]"The First Real Result of Restructuring," loc. cit.

[42]Gorbachev's address to Soviet social science cadres on October 1, 1986, as published in *Pravda*, Oct. 2, 1986.

[43]Shevardnadze's address to the Foreign Ministry cadres on May 3, 1987 as published in *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del* (Moscow), Aug. 5, 1987, p. 3.

[44]"The Dialectics of New Thinking," *Kommunist*, No. 18, 1987, pp. 4–5 (explanation given in reference to Gorbachev's book, *Perestroyka*. . . .) .

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cilably antagonistic, relationship.[45] It also includes Lenin's idea that the two hostile classes are mutually dependent on each other and closely connected with one another, even as they are simultaneously involved in a struggle against each other. According to Lenin, there are only two possible outcomes to this situation: either a "revolutionary restructuring of the whole society" under socialism or a "common annihilation of the struggling classes."[46]

Significantly, the present Soviet leadership still postulates that a socialist victory is the only positive outcome, and dismisses any possibility that the Western system might gain the upper hand. In the opinion of Kremlin officials, if socialism were to be ultimately prevented from fulfilling its world mission, it would only be because the West had sufficient military strength to use brute force to destroy the socialist order. They maintain that such a victory for the West is not a realistic prospect. Moreover, the introduction of the Western system throughout the world is absolutely inconceivable, since that system's political existence is doomed by history. As they point out, under such circumstances, all that the West would be able to achieve would be a massive destruction. Thus, if, as preordained by history, the USSR's Western enemy were to prove too strong to be defeated, then there would be a very strong possibility of mutual annihilation.

While Lenin's concept of class conflict was related to the struggle he foresaw in pre-1917 Russia, this concept has been now transformed into that of the "international class struggle" between the Soviet Union and the United States, and their respective allies. Soviet justification for this derives from another of Lenin's dicta. Lenin is thought to have anticipated that destruction due to a war would be so extensive one day as to threaten the very existence of mankind.[47] Today, Soviet spokesmen espousing Gorbachev's "new thinking" claim that nuclear weapons have made Lenin's prediction come true. Basing themselves on the Marxist-Leninist axiom that class struggle cannot cease until the socialist revolution has abolished the Western system on a worldwide scale, they argue that there is no solution to the nuclear problem other than a decisive effort to deprive the West of this dangerous instrument. They conclude that since class reconciliation between East and West is not a viable possibility, the class enemy must be denied this destructive instrument by means of which he defends his position.

This view is reflected in the Soviet postulate that the class approach cannot be abandoned in dealing with the nuclear threat, for this threat results from the "militaristically inclined circles of the dominating class" in the West. In the Soviet view, it is necessary to use this situation to achieve the "material and spiritual self-discredit" of Western society, while, at the same time, making certain that the "cause of progress in the world and of struggle to prevent a nuclear disaster" is firmly linked to the USSR and its political order.[48] Hence, in order to establish a "dialectical unity between the all-human and the socialist causes" the "historic mission of the working class and the future of mankind" has to be closely intertwined.[49]

Reshaping Foreign Policy

The General Secretary has himself explained what he means by thinking "in a new way": "The present processes must not be promoted by the old formulas. New conclusions must be drawn that reflect today's dialectics of life." Emphasizing the need for truth and realism in decision-making, he has stressed that "efficient solutions to problems" can be found only on this basis. In his opinion, discussion and reconsideration are indispensable for establishing the truth, which cannot be taken a priori for granted.

While Gorbachev's approach may strike some as innovative in that it no longer defines truth on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, such an interpretation misreads the General Secretary's intent. To his mind, Marxist dialectics and the world view contained in Leninist doctrine represent the foundation on which all theory and practice is based.[50] Clearly, it is not the basic doctrine that Gorbachev opens to reconsideration and discussion, but practical choices that are to be made on the basis of that doctrine. Such a reading of Gorbachev's meaning

[45]The thesis of fundamental hostility between East and West is cautiously but unequivocally included in public statements, which usually characterize the relationship as a "main contradiction" (*glavnoye protivorechiye*), as "competition" (*sorevnovaniye*), a "rivalry" (*sopernichestvo*) or an "antagonism" (*antagonizm*). All these terms basically amount to what Gorbachev has bluntly expressed in private: the West is the "enemy" with whom the USSR is involved in a relentless struggle. See Gorbachev's address to Soviet writers on June 19, 1986, whose text has reached the West from two independent sources and was subsequently published in *L'Unità* (Rome) and *La Repubblica* (Rome) on Oct. 7, 1986.

[46]Vladimir I. Lenin, *Polnoye Sobraniye Sochineniy* (Complete Collection of Works), 5th ed., Vol. 26, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1961, pp. 55, 59.

[47]Ibid., Vol. 36 (1962), pp. 396–97; Nadezhda Krupskaya, *On Lenin*, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1960, pp. 40–41.

[48]For the quotations, see "The Dialectics of New Thinking," pp. 5–7.

[49]M. P. Mchedlov, *Sotsializm—stanovleniye novogo tipa tsivilizatsii* (Socialism—Establishing a New Type of Civilization), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1980, pp. 102–04. Mchedlov is the originator of the present-day concept of interdependence.

[50]Gorbachev's address to Soviet social science cadres, *Pravda*, Oct. 2, 1986.

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appears to be confirmed by Gorbachev himself who defines "new thinking" as a "methodology" of action.[51] In other words, he sees "new thinking" as a a new way of applying fixed principles. He extends innovation only to methods, not to substance.

The premise that new thinking is meant to provide a new mode of translating old principles into practice is made explicit in the authoritative statement published in *Kommunist*: "to think and to act in a new way means to think and to act in the way of Lenin: with a genuinely revolutionary impetus and with a feeling of historical responsibility and realism, taking as a point of departure for every action the interests of the working people, conceptualizing creatively the characteristics of the new stage of development, and on this basis formulating a clear program of practical action which is capable of motivating the masses and mobilizing all forces of the party and the people." The fundamental orientation of Soviet policy is based on "Leninist thought"; "in every phase of history the general principles of Marxism-Leninism become relevant in a new way," and "present themselves from new angles and concretely and adequately resonate the times."[52]

Recently, Soviet spokesmen have used several practical examples to illustrate how "new thinking" functions. The message of these examples is that it is imperative to adapt to changing realities so as to preserve and maximize the gains of both the Soviet Union and the cause of socialism. Thus, Lenin's decision to accept the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk in early 1918 is seen by these spokesmen as an exemplary case of "new thinking" because, all Soviet territorial sacrifices notwithstanding, "compromise" with the then threatening German Reich was necessary to save Soviet power.[53] They also portray Lenin as practicing "new thinking" when, a few months later, he sought to exploit the revolutionary potential of the colonial and semicolonial countries in an effort to compensate for the unrealized revolution in the West.[54] A more recent example which bears the mark of "new thinking" is the INF Treaty of December 1987, since the Kremlin chose to conclude the agreement based on a realistic assessment of the situation. The USSR's principal interests, such as weakening the US presence in Europe and inducing a shift in the military balance in Soviet favor, took precedence over secondary interests.[55]

Conclusion

"New thinking" as practiced under Gorbachev serves a specific political need. The Soviet leadership is impressed by the continuing ability of capitalism to prolong its existence, despite signs of "a deepening general crisis," which have been pointed out time and again. As Gorbachev explained at the 27th CPSU Congress, the West remains capable of defending the "social status quo" in the world and can even seek to "take social revenge", i.e. to "regain what has been lost" to socialism.[56] Equally important, he emphasized, is that technological and social innovation are revitalizing the Western system, while economic life and social relations in the Soviet Union have reached a "pre-crisis stage," and hence require strong remedies if future crisis is to be avoided. Under such conditions, the leadership now points out, the old approach to promoting socialism in the world is no longer promising; the Soviet model has lost its attractiveness for both the countries of the Third World, and the public in Western Europe, the United States, and other developed states. The conclusion drawn is that an old-type "ideological struggle," which focuses on the benefits of socialism and the vices of the Western system, cannot be expected to have much political impact.[57]

Basing themselves on this analysis, Soviet officials have come to espouse a new approach founded on guidelines provided by Gorbachev himself. They point out that while the effort to provide for "progress in the workers' movement" of the West has failed, and the "struggle for the realization of the socialist ideal" has met with difficulties, there remains the possibility of uniting "all vanguard and progressive forces of mankind" in opposition to "the threat to the global foundations of civilization" presented by imperialism's growing aggressiveness.[58] Accordingly, communism can link "the struggle for peace with the revolutionary struggle of the working class for social liberation" by championing "mankind's progressive goals" in an effort to mobilize "the total effort of will of the majority of the Earth's population." In this manner, world unity based on the spiritual values of Marxism-Leninism is to result. The driving force for this unity is to be the world revolutionary process which the Soviets see as identical with the communist movement. Soviet officials explicitly state that

[51]Gorbachev's address to the International Peace Forum in Moscow on February 17, 1987, as published in *Pravda*, Feb. 18, 1987.

[52]"The Milestone Achievement . . . ," p. 5.

[53]A. Akhtamzian/N. Kapchenko, "The Break-Through," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, No. 3, 1988, pp. 40–41.

[54]"The Milestone Achievement . . . ," p. 9.

[55]"The First Real Result of Restructuring," p. 5.

[56]*Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1986.

[57]For detailed comment on the situation based on the guidelines provided by Gorbachev, see I. Antonovich, "The Dialectics of the Integral World," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, No. 4, 1988, pp. 46–54.

[58]Ibid., p. 52.

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antagonism between socialism and capitalism will continue to exist as it did before, thus leaving no doubts as to the anti-Western character of the intended dynamics.[59]

That "new thinking" encompasses an anti-Western political struggle is indicated in the revised CPSU Program of 1986, which enumerates the forces forming the "anti-imperialist front." Whereas in Lenin's days, the "anti-imperialist forces" consisted of the Soviet Union and the communist parties in other countries, and in Khrushchev's time they also included the "liberation forces" of the Third World, the recent revised party program approved in 1986 has added the anti-war movement in Western countries as a new force to be exploited in the struggle against the West. Since then, the concept of using Western anti-nuclearism and pacifism has been broadened to include all groups within the new social movement (anti-nuclearists, pacifists, environmentalists, proponents of aid to the Third World, advocates of a new world economic order, etc.), as well as "reasonable" forces within the political establishments of Western countries.

The Soviet decision to include the peace movement was based on the politicial strength displayed by that movement in the early 1980's. Since then, Soviet assessments of the "peace potential" in Western societies has become less sanguine. At the same time, communism and its program is felt to be in decline. The Kremlin believes that if it succeeds in appealing to a wider range of social groups that are perceived to be in ascendancy, it can gain new possibilities for triumphing over the West, at least in the long run. For this reason, the old-style "ideological struggle" under predominantly communist auspices has been replaced by a seemingly non-ideological form of anti-Western political competition under the heading of "new thinking." Appeals to unite energy and effort in the interests of solving mankind's "global problems," leaving aside all differences in political persuasion and ideological belief, are presently the principal means the Kremlin has decided to use in order to undermine public support for Western

[59]Ibid.

A Soviet-American peace demonstration in Moscow in July 1987; the signs read "Peace to the World" and "The Earth is Our Common Home, We Must Jointly Protect It."

—Sygma.

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policies and the NATO alliance in Western Europe and the United States.

Soviet instrumentalization of "global problems" as a political weapon against the West is reflected in the statement that the class conflict extends "directly also to the sphere of interstate relations"[60] and that ultimately "not the generally human but the social class aspects are relevant" in politics.[61] The conclusion is that the potential of "global problems" for creating considerable "dynamism in capitalist society" imposes on the Kremlin the task of "transforming the democratic mass movements in the capitalist world into one of the main driving forces of social development" in the direction of socialism.[62]

In Soviet theory and practice, foreign policy is a two-tier affair. Traditional diplomacy at the "interstate" level is complemented by efforts to mobilize political forces in Western societies in support of Soviet policies. Previously, this process was seen as an "ideological struggle" waged at the "societal" level under class auspices. Today, Gorbachev appears to be pursuing an approach designed to link the two aspects of foreign policy more closely. Not only does he substitute the seemingly non-class appeal to promote a solution to "global problems" for the traditional appeal for social change and ultimately revolution in the West, but, in a dialectical fashion, he also asserts that the "global problems" are in fact class-linked. The social issues at the "societal" level and the "interstate" problems handled by the governments are thereby tied together. On the one hand, the "internal contradictions" of the Western system lend themselves to exploitation by the Kremlin in its own diplomatic interests; on the other hand, such matters of diplomacy as international security in general and the alleged prospect of nuclear disaster in particular are used to denounce (and hence weaken) Western governments and other proponents of Western democracy who oppose an extension of the Soviet system's "social status quo".

This is the context in which the Soviets view the East-West conflict over security. In their perception, the representatives of the Western political order "continue to view the arms race as a means and an instrument of class struggle against socialism." Underlying this perception is the assessment that the West's political-military strategy, which reserves the option to use nuclear weapons, contributes crucially to the Western system's ability to counteract the political onslaught of socialism: "In this way, they [the Western leaders] seek not only to preserve their positions but also to weaken socialism and to erect insurmountable barriers on the road to social progress."[63] Nuclear deterrence is seen as preventing the USSR from making its military weight felt politically, especially in Europe. In hopes of removing this obstacle, the Soviets appeal to the "instincts of physical self-preservation" in Western countries.

The Soviet approach is portrayed as being "all-human" in character; however, it also subsumes that "the threat of common extinction does not weaken the truths of class relations in any way." Indeed, not only are "the classes and the class approach" retained,[64] but the socialist world view remains the primary political guideline. The Soviets see interdependence resulting from the interest in survival in both East and West as secondary in importance, or, to be more precise, as an instrument of "class struggle." A "dialectical" policy orientation is called for: "class struggle" against the United States and NATO must be waged not as "class struggle" but as an "above-class" effort to solve "global problems." In this fashion, the Soviet leadership expects that large sectors of the Western public, notably the new social movement and even conservative supporters of Western governments, will not be antagonized but will ally with the Soviet Union in its fight against the Western policy of nuclear deterrence, which the Soviets see as perpetuating the Western "social status quo."

[60]D. Tomashevskiy, "Lenin's Concept of Coexistence," *SShA* (Moscow), No. 4, 1986, p. 4.

[61]Zagladin, "Programmatic Goals . . . ," p. 7

[62]Ibid., p. 10.

[63]N. Kapchenko, "The Political Philosophy of Peace in the Nuclear Age," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, No. 6, 1986, p. 4.

[64]Yu. Zhdanov, "The Class and All-Human Approach in the Nuclear Age," *Pravda*, Mar. 6, 1987.

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Economic Rationale for Eastern Europe's Third World Policy

Bartłomiej Kamiński and Robert W. Janes

Until recently, the dominant tendency in analyzing the relations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania with the Third World has been to treat them in one way or another as a subset of Soviet involvement. Typically, such analyses have centered on the extent to which the activities of a given East European country are subservient to Soviet purpose. As Eastern Europe has acquired a more distinct stature in the international political arena, both as a region and as individual states, the issue of surrogacy has, however, become blurred. Relations between Eastern Europe and the Third World have become increasingly complex and diverse, raising important questions concerning not only the choice of conceptual framework but, more important, the distinction between the political and economic motivations of East European foreign policy.

Should East European involvement in the Third World be analyzed in terms of a dichotomy that contrasts (1) hierarchical behavior coordinated by Moscow with (2) self-interested, competitive foreign policy actions? In the first case, the foreign policies of East European states are presented as being tightly subordinated to the political and strategic objectives of the Soviet Union. The problem of policy diversity is, in this approach, explained by a variant of conspiracy theory: although East European foreign policies may indeed be self-interested, they are carried out according to a Moscow-prescribed master plan for the international division of foreign policy activities. In the second case, East European countries are seen to compete with the Soviet Union and with one another in order to maximize unilateral benefits.[1]

A problem further complicating analysis of the nature of East European relations with the Third World is the overlap of ideological/political considerations and economic pragmatism. Although one can point to political objectives, such as trying to reduce Western influence among the developing countries or promoting a given state's international stature, economic motivation is also evident in these relations. As has been argued elsewhere,[2] the search for new sources of hard currency and for materials of declining availability from partners in the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) has fostered the interest of smaller East European countries in developing closer ties with the Third World. Does such a pragmatic commercial approach signal relative autonomy from the Soviet Union?

The search for the correct balance between political and economic motivation is complicated by the fact that the USSR's own Third World policy has become in-

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[1]For a discussion of different perspectives, see Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Eastern Europe in World Perspective," in Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, *Communism in Eastern Europe*, 2nd ed., Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1984, pp. 8–49. See also Christopher Coker, *NATO, the Warsaw Pact and Africa*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1985; and Colin Lawson, "The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in Southern Africa: Is There a Conflict of Interest?" *International Affairs* (London), Winter 1982/1983, pp. 32–40.

[2]Istvan Dobozi, "Problems of Raw Materials Supply in Eastern Europe," *The World Economy* (Oxford, England), Vol. 1, No. 2, 1978, pp. 112–43; Bartlomiej Kamiński, "Impact of Central Planning on East-South Trade," Background Paper, World Development Report 1987, Washington, DC, The World Bank, 1986; and Roger E. Kanet, "East European States," in Thomas H. Henriksen, Ed., *Communist Powers and Sub-Saharan Africa*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1981, pp. 23–48.

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creasingly shaped by domestic economic considerations. In the view of some Western analysts, the quest for economic efficiency in acquiring raw materials has forced the Soviets to pull back from a policy of using economic ties for purely political ends and to promote the Soviet Union's own economic advantage in dealings with Third World countries.[3]

The dichotomous approach to analysis fails to give due recognition to the structural impact of the political economy of Eastern Europe on its ability to interact with the non-communist external environment. East European foreign economic policies are constrained not only by the instrumentalities of domestic economic policies but also by a host of institutional and economic characteristics of intra-CEMA relations, exemplified by the non-convertibility of the transferrable ruble used in CEMA trade. Moreover, despite variations in domestic and international circumstances, East European countries share a number of important characteristics making them a distinctive set within world politics. These include the resource-intensive character of centrally planned economies, their bias toward bilateralism in trade, and considerable economic dependency vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.[4]

The purpose of this article is to explore changes and common characteristics in revealed patterns of East European interaction with the Third World and to assess the ability of East Europeans to exploit opportunities created by Soviet inroads into the Third World. Only then is one in a position to assess the relative importance of subservience, autonomy, systemic constraints, and domestic circumstances in the policies of the East European states toward the Third World.

Early Involvement

In the 1950's and throughout much of the 1960's, East European interest in the Third World was overwhelmingly a function of the Soviet Union's policies and perceptions.[5] East European states very much followed the Soviet lead in developing relations with newly emerged states, primarily in Africa and the Middle East, many of which adopted a militant anti-Western stance in their search to match political sovereignty with economic independence. The new nations generally first established close political relations with the Soviet Union on ideological grounds, and then established ties with the East European states. Trade and assistance agreements naturally accompanied diplomatic relations, although in the case of Eastern Europe, these agreements did not achieve great or consistent volume.[6] Some states, in particular Czechoslovakia, did attempt to develop more extensive trade and aid relations, but until the early 1970's, these efforts were circumscribed and halting at best.[7]

The low level of trade with the Third World and the lack of definitive trade policies or strategies on the part of East European regimes during this period can be explained by their domestic focus on "socialist modernization" oriented toward the Soviet Union. This strategy was based on the assumption of permanent access to the Soviet resource base. As a consequence, the foreign economic activities of East Europe were largely immersed in bilateral economic relations with the Soviet Union (though, of course, there was growing interest in access to Western capital and technology).

Until the late 1960's or early 1970's, then, economic interests played no strong role in East European activity in the Third World,[8] even though arms transfers, a dominant item in East European exports to developing countries in the 1950's,[9] helped finance purchases in those countries. In marked contrast to the West, Eastern Europe was not in need of sources of supply of raw materials, because of the intra-CEMA division of labor and

[3]Giovanni Graziani, "Commercial Relations between the Developing Countries and the USSR, Recent Trends and Problems," Working Paper No. 5, University of Calabria, 1985; and Elizabeth Valkenier, *The Soviet Union and the Third World: An Economic Bind*, New York, Praeger, 1983.

[4]Andre Liebich has observed: "In what can be called an *esprit de contradiction*, some historians have been pleased to point out that the apparent heterogeneity of the area [Eastern Europe] conceals some common underlying features, or at least, features which make it distinct from Western Europe." See "Six States in Search of an Identity," *International Journal* (Toronto), Winter 1987/1988, forthcoming.

[5]For a review of major developments during this period, see Valkenier, op. cit.; and Robert and Elizabeth Bass, "Eastern Europe," in Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ed., *Africa and the Communist World*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1963, pp. 84–115.

[6]For a good example of this pattern, see R. N. "Bulgaria's Presence in Black Africa," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty (hereafter, RFE-RL), *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), RAD Background Report, RAD 92/79, April 20, 1979.

[7]The major exception to this was Czechoslovakia, which renewed some of its prewar trade ties in the 1950's. Czechoslovakia maintained a high-profile surrogate role as well, illustrated by the arms deal with Egypt in 1955. After the Soviet invasion of 1968, Czechoslovak involvement in the Third World practically ceased. There is evidence that by then, Czechoslovakia had over-extended itself in terms of loans and economic assistance. See Vratislav Pechota, "Czechoslovakia and the Third World," in Michael Radu, Ed., *Eastern Europe and the Third Worlds: East vs. South*, New York, Praeger, 1981, pp. 77–105.

[8]An exception in the case of Africa was Nigeria, where in the late 1950's, several East European countries pursued basically economic interests. Although this trade involved a wide range of products, the volume was generally very low. See Roman Stefanowski, "Poland's Presence in Black Africa," RFE-RL, *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), RAD Background Report, RAD 50/79, Mar. 1, 1979. There was also a very modest and intermittent trade with a few countries of Latin America and Asia.

[9]Robert M. Cutler, Laure Despres, and Aaron Karp, "The Political Economy of East-South Military Transfers," *International Studies Quarterly* (Guildford, Surrey), No. 3, 1987, pp. 273–99.

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the very specific "radial" pattern of integration of the East European economies with the Soviet economy that stemmed from great similarities in East European productive structures, parallelism in development of industries, and integration with the Soviet raw-material base. The global deterioration in the terms of trade of raw materials in the 1960's only increased incentives for the Soviet Union to supply such items to Eastern Europe, inasmuch as CEMA pricing mechanisms softened the impact of the declining prices on the USSR.

However, developments in world politics and the international political economy in the 1970's brought a considerable increase in East European interest in relations with developing countries. Economically, the first oil shock of 1973–74 induced a radical improvement of terms of trade for primary-commodity exporters and reduced Soviet willingness to meet the rapidly growing demand of the East European economies for energy and other resources. Locked into energy- and resource-intensive growth strategies and faced with limitations on Soviet oil deliveries, East European countries had a markedly increased self-interest in expanding economic relations with developing countries. Politically, superpower détente, combined with the post-Vietnam syndrome underlying US retrenchment in the Third World, created new opportunities for Soviet pursuit of a policy of global reach in the Third World. Soviet successes in turn gave its East European allies greatly enhanced opportunities to expand relations in the Third World. Marxist regimes came to power in Ethiopia and Afghanistan as well as in the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique. Yet, it is not clear whether the majority of East European countries perceived the increased number of pro-Soviet regimes in the Third World to be of any particular political benefit. East Germany and Romania appeared to be the exceptions in this regard.

The GDR jumped at the opportunity to advance its

Hungary's Istvan Dobi, President of the Presidential Council, greets Kwame Nhrumah, President of the Republic of Ghana, upon his arrival in Hungary for an official visit in the early 1960's.

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international legitimacy in rivalry with the FRG.[10] That political considerations outweighed economic motives is suggested by the fact that other East European countries except Czechoslovakia increased *economic* relations with the Third World at much faster rates than did East Germany. Between 1970 and 1980, East German trade turnover with the Third World increased five times, which contrasts to a Hungarian increase of 7.8 times, Bulgaria 6 times, and Poland 5.5 times. Although there is no data for Romania's trade with the less developed countries (LDC's) in 1980, already by 1975, its trade turnover with the LDC's had increased 5.2 times as compared to 1970.[11]

However, East German policy in the Third World may have brought the GDR other, indirect economic benefits. East Germany was apparently the largest recipient of Soviet implicit subsidies to Eastern Europe in the period 1970–78 and was able to secure Soviet oil supplies exceeding its domestic demand. It cannot be ruled out that Soviet supply of oil to East Germany in quantities that allowed for profitable re-export to West Germany were a reward for the GDR's actions in Africa.[12]

For Romania, too, politics long played a key role in relations with the Third World. Starting in the late 1960's, Bucharest sought to bolster its claims for autonomy within the bloc by fostering relations with the Third World, no less than with China and Western Europe. A distinctive aspect of Romania's relations with the Third World has been its courting of the Non-Aligned Movement as a fellow Third World state. Romania has articulated a detailed and coherent position toward the movement reflecting its criticism of both blocs as well as its attitudes toward developmental problems.[13] Along with its calls for the dissolution of the system of opposed political blocs, Romania has used these diplomatic opportunities to reiterate with great consistency support for the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. In marked contrast to other East European countries, it has not shied away from developing strong relations with Western-oriented regimes.[14]

Where the East German and (early) Romanian excursions in the Third World appear to have reflected mostly political considerations, it has been developments in domestic economies and in economic relations with foreign partners that have been pushing other East European states toward expanded Third World connections. The evolution of relations through the 1970's reflected a clear growth in the importance of economic motives, which gradually reduced the priority of Eastern Europe's role as political surrogate for Moscow. There was not only growth of the depth of economic ties with the Third World but necessarily an increase in the complexity and diversity in these relations.

By the end of the 1970's, commercial relations between Eastern Europe and the Third World had undergone considerable evolution. There had been a very rapid growth of the significance of Third World trade for most East European countries (see Table 1). This was evident not only for the more extreme case of Romania, but for Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland as well. The only exceptions were the two most industrialized East European countries—Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Despite their active political involvement in the Third World, the share of Third World trade in the total of these two states has been the lowest of the CEMA Six.

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[10]Détente in Europe brought an end to East Germany's diplomatic isolation imposed by the Hallstein doctrine, whereby West Germany had refused to have relations with any country recognizing East Germany. West Germany had traditionally been quite active in the Third World both as an aid donor and as an arms merchant. In 1970, only 13 countries recognized the GDR; in the two years following the signing of the Basic Treaty with the Federal Republic, over 60 countries recognized the GDR. By the end of the decade, the number had reached almost 130. See Michael Sodaro, "The GDR and the Third World: Supplicant and Surrogate," in Radu, op. cit., p. 135.

[11]Calculated from data in Carl H. McMillan, *Multinationals from the Second World*, London, McMillan, 1987.

[12]The GDR received subsidies totaling US$11.2 billion, compared to $6.5 billion for Czechoslovakia, $5.9 billion for Poland, $5.1 billion for Bulgaria, $4.1 billion for Hungary, and $357 million for Romania. Calculated from data in Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous, "Implicit Subsidies and Non-Market Benefits in Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe," Department of Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, December 1981. Given criticism leveled at the Marrese-Vanous estimates (see, e.g., Paul Marer, "The Political Economy of Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe," in Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, Ed., *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1984, p. 155) and the close relationship between levels of subsidies and of trade turnover between the Soviet Union and the respective East European states, there may have been no particular benefit granted to the GDR in this respect.

Also, it has been demonstrated (see Keith Crane, *Military Spending in Eastern Europe*, Santa Monica, CA, The RAND Corporation, May 1987) that the GDR has been the only East European country to have heeded Soviet pressures to increase military expenditures. Thus, independently of economic benefits that a special relationship with the Soviet Union might yield to the GDR, the latter seems to have been more "subservient" than other members of the alliance.

[13]In seeking to heighten Romania's international stature, Ceauşescu carried out an ambitious diplomatic agenda. Starting in 1972, he made six trips to Africa alone by the end of the decade. Numerous Third World and Western leaders have also visited Bucharest. In 1982, Romania declared itself a developing country, albeit a socialist one, and sought preferential treatment from the European Economic Community and other international organizations. In 1976, it was finally successful in attaining guest status with the Group of 77. See Ronald Linden, "Socialist Patrimonialism and the Global Economy: The Case of Romania," *International Organization* (Cambridge, MA), Spring 1986, pp. 347–80.

[14]For instance, President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire visited Bucharest in 1970, with Ceauşescu paying a return visit to Zaire in 1972. For a discussion of the complexity involved in Romania's relations with revolutionary movements, as demonstrated during the Angolan civil war, see Robert W. Janes and Bartłomiej Kamiński, "Eastern Europe and the Third World: Increasing Opportunity, Decreasing Capability," *International Journal*, Winter 1987/1988, forthcoming; also, Cutler, et al., loc. cit.

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Table 1: Shares of the Third World in Total Exports and Imports of East European Countries, 1970–85

(in percent)

		1970	1975	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Bulgaria:	Exports	7.7	13.2	14.9	16.9	13.9	12.9	16.4	16.2
	Imports	6.6	5.9	5.4	6.5	7.7	8.0	8.3	6.9
Czechoslovakia:	Exports	9.8	9.3	9.1	9.8	9.4	10.0	9.0	8.3
	Imports	7.7	6.3	6.0	6.7	5.1	4.7	5.2	4.9
GDR:	Exports	5.5	5.7	8.0	8.1	8.8	7.5	6.4	5.9
	Imports	5.0	5.1	7.2	4.9	5.6	6.2	6.1	4.4
Hungary:	Exports	6.4	7.0	11.4	12.7	14.0	13.7	12.6	12.1
	Imports	6.8	7.6	10.1	9.3	11.2	13.2	12.0	7.4
Poland:	Exports	8.2	8.7	8.7	9.3	11.8	11.6	10.9	8.7
	Imports	5.9	5.0	9.4	7.2	6.3	7.9	6.5	5.9
Romania:	Exports	9.7	20.4	19.4	28.1	27.8	23.9	24.1	18.3
	Imports	6.8	13.9	31.5	28.1	30.0	32.8	35.9	32.8

SOURCES: *UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* (New York), various issues; and data collected and processed for the Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Systems by Zofia Wysokinska.

The variation in trading patterns shown in Table 1 can be directly related to differences in economic and political circumstances. With more than one-fourth of its total trade turnover with the Third World, Romania stands apart. In order to foster this soaring trade, Romania assumed the largest burden among East European states of financial assistance to Third World countries, and was the only East European country that ran a persistent trade deficit with developing countries.

Ceauşcescu's decision to launch an industrial modernization program that was focused on developing Romania's own heavy-industry base led to a dramatic increase in domestic energy consumption. As a result, Romania had become a net importer of oil by 1976.[15] Having refused to participate in CEMA joint projects to develop the raw material base in the Soviet Union and unwilling to compromise its autonomy in foreign policy, Romania had to secure its raw material and energy requirements outside of the CEMA in the period coinciding with the second oil shock.

Because of the growing oil bill, the share of imports from the Third World in total Romanian imports skyrocketed between 1975 and 1980. That Romania's economic interaction with the developing countries has been driven by growing import demand for oil is best illustrated by the share of Middle Eastern and North African members of the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries in Romanian imports from the Third World—more than 80 percent in the 1980's. Ultimately, facing a debt crisis and a decline of import demand for its goods in Middle East oil-exporting countries, Romania had to turn to the Soviet Union for additional oil supplies.[16] Thus, economics came to overshadow politics in Romanian trade relations.

It is striking that the share of the Third World in overall Romania *exports* was much closer to that for other East European states than was the case with *imports*, this despite the considerable political effort and financial assistance extended by Bucharest. This suggests that exports of all East European countries to the Third World have hit a similar set of structural constraints.

Next to Romania, the East European states most involved in trade with the developing countries were Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland. Although the share of the Third World in Bulgaria's imports is relatively low, it expanded by 60 percent between 1980 and 1985. Bulgaria's trade surplus with the developing countries has allowed it to offset imbalances in trade with Western Europe. Hungarian trade turnover with the Third World peaked in 1983; in 1986, it stood at 85 percent of the 1980 level. The share of the Third World in Poland's exports increased in the 1980's, but only in the context of a

[15]Ronald G. Oechsler and John A. Martens, "Eastern European Trade with OPEC: A Solution to Emerging Energy Problems?" in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee (hereafter, JEC), *East European Economic Assessment*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1981, Vol. 2, pp. 509–40.

[16]For a discussion of the political economy of Romanian foreign relations and draconian adjustment in the 1980's, see Linden, loc. cit.; and Alan H. Smith, "Romania: Internal Economic Development and Foreign Economic Relations," in Philip Joseph, Ed., *The Economies of Eastern Europe and Their Foreign Economic Relations*, Brussels, NATO Colloquium, April 1986.

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Table 2: Concentration and Distribution of East European and Soviet Third World Trade, 1984[1]

	Share of top three trade partners (%)		Share of North Africa and Middle East (%)	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Bulgaria	51	73	68	38
Czechoslovakia	38	36	56	18
Hungary	29	61	63	28
Poland	31	44	50	17
Romania	46	61	45	87
Eastern Europe	31	33	53	49
Soviet Union	53	47	21	24

[1]The Third World also includes developing centrally planned economies. Available trade data for the GDR is not disaggregated enough to allow calculation of concentration.

SOURCES: Calculated from *UN Monthly Bulletin of Trade Statistics*, June and July 1986, and International Monetary Fund, *Directions of Trade Statistics* (Washington, DC), 1986.

drop in total exports. As for Czechoslovakia and East Germany, trade with the Third World accounts for less than 10 percent of total trade.

The geographic concentration of trade and the choice of trading partners reveals important similarities and differences among the East European states. As can be seen in Table 2, both exports to and imports from the Third World tend to be significantly concentrated. In particular, this is the case for Bulgaria and Romania, which score highest in both of the measures of concentration provided in the table.

There are similarities in the choice of the major trading regions by East European states, although within a given region they tend to choose different countries as major trading partners. In the 1980's, the Middle East and North Africa have by far dominated, accounting for about half of East European trade turnover with the Third World.[17] Among the three most important Third World export outlets of each East European state one always finds a Middle Eastern or North African country. For instance, Libya was the largest export market for Bulgaria and Poland, ranking third for Czechoslovakia, fourth for Hungary, and fifth for Romania. Syria was the most significant Third World export outlet for Czechoslovakia, as was Algeria for Hungary. Although China ranked first among Romania's customers, it was closely followed by Iraq, Egypt, and Lebanon, which together took almost 30 percent of Romanian exports.

East European imports from the Third World are slightly more concentrated, albeit somewhat less oriented toward the Middle East and North Africa. Oil-exporting countries account for 75 percent of Romanian, more than 30 percent of Bulgarian, and 25 percent of Hungarian imports. For instance, Iran, Egypt, and Syria account for about 60 percent of Romanian imports from the Third World; Libya and Iran for about 40 percent of Hungarian imports; Libya, for 30 percent of Bulgarian and a modest 10 percent of East German imports from the Third World. The share of oil-exporting countries is markedly lower in the imports of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Financial Crisis and Response

Faced with a severe balance of payments crisis at the end of the 1970's, East European countries found economics to be of increased importance in its relations with the Third World. As a response to this crisis, the East European countries in the early 1980's exploited trade with the Third World to offset deficits they incurred in trade with the West.

The crisis was triggered by a confluence of several developments: a marked deterioration in Eastern Europe's growth performance, difficulties in trying to integrate with the world economy in general and the West in particular, curtailed access to Western financial markets, and a declining availability of energy and raw materials from other CEMA partners. In the West, policies of controlling domestic inflation through money supply implemented in the late 1970's brought (1) a significant increase in real interest rates and (2) an economic recession. The first swelled the services component of East European balances of payments, thus putting the burden of external adjustment on hard-currency trade. The second brought a contraction in Western import demand, which had particularly adverse effect on marginal suppliers from Eastern Europe.[18]

Faced with a debt squeeze and falling import demand in the West, East European countries drastically cut Western imports and sought to increase surpluses with some Third World countries. Starting from a small deficit in trade with the developing countries of US$600 million in 1980, East European states generated a $3.4 billion surplus in 1981 and have maintained a declining surplus thereafter (see Table 3).

What appears to have emerged, if only for a brief interval, is something akin to the sort of triangular relationship envisaged by some in the early 1960's, in which the East would run deficits with the West that would be

[17]Data calculated from various issues of *UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* (New York).

[18]Raimund Dietz, Gerhard Fink, and Ilse Grosser, "East-West Trends in Perspective," Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies, *Reprint Series*, No. 107, 1988.

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counterbalanced by surpluses generated by the transfer of intermediate technologies from Eastern Europe to the Third World.[19]

Some have argued that because a substantial amount of Eastern Europe's trade with the Third World takes place through barter or semi-barter arrangements and hence may not improve hard-currency positions, the surplus in this trade was not the result of a deliberate East European effort to use it as a vehicle for external adjustment of financial disequilibrium in relations with the West.[20] Yet, as one of us has already argued in more detail elsewhere,[21] there are several reasons to take the opposite view—that most indebted East European countries did seek to exploit their relations with the Third World in order to offset their imbalances with the West. In fact, all East European countries except for Romania were able to obtain surpluses in their trade with the Third World, primarily thanks to hefty, albeit declining, surpluses in their commercial relations with countries of North Africa and the Middle East. Owing to the fact that, except in the case of Romania, domestic demand for oil in Eastern Europe has by and large been met by imports from the Soviet Union,[22] one could make a strong case that energy imports from the Third World constituted a de facto surplus readily convertible into hard-currency earnings. Since none of the East European countries has domestically-produced surpluses of oil, their quite significant exports of oil and oil products to the West were made possible by their commercial links with Middle East oil producers.

Trade with North African and Middle Eastern countries was a primary factor in Eastern Europe's ability in the early 1980's to convert the deficit in its non-socialist trade into a surplus. As can be seen from Table 3, the aggregate surplus of Eastern Europe (excluding the GDR) with the economies of North Africa and the Middle East accounted for about 40 percent of the total hard-currency surplus, although the total share of the latter regions in East European exports was only about 25 percent between 1981 and 1984. Indeed, were it not for persistent Romanian deficits triggered by that country's considerable import demand for oil, the aggregate surplus of Eastern Europe would have been some 20 percent higher.

In trade with the Middle East and North Africa, the East Europeans took advantage of a rapidly growing demand for arms. In the late 1970's, production of tanks was restarted in several East European countries, and Romania, Bulgaria and, probably, Czechoslovakia substantially expanded production of ammunition and small arms.[23] During this period, arms deliveries to the non-communist developing world more than doubled, soaring from $635 million in 1980 to $1,315 million in

[19]See Leon Żurawicki, "Perspectives of East-South-West Trilateral Cooperation," *Sprawy Międzynarodowe* (Warsaw), No. 5, 1978.

[20]Marie Lavigne, "Eastern Europe-LDC Economic Relations in the Eighties," in JEC, *East European Economies: Slow Growth in the 1980s, Vol. 2, Foreign Trade and International Finance*, Washington, DC, US Government Prtinting Office, 1986, Vol. 2, pp. 62–90.

[21]Bartłomiej Kamiński, "External Dimensions of Balance of Payments Adjustment in Eastern Europe," *Osteuropa Wirtschaft* (Munich), No. 2, 1988, forthcoming.

[22]In 1983, imports of energy (mainly oil and gas) from the Soviet Union accounted for a major proportion of East European energy imports. The proportion generally ranged from 77 percent in the case of Hungary to 96 percent in the case of Poland, with Romania standing out as a clear exception, at 19 percent. See Dietz et al., loc. cit., p. 59.

[23]Mike Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, *Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1971–1985*, New York, Oxford University Press for Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1987, p. 103.

Table 3: Trade Balances of Eastern Europe with Market Economies, 1980–86

(In billions of US$)

Year	With all market economies		With developed economies		With developing economies		N. Africa and ME[1]	OPEC countries
1980	–2.9	Cumulative	–2.3	Cumulative	–0.6	Cumulative		
1981	1.4	1.4	–2.0	–2.0	3.4	3.4		
1982	5.2	6.6	1.7	–0.3	3.5	6.9	3.2	2.3
1983	6.0	12.6	3.7	3.4	2.3	9.2	2.1	1.4
1984	7.3	19.9	4.7	8.1	2.6	11.8	1.6	1.3
1985	4.6	24.5	2.7	10.8	1.9	13.7	1.6	1.2
1986	0.7	25.2	0.6	11.4	0.1	13.8		

[1]According to United Nations country classification—excludes Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, and Nigeria.

SOURCES: for 1980 and 1981, estimates of the Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies, in the case of the GDR, trade balances derived from data in *UN Monthly Bulletin of Trade and Statistics*, July 1986; data for the period 1982–86, estimates of the UN ECE Secretariat, *Economic Bulletin for Europe* (Elmsford, NY), Vol. 38, United Nations, 1987. In the case of the data for the Middle East and North Africa, there was no data for the GDR.

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1981 and almost $2 billion in 1982.[24] Arms exports of Bulgaria, for example, came in well ahead of re-export of crude oil as the leading source of export revenues in 1982 (54 percent versus 9 percent of total earnings); in that year, the overall value of the Bulgarian exports to developing countries—mostly Algeria, Libya, and Iraq—were triple the 1979 earnings.[25]

As with trade relations in general, East European arms sales manifest a distinctive geographic pattern, with over 90 percent of such sales in the period 1971–85 going to the Middle East and North Africa. Of the arms exported by Czechoslovakia to developing countries in that period, 70 percent went to Syria, Libya, and Iraq. In the case of Poland, about 40 percent went to Iraq, South Yemen and Syria. Moreover, the geographic concentration of Czechoslovak and Polish arm sales has been increasing. In 1981–85, Libya, Syria, and Iraq accounted for 77.1 percent of Czechoslovak arms sales, while Iraq, Libya, and South Yemen accounted for 66.6 percent of Polish arms sales.[26]

Viewed in a broader perspective, then, Eastern Europe's external adjustment produced a "mini" triangle of international payments, with developed market economies running deficits with LDC oil exporters, who in turn had trade deficits with Eastern Europe, which utilized a flow of resources (obtained mainly thanks to arms transfers) from LDC oil exporters to offset financial and commercial imbalances with the West.

However, both the share of Eastern Europe's trade surpluses with the Middle East and North Africa in total trade surpluses and the share of this region in Eastern Europe's exports to non-communist states have been falling. The arms versus oil mini-triangle appears to have been a short-lived phenomenon in the international commercial and financial relations of Eastern Europe. This trend reflects several significant and interrelated problems. Although a significant portion of this decline may be attributable to the curtailed ability of East European countries to purchase spare parts and intermediate products in the West, there are deeper structural problems detracting from the region's international competitiveness.[27] As a result, the oil-exporting countries are turning increasingly toward countries such as Taiwan and Korea and the newly industrializing countries as trading partners.

A particular source of pessimism should be the deteriorating commodity composition of East European exports. Although manufactures still constitute a much larger percentage of total exports to the Third World than of those to the West, it must be disappointing to East European planners that the largest improvement in demand for East European exports to developing countries has been occurring in low-processed, resource-intensive products rather than manufactures.[28]

For instance, the largest increase in East European exports to the Third World occurred in the only expanding market among developing countries, i.e., crude materials. Since East European prices, in most cases, bear little relation to world prices, it would be difficult to assess whether the region enjoys a genuine comparative advantage in those products. Given its natural-resource endowment, Eastern Europe's comparative advantage in resource-intensive products is highly questionable. There are reasons to believe that those exports may entail significant opportunity costs. Although a slow-down in industrial production in Eastern Europe in 1981–85 depressed domestic demand for these materials and may well have facilitated the ability to export them, Eastern Europe is not likely to remain a true net exporter of these commodities.

Nor do the prospects of continued arms exports appear that certain. The larger and more expensive weapons systems produced by the East Europeans are becoming increasingly obsolescent technologically.[29] These countries face perhaps insurmountable competition in medium-level systems from more advanced Western producers. At the same time, new producers are also making the global small-arms market increasingly competitive.

Soviet and East European Patterns

Because of its status as a net exporter of nonrenewable resources and its cautious approach to borrowing in international financial markets in the 1970's, the Soviet Union did not face the balance of payments adjust-

[24] *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid to Non-Communist LDCs, 1984*, Washington, DC, US Department of State, May 1986, p. 19.

[25] See "Developments in Bulgarian Arms Exports," in Marvin R. Jackson, Ed., *East-South Trade, Economics and Political Economics*, Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1985, pp. 80–85.

[26] Brzoska and Ohlson, op. cit., pp. 102–04; and *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1986*, Washington, DC, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1987.

[27] For an illuminating comparative analysis of Eastern Europe's competitiveness in Western markets vis-à-vis the newly industrializing countries of Latin America and Southeast Asia, see Kazimierz Poznanski, "Competition between Eastern Europe and the Developing Countries in the Western Market for Manufactured Goods," in JEC, *East European Economies: Slow Growth in the 1980s*, Vol. 2, pp. 31–61.

[28] For an extensive discussion of competitive and structural factors shaping the commodity composition of East European exports to the Third World, see Kamiński, "External Dimension of Balance of Payments Adjustment in Eastern Europe," loc. cit.; and Istvan Dobozi, "Pattern Determinants and Prospects of East-South Economic Relations," *Development and Peace* (Budapest), Spring 1987, pp. 80–101.

[29] Cutler et al., loc. cit., p. 295.

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ment problems that forced East European countries to seek ways to generate trade surpluses. There are, indeed, a number of ways in which Soviet involvement with the Third World has differed from, as well as ways in which it has been similar to, that of Eastern Europe. This can be seen in trade, arms sales, and economic assistance activities.

Trade. The variation in trade with the Third World tends to be greater between the CEMA Six as group and the Soviet Union than among the East European countries themselves. This sheds interesting light on underlying motives in the expansion of the Third World "connection" and on Soviet–East European relations.

In the Soviet case, ideological affinity and geographical proximity play major roles in the determination of trade partners, which does not seem to be the case for its junior allies. Cuba accounts for roughly one-third of Soviet trade turnover with the Third World, and there is clearly a political basis for this trading relationship that far outweighs any economic benefit. The presence among Soviet trading partners of such countries as Angola, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Vietnam, and North Korea also suggests the importance if not outright dominance of politics in Soviet export policies. (These same countries are conspicuously absent from among Eastern Europe's major Third World trading partners.) Political and geographic reasons explain the roughly 25 percent share that Afghanistan, China, Iran, North Korea, Mongolia, and Turkey account for in Soviet trade turnover with the Third World.[30]

Although East European trade practices suggest that priority is assigned to economic factors, the larger configurations of superpower politics have unquestionably played an influential role in East European economic relations with the Third World, particularly with regard to relations of a military nature.

Arms sales. It is clear that a significant portion of Eastern Europe's comparative advantage in arms trade in the Third World derives from Soviet arms export performance. Because of the high degree of centralization and consequent standarization of arms production in the Warsaw Pact, Third World purchases of Soviet weapons have often led to East European sales. In cases of resupply, the Soviet bloc can deliver without cutting into existing Soviet arms stocks, and Moscow can have greater flexibility in upgrading the quality of the arms supplied, the ability to supply replacements quickly and—if foreign policy considerations require it—to substitute other suppliers in place of the Soviet Union.[31]

A closer examination of data on the geographic distribution of arms sales of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Poland reveals both obvious similarities and suggestive differences. Although Libya, Syria, and Iraq accounted for the bulk of the arms exports of these countries, the degree of concentration was higher for both Czechoslovakia and Poland than for the Soviet Union. The three accounted in 1981–85 for 77 percent of Czechoslovaki, 67 percent of Polish, and only 41 percent of Soviet arms exports. Libya, Syria, and Iraq were also Poland's and Czechoslovakia's most important export markets. By contrast, the same three countries took up only about 5 percent of total Soviet exports to the Third World.

Still, there is a marked correlation between the countries buying arms from the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and from Czechoslovakia and Poland, on the other, which is suggestive of political motivation, if not Soviet control, of this trade. The lower degree of correlation between Polish and Soviet choices of arms customers raises some interesting questions. Does Moscow, recognizing Poland's economic crisis and desperate need for hard currency, acquiesce in Polish arms sales to less-favored clients? Does Moscow orchestrate some division of labor in arms sales to maximize gains in the Third World? Or does the division of labor in arms production within the Warsaw Pact make Polish exports attractive because of the nonavailability of certain kinds of arms from other Warsaw Pact countries?

Given the shortage of information about decision-making processes in the Warsaw Pact, it is difficult to present a substantiated argument in favor of any of these hypotheses. As seen above, however, there is considerable evidence that the Soviet Union and its junior partners now seek hard-currency revenue from military sales to the Third World in addition to whatever political gains such sales might entail.

Economic assistance policies. The granting of economic assistance has also figured among the instrumentalities of the Soviet and East European efforts to

[30]It is worth noting that if trade with Asian "centrally planned economies" is excluded—which is standard practice in Soviet official statistics—the share of developing economies in Soviet trade falls below 15 percent. This would place the USSR on a rough par with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland, as a country moderately involved in Third World trade.

[31]See Thomas H. Snitch, "East European Involvement in the World's Arms Markets," in *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1972–1982*, Washington, DC, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, April 1984, p. 118.

For instance, it has been argued that at the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, when the Soviet Union initially adopted a neutral position and refused to supply Iraq directly with more weapons, a dramatic increase in East European supplies provided an indirect means of replenishing Iraqi weapons stocks. See Snitch, loc. cit.; and Brzoska and Ohlson, op. cit, pp. 103–04.

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Iraqi troops riding Soviet-made tanks head toward the Karum River during the first month of the Gulf war in 1980.

—UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos.

gain influence in the Third World. Beginning in the 1950's, the Soviet Union and the East Europeans have given training to students from and sent technicians and economic aid to Third World countries.

Out of ideological solidarity and a desire to train future elites that are imbued with a Marxist-Leninist outlook and East-bloc loyalties, the East Europeans have been generous in opening their universities to Third World students. Since the early 1960's, the number of students brought to Eastern Europe has been steadily growing. Third World students at East European universities increased from a little more than 1,000 in 1960 to five times that much by 1970. At the end of the 1970's, the number had reached over 48,000. The level has remained high in the 1980's, with 35,465 students attending in 1984. There is no indication, however, that this has translated into direct benefit for the East bloc. It is not clear what perceptions these students take back to their own countries or even how they are received when they return, since Western education continues to be more highly valued.[32]

The greatest source of East European presence in the Third World is the large number of economic and technical specialists sent there. Some observers claim that relative to the size of their populations and economies, East European states have provided a quantity of personnel that compares favorably with the Soviet Union.[33] East European advisors predominate by a factor of more than two to one over Soviets in North Africa and the Middle East. Another major recipient of large East European assistance is Sub-Saharan Africa. By contrast, countries of Latin America and Asia have, with few exceptions, been largely ignored.

Since the available information on the geographic distribution of these technicians is not disaggregated below the regional level, it is impossible to contrast Soviet and East European engagement on a country-by-country basis. However, examination of differing regional allocations of Soviet and East European

[32]See Aspaturian, loc. cit., pp. 37 and 40; and *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid . . .*, p. 6.

[33]Aspaturian, loc. cit., p. 39. Indeed, in 1984, Eastern Europe provided some 86,000 of the total of 126,000 Soviet and East European economic technicians stationed outside the bloc. See *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid . . .*, p. 5.

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technicians in non-communist developing countries and a country-by-country breakdown of total Soviet and East Europen technicians abroad permits some inferences regarding respective priorities. For example, in 1984, out of a total of 16,020 Soviet and East European specialists sent to Sub-Saharan Africa, the three most important pro-Soviet regimes, Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique, taken together accounted for half. Sub-Saharan Africa was the only region where the number of Soviet experts exceeded East Europeans. (The Soviet Union had 23 percent of its technicians there; Eastern Europe, only 8 percent). One may suspect that the highest concentration of East Europeans in the region was in Nigeria, which—not tilted ideologically toward the East bloc but having the most steady economic relationship with it—had the largest single share of specialists (4,035, or 25 percent).[34]

As Table 4 indicates, there was a high degree of similarity in the regional distribution of credits and grants provided to the Third World by Eastern Europe and by the Soviet Union on through the 1970's. In the 1980's, however, substantially differing priorities emerged within a generally shrinking aid effort. A variety of political and economic factors help explain these substantial changes. Suharto's coup d'état in Indonesia and the low economic attractiveness of Laos and Cambodia controlled by Vietnam explain a contraction in aid to East Asia; the decline in credits to the Middle East was triggered by the oil glut. The largest recipient of East European credits in the Middle East was Egypt, which had long maintained unusually diversified commercial and financial ties with Eastern Europe. Credits granted to finance trade with Turkey account for an increase in the share of South Asia.

Given Eastern Europe's balance of payments difficulties, it comes as no surprise that East European programs are oriented toward promoting trade opportunities. As it can be seen from the data in Table 5, seven out of the ten largest recipients of Eastern Europe's credits are among the region's major export customers. At the same time, there are wide annual fluctuations in East European economic aid and credits, which does not fit well with the development of steady economic relationships. For instance, in 1979–85, total annual economic aid from Eastern Europe to the Third World ranged from $415 million to $1,750 million.[35]

East European assistance policies have followed the broader outlines of Soviet involvement, but there are some important differences. Although both initiated economic aid, for example, to gain greater access and influence in developing economies, East European programs have been characterized by far fewer soft-term grants and have sought to maximize returns by charging higher interest rates.[36] Also, most East European aid has been directed toward specific industrial projects and equipment sales for the purpose of expanding trade. In addition, the East European states have under-

[34]See *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid.*

[35]Derived from US Central Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1986*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office.

[36]*Warsaw Pact Economic Aid . . .*, p. 1. On Eastern Europe's efforts to maximize the return on economic aid even in the 1950's, see Robert and Elizabeth Bass, loc. cit.

Table 4: Credits and Grants Extended by the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to Non-Communist Developing Regions, 1954–85

	1954–79				1980–85					
	USSR		Eastern Europe		USSR		Eastern Europe			
	Current US$ bil.	Percent[1]	Current US$ bil.	Percent[1]	Current US$ bil.	Percent[1]	Current US$ bil.	Percent[1]	% change in share: USSR	E. Europe
Africa	4.1	23	2.4	25	4.9	33	1.7	27	+43	+8
East Asia	0.3	1	0.5	6	—	—	0.1	2	—	–66
Latin America	1.0	5	1.9	19	1.4	10	1.1	17	+100	–10
Middle East	7.9	43	3.7	38	4.3	29	1.2	20	–32	–47
South Asia	5.0	27	1.2	13	4.5	31	2.1	34	+15	+161
Total	18.2		9.8		14.7		6.3			

[1]Because of rounding, may not add up to 100 percent.

SOURCES: US Central Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1986;* and idem, *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries 1979 and 1954–79; A Research Paper*, ER SO-10318 U (October 1980) as quoted in Roger E. Kanet, "Eastern Europe and the Third World: The Expanding Relationship," in Michael Sodaro and Sharon Wolchik, Eds., *Foreign and Domestic Policy in Eastern Europe in the 1980's*', New York, St. Martin's Press, 1983.

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Table 5: Eastern Europe and the Third World, Aid Patterns, 1954–85, and Exports, 1980–85

1954–79		1980–85			
Top 10 aid recipients	Share of aid, in percent	Top 10 aid recipients	Share of aid, in percent	Ranking as export market[1]	Percent share of EE exports[1]
Syria	9.7	Turkey	15.5	5	5.6
Egypt	9.0	Egypt	13.3	6	5.0
Iran	7.0	Syria	12.7	7	4.8
Brazil	6.3	Nigeria	9.4	17	0.8
Algeria	5.3	Bangladesh	7.6	n.a.	n.a.
Iraq	5.0	Ethiopia	5.6	n.a.	n.a.
India	4.6	Algeria	4.0	9	2.9
Turkey	4.0	Pakistan	3.4	13	1.5
Indonesia	2.9	Brazil	2.6	12	2.7
Sudan	2.4	Zambia	1.7	n.a.	n.a.

[1]Ranking and shares within total exports to the Third World are cumulative figures for 1980–85.

SOURCES: US Central Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1986; UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, various issues.

taken various industrial projects largely geared toward developing natural resources.

The GDR has manifested a distinctive broader profile in its training and assistance activities. GDR efforts overall appear geared toward promoting such socialist proto-Leninist principals as expansion of the state sector and development of cadres.[37]

The extensive way in which the GDR has been able to involve itself has led to considerable success and popularity with certain regimes on its own account rather than as a surrogate for Moscow. This latter point was illustrated in 1976, when Somalia expelled Cuban and Soviet advisors following Moscow's shift to support of Ethiopia in the Ogaden conflict. Relations between the Somalis and the GDR remained friendly, leaving the latter an important role as diplomatic intermediary.[38] However much the GDR's efforts may have served Moscow's objectives, these developments count equally as evidence of East German interests and successes that go beyond simple surrogacy. No other East European state, with the possible exception of Romania, has succeeded in developing such a broad range of ties with some Third World countries.

Conclusion

What emerges from consideration of trade and assistance relations of Eastern Europe and of the Soviet Union is further confirmation of the structural character of the influence of the Soviet Union on East European behavior. The geographic concentration of trade and assistance activities shows at the very least a congruence of Moscow intent and East European economic self-interest. At the end of the 1970's, the increasing importance of economic calculations related to the balance of payments crisis increased the intensity of East European economic relations with the Third World.

Recent developments in relations of all the East European states with the Third World suggest that in each of the states there exist similar limitations on efforts to increase trade, limitations that are rooted in similar systemic constraints. These features have an important implication for the analysis of the foreign relations of Eastern Europe in general and the region's relations with the Third World in particular.

Similarities in the foreign policies of East European states do not manifest blind following of the Soviet lead; rather, they are the product of similarities in political and economic circumstances. Given the level of their economic dependency on the Soviet Union, Moscow does not have to resort to "administrative" means to subordinate its junior partners. On the other hand, emulation of the Soviet policies need not conflict with individual objectives of maximizing welfare and of pursuing other, even political objectives. Hence, within the structurally determined similarity of foreign relations, one can trace considerable and increasing diversity among East European countries.

This paper has stressed two elements, in particular, that assisted the East European states in establishing a distinct pattern of involvement: the "free ride" created by Soviet openings in the Third World, and a continued

[37]See Wolfgang Schmidt-Streckenbach, "Administrative Aid for Developing Countries: The Case of the German Democratic Republic," *Public Administration and Development* (Chichester, Sussex), No. 4, 1985., pp. 339–51; and Melvin Croan, "A New Afrika Korps?" *Washington Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Winter 1980, pp. 21–32.

[38]See Edwina Moreton, "The East Europeans and the Cubans in the Middle East," in Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, Eds., *The Soviet Union in the Middle East*, New York, Holmes and Meier, 1982, p. 75.

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comparative advantage in human capital. The evolution of this involvement has reflected a combination of domestic political and economic circumstances, evolving Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe, and the demands of Soviet global strategy. The increased dependence of small East European states on foreign trade eventually led to the active search for export outlets and new suppliers in the Third World.

The resulting expansion of the relations of the East European states with the Third World has been shaped largely by economic motivations. However, the decline in the surpluses with the oil-exporting countries combined with the declining competitiveness of Eastern Europe indicates that the successes produced by this strategy may no longer be viable. This is suggested by the increasingly less advantageous commodity composition of this trade, which, in turn, means that Eastern Europe will become less attractive to the Third World on strictly economic grounds. It will, however, remain politically attractive to the extent that it offers leverage in Third World dealings with Western partners.

As East European competitiveness declines, the dichotomy of hierarchical subordination versus bargaining in East Europe–Soviet relations decreases in relevance. Unable to integrate with the world economy, Eastern Europe is subject to considerable Soviet leverage, if only through the supply of energy resources. On the other hand, Eastern Europe's weak, at times precarious, economic situation is likely to exercise its own form of leverage. The Soviet Union has probably encouraged East European states to increase ties with both the West and the developing countries in order to lessen the chances that they would become an excessive burden on the Soviet economy. In addition, if Moscow wants increased East European participation in the Third World for its globalist political purposes it will probably have to guarantee that such participation not impose new economic costs on its East European partners.

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Drug Abuse in the Soviet Union

John M. Kramer

It is only in the last several years that the Soviet Union has acknowledged the existence of a real and growing problem with drug abuse.[1] As late as the mid-1980's, one could read Soviet claims that "serious drug addiction does not exist," that "no minors suffer from drug addiction," and that "not a single case" of addiction to amphetamines, cocaine, heroin, or LSD had been recorded.[2] When it was admitted, in 1985, that there were some 2,500–3,000 addicts in the Soviet Union, these were said to be primarily persons who unwittingly had become addicted while being treated for chronic diseases, and it was claimed that there was a "tendency toward a decline" in this modest amount of addiction.[3]

However, there were strong, if indirect, signs since the 1960's that drug abuse was far more widespread than publicly acknowledged. For example, in 1966, the USSR Supreme Court and its counterpart in the Russian republic convened plenary sessions that examined, inter alia, legal issues involved in the prosecution of individuals accused of manufacturing and distributing "narcotics" and other "poisons."[4] In 1972, the Principles of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics were amended to add to the list of "grave crimes" the "theft, manufacture, acquisition, or possession of narcotics for the purpose of sale, and/or the sale of such substances."[5] The Russian republic in the same year decreed that narcotics addicts must undergo specialized treatment for their condition. Those addicts who "evade treatment or continue to take drugs after treatment, who violate labor discipline, public order, or the rules of socialist communal living" were made subject to "compulsory treatment and labor re-education" for terms of one to two years.[6] In 1974, the USSR Supreme Soviet issued a tough decree "On Intensifying the Struggle Against Drug Addiction."[7] Finally, in 1975, the USSR Supreme Court, in a plenary session, again examined the issue of drug addiction. The Court did so, one commentary explained defensively, "not because the scale of drug addiction has become menacing in any way, but because . . . this poison must be killed in its infancy."[8]

Concern about drug abuse seemed particularly acute in the republic of Georgia. As early as 1967, officials there were reportedly asking:

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[1]Among the few previous analyses of this subject in English are E. A. Babaian, "Control of Narcotic Substances and Prevention of Addiction in the USSR," *Bulletin on Narcotics* (New York), January-March 1979, pp. 13–22; and David E. Powell, "Drug Abuse in Communist Europe," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1973, pp. 31–40. For an analysis of drug abuse throughout Communist Europe, see John M. Kramer, "Drug Abuse in Communist Europe: An Emerging Issue of Public Policy," *Slavic Review* (Austin, TX), forthcoming.

[2]*New Times* (Moscow), No. 22, May 1984, p. 27.

[3]Radio Moscow, Apr. 4, 1985, transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), Apr. 8, 1985, p. R/3.

[4]*Izvestiya* (Moscow), Mar. 3 and Nov. 26, 1966.

[5]*Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR* (Moscow), May 31, 1972, Item 176.

[6]*Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR* (Moscow), Aug. 31, 1972, Item 870.

[7]*Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, May 1, 1974, Item 275.

[8]*Izvestiya*, Oct. 9, 1975; and *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Oct. 15, 1975.

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Why were hemp and poppies being grown in areas of Georgia where they had not been sown in the past? Why were many young people with no ties to the criminal world and no previous convictions turning up among drug addicts? Why were there a growing number of crimes—thefts, speculation, extortion—committed for a single purpose: to obtain money immediately?[9]

In response to these concerns, the republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and communist youth organization (Komsomol) established a special commission to study the extent of drug abuse in Georgia and draft proposals for measures to combat it.[10]

Ten years later, researchers in Georgia conducted one of the first empirical sociological studies in the USSR of individuals officially considered to be abusers of drugs, although it took another decade for the results to be published.[11] The study found that among its sample, the consumption of opium-based derivatives occupied "first place"—thereby seemingly refuting claims in the official media of as late as 1986 that consumption of such drugs is "practically unheard of" in the USSR.[12]

The accession to power of Mikhail Gorbachev initiated a dramatic change in the official attitude toward drug abuse. Reflecting the General Secretary's campaign for openness and for delving into a wide variety of social pathologies, the official media have begun to carry numerous revealing accounts—frequently employing lurid, even hyperbolic language—portraying a much wider incidence of what Soviet sources themselves often label "narcomania." In the words of one commentary,

Concealing an illness will not make it go away; it will only drive it inward. We have come to realize that openness is needed in the struggle against drug addiction; that we must look truth in the eye, no matter how unsavory it is.[13]

An account by one official in the USSR MVD claims that in some areas of the Soviet Union, illegal drugs are so available "it's as if home-brewed beer flowed out of the water faucets."[14] A reporter for *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* recalling how she was warned when visiting the United States always to carry money for drug addicts who might accost her, observed that "now, as we see, this misfortune also has overtaken our country."[15] Another article spoke of control of the lucrative trade in illegal drugs by gangs whose leaders sleep with bodyguards by their bed, "keep hundreds and thousands of rubles under their doormat," "have hundreds of lives on their conscience," and are rarely apprehended by the authorities.[16]

An anti-drug cartoon published in the Soviet humor journal Krokodil *with a caption that reads: "Playing With Death."*

—Reprinted from *Krokodil* (Moscow), No. 24, August 1987, with permission from Sovfoto.

Assessing the Scope of the Problem

Between the concealment of the past and the evident hyperbole of current Soviet commentary about drug abuse in the USSR, it is difficult to gauge the actual dimensions of the problem. Indeed, Soviet officials concerned with drug abuse acknowledge that data on this topic are imprecise.[17]

Several factors contribute to this imprecision. First, within the USSR, as elsewhere, there is considerable

[9] *Izvestiya,* Aug. 12, 1986.
[10] Discussed in Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 204/87, May 25, 1987.
[11] For a detailed analysis of the results of this study, see *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo* (Moscow), No. 7, 1987, pp. 64–69.
[12] See, e.g., Radio Moscow, Aug. 30, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV,* Sept. 3, 1986, p. R/4.
[13] *Bakinskiy Rabochiy* (Baku), Aug. 26, 1986.
[14] *Komsomolskaya Pravda,* June 8, 1986.
[15] *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* Aug. 20, 1986.
[16] *Izvestiya,* Aug. 12, 1986.
[17] See, e.g., the interview with the health minister of the Russian republic in *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* Aug. 20, 1986. It might be noted that an official with the United States Institute of Drug Abuse similarly acknowledged that "you just can't trust the numbers" when assessing drug abuse in American society. Quoted in *The Washington Post,* Aug. 11, 1986.

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fuzziness in the terminology utilized in much of the writings about drugs. Terms such as "abuse," "addiction," "dependency," and "misuse" have no universally accepted definitions and often are employed interchangeably.[18] Soviet sources frequently refer to all drugs—regardless of their pharmacological properties—as "narcotics" and all users as "addicts."[19] Indeed, a senior official in the USSR Ministry of Health argues that to make a distinction among different drugs is a "pernicious practice" because all drugs are "dangerous."[20]

According to another official, E. A. Babaian, Chairman of the Standing Committee on the Control of Narcotics of the USSR Ministry of Health—officially the principal coordinating body charged with controlling production and use of narcotic and psychotropic substances in the USSR—the term "narcomania" describes a "state induced by the use of narcotic substances" and is employed when "nonmedical use occurs of a substance which by law is classified as a narcotic substance." In contrast, the term "toxicomania" defines "the damage to health" which is induced by the nonmedical use of a substance "which has not yet been juridically recognized as being narcotic."[21] Unfortunately, these terms themselves are not without terminological imprecision. For example, how does one define—and what criteria are employed to measure—that "state" which narcomania induces or that "damage to health" which toxicomania describes?

A second factor impeding the collection of comprehensive information on the extent of drug abuse in the Soviet Union is that, as anywhere, Soviet drug abusers for personal and professional reasons often conceal their condition. This is especially likely in the USSR where even casual drug users are registered with the police and subject to often severe legal penalties. Indeed, proponents of less draconian sanctions contend that current law serves only to discourage drug abusers from revealing their condition publicly and availing themselves of requisite medical treatment and counseling services.[22]

Third, the USSR has, to date, not compiled any comprehensive national—or even regional—statistics on drug abuse.[23] Indeed, the dictates of *glasnost'* notwithstanding, Soviet officials appear ambivalent about how candidly they should discuss the issue of drug abuse. USSR Minister of Internal Affairs A. V. Vlasov typified this ambivalence in a recent interview. After conceding that "keeping silent" about drug abuse only exacerbates the problem, the Minister nevertheless advocated limits on public discussion to avoid "stimulating unhealthy curiosity and interest" in the subject.[24]

It is clear that official statistics about drug abuse—which include only those individuals registered with the police—substantially understate the extent of the phenomenon. Thus, the health minister of the Russian republic contends that it is "naive" to believe official statistics that report only one or two drug addicts in many oblasts of the USSR.[25]

With these caveats in mind, what do we know about the scope of drug abuse in the Soviet Union? In 1988, there are reportedly 52,000 individuals registered as drug addicts in the USSR. Individuals under the age of 30 (including 14,000 minors) comprise 62 percent of this group, and females comprise 12 percent.[26] According to the head of the Main Administration for Criminal Investigation of the USSR MVD, registered addicts

[18]To mitigate, if not eliminate, such terminological confusion, the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1965 proposed to substitute the term "drug dependence" for "drug addiction" in discourse about the subject. The WHO defined "drug dependence" as follows: "A state, psychic and sometimes also physical, resulting from the interaction between a living organism and a drug, characterized by behavioral and other responses that always include a compulsion to take the drug on a continuous or periodic basis in order to experience its physiological effects and sometimes to avoid the discomfort of its absence." The United States National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse has recommended (notwithstanding the title of the Commission itself) that the term "drug abuse" be deleted from public discussion: "The term has no functional utility," the Commission claims, and "has become no more than an arbitrary code-word for that drug use which is presently considered wrong." See the Commission's Second Report, *Drug Use in America: Problem in Perspective,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1973, pp. 126–27 and 13. For another discussion of this subject, see R. L. Hartnoll, "Current Situation Related to Drug Abuse Assessment in European Countries," *Bulletin on Narcotics,* January-June 1986, especially pp. 71–76.

[19]"Narcotics" medically are defined as central nervous system depressants with analgesic and sedative properties. Under United States federal law, narcotics are considered to be addictive drugs that produce physical and psychological dependence and include opium and its derivatives, heroin, morphine, codeine, and several synthetic substances which can produce morphine-type addiction. Under this conception of narcotics, hashish and marijuana would be excluded. See Robert O'Brien and Sidney Cohen, Eds., *The Encyclopedia of Drug Abuse,* New York, Facts on File, p. 183.

[20]*Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya* (Moscow), Sept. 16, 1987.

[21]Babaian, loc. cit., pp. 18–19.

[22]As one source explains, "It's no secret that if dozens of addict-treatment institutions were created, people wou d be afraid to go for treatment for fear that criminal charges would be brought against them." *Izvestiya,* Oct. 3, 1986.

[23]Existing research on this subject, according to the health minister of the Russian republic, is "extremely scanty and ineffective." *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* Aug. 20, 1986.

[24]*Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 6, 1987. Another example of this circumstance involved the repeated but unsuccessful efforts by correspondents of *Izvestiya* to obtain an allegedly public document detailing the anti-drug program of the Moscow City Soviet. Calling the situation a "strange approach to *glasnost'*," the writers added: "A document that is not secret has, for all practical purposes, been closed to the public. Specifically, the editors were unable to obtain a copy of the document." *Izvestiya,* Nov. 23, 1987.

[25]*Literaturnaya Gazeta,* Aug. 20, 1986. For a similar opinion, see *Pravda,* Feb. 18, 1988.

[26]TASS, Mar. 26, 1988 in *FBIS-SOV,* Apr. 5, 1988, p. 49.

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are "people whom doctors officially consider sick." This same official also reports that approximately 80,000 individuals "use," but are not addicted to, "narcotics." This category comprises individuals who use "narcotics" in "one way or another or have already tried them . . . (but) whom doctors do not consider sick." Hashish is the principal drug consumed by a "majority" of individuals in each of these two categories.[27]

These statistics clearly are of limited utility. First, they do not indicate what criteria doctors employ to determine how and when a person is sufficiently "sick" to merit the appellation "addict." Second, a category that includes individuals who use "narcotics" in "one way or another or have already tried them" reveals little about the actual incidence of drug abuse. Third, to consider hashish—which produces no physical and usually no psychological dependence—as a "narcotic" is, at best, a debatable proposition.

Other published materials on this subject exhibit similar limitations. One source reports that in 1987, Moscow had 710 drug addicts, 510 toxic substance abusers, and "more than 1,500 people" who are "at risk."[28] The source neither indicated precisely what "at risk" constitutes nor identified into which group these individuals are "at risk" of falling. Another source reports—without providing any information on the drugs involved—that a "sharp expansion in the number of substances used by drug addicts" has prompted the USSR Ministry of Health to expand its list of controlled substances.[29] (It should be noted that I have not found any national statistics on deaths related to drug abuse, although one report of such a death informs the reader that this occurrence is "far from unique."[30])

Data on the number of individuals registered as drug addicts—or even estimates of the overall scope of drug abuse—exist for only several of the USSR's 15 union republics. The 6,500 individuals registered as drug addicts in Turkmenistan appear to constitute the largest total in any republic.[31] A drug treatment specialist discloses that in Tbilisi there are "several hundred" registered drug addicts and that "2 1/2 times that number" exist throughout the Georgian SSR; this would indicate that approximately 1,000 individuals are registered as addicts in that republic. However, Georgia's deputy health minister reports that there are at least "6,000 drug addicts" in the republic.[32]

One can hypothesize that drug abuse is a serious problem in the republic of Moldavia since the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet recently heard a report on this subject. Unfortunately, published materials on the report merely note that "drug use, especially among young people, is not falling" in Moldavia. These materials also assert—again without providing any data in substantiation—that "the state of the struggle against drug addiction, especially among young people, is causing great concern in such republics as Kirghiziya and Turkmeniya, as well as in a number of oblasts of the RSFSR, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan."[33]

Data on the socioeconomic background and drug-related activities of known drug users come principally from two polls in the republic of Georgia, conducted in 1977 and the mid-1980's respectively.[34] Unfortunately, the absence of comparable national statistics prevents an assessment of how representative of drug users throughout the Soviet Union (or even in Georgia itself) these polls are. Nonetheless, the data may be indicative of broad trends.

A comparison of the respective samples indicates that in the 1980's drug users were far more likely than their counterparts in the 1970's to be female, younger, better educated, affluent, and raised in families with both parents present.[35] The poll conducted in the 1980's also afforded data on the occupational status of its sample (see Table 1).

Finally, the polls provide data on the specifics of drug use. Individuals in the 1977 sample typically began to use drugs while in prison. In contrast, in the following decade users were far more likely to have been introduced to drugs by friends and acquaintances at home and at school. This circumstance suggests that illicit drug use by the 1980's may have spread to a broader segment of the general population than was the case in the previous decade.

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[27]*Izvestiya*, May 13, 1987. This source adds that addicts "to a lesser extent" consume sundry opiates.

[28]Moscow Domestic Service, Dec. 15, 1987, in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 18, 1987, p. 41.

[29]*Izvestiya*, Jan. 1, 1988.

[30]Ibid., May 30, 1987. Another source adds, albeit without providing empirical data in substantiation, that "group deaths" of children have occurred from sniffing sundry volatile substances. Ibid., June 20, 1986.

[31]TASS, April 15, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 19, 1988, p. 51. Another source asserts that in "probably no other region of the country is this problem so serious as it is in the Turkmenian SSR." *Izvestiyia*, Oct. 3, 1986.

[32]See RFE-RL, *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 204/87, May 25, 1987, citing *Literaturuli Sakartvelo*, Sept. 12, 1986; cf. *Zarya Vostoka* (Tbilisi), Mar. 20, 1987. The health official provided the data on the number of drug addicts in the republic who had been tested for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS); it may be that this includes individuals not official registered as addicts.

[33]*Izvestiya*, Mar. 10, 1988.

[34]All materials on these polls are drawn from *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 7, 1987, pp. 64–69. See also *Zarya Vostoka*, Feb. 20, 1987; and *Sotsialogicheskiye Issledovaniya* (Moscow), No. 1, 1987, pp. 48–53.

[35]At the same time, the phenomenon now appears, albeit to different degrees, among all socioeconomic groups and educational levels in the population. An earlier Western study of this subject found that drug abuse in the Soviet Union was restricted primarily to the progeny of the middle and higher classes resident in urban areas. See Powell, loc. cit., p. 40.

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Table 1: Occupational Status of Drug Users in the Georgian SSR in the Mid-1980's

(N = 1,760)[1]

Category	Percent
Industrial worker	46.4
Employee (*sluzhashchiy*)	29.3
Collective farm workers	4.5
Housewives	2.7
Soldiers	0.4
Other occupations	16.7

[1]An approximate total for the sample.

SOURCE: Compiled from data in *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo* (Moscow), No. 7, 1987, p. 65.

The frequency of drug use differed little between the two samples. More than 80 percent of the individuals in each sample consumed drugs at least once a day, and a majority of them did so at least twice a day. However, the polls did find a significant difference in the types of drugs that users consumed. Opiates occupied "first place" in 1977. In the later sample, hashish held this status, although opiates continued to be among the "most-consumed" narcotic substances.

Causes

Soviet sources themselves sometimes appear perplexed that the New Soviet Man would want to abuse drugs. Reflecting these sentiments, one source states:

Drug addiction. It does not seem to make sense for our contemporaries, our countrymen, to suffer from this disease. The social causes that drive Western young people into a drugged haze do not exist in the USSR. If, over there, inability to find work or the hopelessness or excesses of life force young people to seek escape from reality, in our case we have to seek the roots elsewhere.[36]

Yet, most commonly, Soviet commentaries point to a cluster of personal factors—boredom, curiosity, escapism, hedonism, the desire for acceptance by one's peers—as the motivation for trying drugs. For example, a senior official in the USSR MVD contends that youths take drugs primarily out of curiosity aroused by sensationalist publications and "idle" conversations about drugs with their peers.[37] Others suggest that Soviet youths seek to emulate the hedonistic lifestyles, including the use of drugs, allegedly glorified in Western films. "Such films need not be banned, but people must be taught to interpret them correctly and critically," one commentator cautions.[38]

Reportedly, many individuals turn to drugs to escape from the trials and travails of their daily lives. Such "shortcomings" in the family as divorce, excessive drinking by parents, the absence of warm and loving bonds among family members are all seen as driving youths to seek solace in drugs.[39] Then too, drug abuse among certain ethnic groups (particularly Muslim peoples of Central Asia) is viewed as a "vestige of the past," i.e., the use of drugs is viewed as something that is embedded in traditional culture.[40]

Those close to the treatment of addicts see official reticence about drug abuse contributing to the problem. A prominent drug treatment specialist contends that the public must understand that to use an illicit drug even once "can lead to tragedy" and called for a comprehensive campaign to alert the citizenry to the dangers of drugs.[41] Still others argue—without providing compelling evidence in substantiation—that Mikhail Gorbachev's campaign to combat alcoholism unintentionally fosters drug use among individuals who now seek substitutes to satisfy their craving for vodka.[42]

Still others point to more fundamental issues, including failings of official policies at home and abroad, as contributing to drug abuse:

If one thinks that upbringing is only a task of schools, family, slogans, and brilliant lectures by intelligent teachers, one can make a dangerous mistake. Unfortu-

[36]*Moskovskaya Pravda* (Moscow), June 11, 1986.
[37]*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Aug. 20, 1986.
[38]*Kommunist Tadzhikistana* (Dushanbe), Aug. 1, 1986.
[39]For a typical exposition of this argument, see *Bakinskiy Rabochiy*, Aug. 26, 1986.
[40]See, e.g., *Izvestiya*, Oct. 3, 1986; and *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, Aug. 1, 1986.
[41]Moscow Domestic Service, Dec. 15, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 18, 1987, 42. Polling data from the Georgian SSR indicate that 90 percent of the drug users surveyed "did not know about the pernicious consequences of narcotics when they reached for the poison the first time." *Izvestiya*, Aug. 12, 1986. A similar argument is made in *Uchitelskaya Gazeta* (Moscow) Jan. 10, 1987.
[42]See, e.g., *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, June 8, 1986; and *Moskovskaya Pravda*, June 12, 1986.
On the other hand, the deputy head of the Main Administration for Criminal Investigation of the USSR MVD asserts that no definitive data establish a link between increased consumption of illicit drugs and Gorbachev's anti-alcoholism compaign. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Aug. 20, 1986. Lending credence to this assessment, are the numerous reports indicating that the Gorbachev campaign has encountered serious obstacles and done little to reduce the overall consumption of alcohol in the USSR. Indeed, the campaign is far more likely to have stimulated the consumption of *samogon*—i.e., "moonshine"—than of illicit drugs. On the problems encountered in the anti-alcoholism campaign, see *Izvestiya*, Oct. 3, 1987.

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nately, we haven't avoided this mistake. Economic miscalculations, discrepancies between words and deeds, and wishful thinking have brought moral losses and created a moral vacuum. Drug addiction has sprouted from this ground.[43]

In particular, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan may have contributed to drug abuse. Published accounts report widespread use of hashish and sundry opiates among Soviet troops in that country. Reportedly, upon their return to the Soviet Union, many of these veterans continue their drug habit, in part to erase memories of the war.[44]

Although these explanations may all have some merit, the nascent state of the etiology of drug abuse in the USSR is obvious. To be sure, Western specialists as well advance numerous—and conflicting—physiological, psychological, and sociocultural hypotheses to explain drug abuse.[45] The unique physical and psychological makeup of each individual probably precludes any definitive explanation for the phenomenon. Nevertheless, both Soviet and Western researchers agree that drugs can become a placebo for adolescents seeking to cope with the emotional insecurities and vulnerabilities typical of their stage in life.

Acquiring Drugs

Soviet drug abusers can acquire drugs in numerous ways. Frequently, they purchase drugs from professional traffickers. For example, more than 70 percent of the drug users surveyed in Soviet Georgia in 1977 indicated that they acquired drugs principally by this means.[46] The vast areas in the Soviet Union where poppies and hemp grow wild or are cultivated either legally by collective farmers or illegally by "hundreds of thousands" of households are a major source of raw materials for drugs. Although the poppy harvest supposedly is reserved exclusively for the production of legal drugs and for culinary purposes, much of the crop is sold on the black market to organized drug manufacturers and individuals who produce opium-based derivatives from

A police official writes up a report during a raid on a drug den in Leningrad.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

it. Collective farmers often more than double their incomes through the lucrative trade in poppies.[47] A deputy minister of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture calls the growth of wild hemp (from which hashish is produced) the "problem of problems" in the spread of drug abuse and admits that, to date, his ministry has been "powerless" to stop it. This same official estimates that upwards of 50 percent of the hemp and poppy crop grown legally on collective farms remains in the fields after harvesting and becomes a fertile source of drugs for both local users and illegal drug producers.[48]

Pharmacies, hospitals, and other medical establishments provide another source of drugs for illicit use. Reportedly, such institutions have become the principal source for illicit drugs of 30–40 percent of the drug abusers in Leningrad, Moscow, and the Baltic republics.[49]

[43] *Sobesednik* (Moscow), No. 40, September 1986.

[44] Ibid., No. 2, January 1988. A Soviet officer recently returned from Afghanistan asserts: "Poppy is everywhere in Afghanistan. It's not forbidden there, and, well, some of our guys develop an easygoing attitude toward drugs." Quoted in Bill Keller, "Home from Afghanistan," *The New York Times Sunday Magazine*, Feb. 14, 1988, p. 86. For an overall discussion of drug abuse in the Soviet military, see *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Nov. 28, 1987.

[45] A compilation of these theories appears in O'Brien and Cohen, op. cit., esp. pp. 274–79.

[46] *Zarya Vostoka*, Feb. 20, 1987.

[47] *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, June 8, 1986. *Izvestiya*, Oct. 6, 1987, was the source of the comment that "hundreds of thousands" of households illegally grow poppies and hemp.

[48] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Aug. 20, 1986.

[49] As reported by the head of the Main Administration for Criminal Investigation of the USSR MVD in *Izvestiya*, Feb. 29, 1988.

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Approximately 1,000 kilograms of hashish seized in the Moscow region on October 13, 1987, is set on fire.

—Novosti from Sovfoto.

These drugs are obtained by theft, use of fraudulent prescriptions, or purchase of stolen drugs from personnel employed in these institutions. Supposedly, pharmacies exercise strict control over the filling of prescriptions, but, according to one law enforcement official, to believe they actually do so is "wishful thinking."[50]

Drugs also become available through smugglers, either amateur or professional. The former consist of individuals among the thousands of foreign tourists and students who annually visit the USSR who bring with them drugs to sell or give to local friends and acquaintances.[51] However, the bulk of smuggling is professional, with the drugs being destined directly for the Soviet Union or falling out from shipments transiting the USSR from Asia and the Middle East to Western Europe and the United States.

No published estimates exist on the volume of drugs smuggled into the USSR. Soviet sources themselves contend that strict controls at borders over the movement of both goods and individuals substantially limit the extent of smuggling.[52] At the same time, there are indications that "chinks" exist in the wall erected by the Soviet customs service,[53] and as we shall see below, Moscow is sufficiently concerned about drug smuggling to be exploring international arrangements to combat it.

Finally, abusers satisfy their habit through the use of commodities obtained legally. Thus, they inhale volatile substances (e.g., glue and paint remover), they swallow brews of legitimate medicines mixed with alcohol or strong teas, and they produce synthetic or semi-synthetic drugs from legally available chemicals and other ingredients.[54]

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[50]*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Aug. 20, 1986. On the other hand, enhanced security measures have, according to one report, "sharply reduced" the theft of drugs from pharmacies. *Pravda*, Feb. 17, 1988. These measures include connecting almost all pharmacies to centralized burglar-alarm systems and creating at many stores an additional (but unspecified) "two or three lines of defense." *Izvestiya*, Feb. 29, 1988.

[51]For an accusation that such practices occur, see Moscow Domestic Service, Jan. 29, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 2, 1988, p. 63.

[52]See, e.g., *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Aug. 20, 1986.

[53]On the "chinks," see *Pravda*, Feb. 3, 1988. The problem is apparently particularly serious along the border of Turkmenistan with Afghanistan and Iran. See TASS, Apr. 15, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 19, 1988.

[54]See *Izvestiya*, Mar. 26, 1988. The minister of the USSR MVD estimates that there are 22,000 individuals who satisfy their drug habit primarily by sniffing glue. TASS, Mar. 26, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 5, 1988, p. 49.

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Definitive generalizations cannot be made about expenditures on illicit drugs in the USSR. However, the data available do suggest that for many individuals, these expenditures each month substantially exceed the average monthly wage of a Soviet worker. In the 1977 poll of drug users in Soviet Georgia, 44 percent of those surveyed reported monthly expenditures on drugs of 300–500 rubles, and 36 percent reported expenditures of more than 500 rubles. A similar survey (whose size and composition remains unpublished) conducted by the USSR MVD found that in its sample, 22 percent spent 1,000–3,000 rubles, and 8 percent spent 300–500 rubles each month on drugs.[55]

Drug users often resort to various criminal activities to acquire such sums. By one report, 40,000 crimes "stemming from drug addiction" are committed each year in the Soviet Union.[56] Drug addicts are said to be responsible in "some regions" for upwards of 60 percent of all burglaries of apartments, and there are even cases of drug-related murders.[57] The head of the Main Administration for Criminal Investigation of the USSR MVD, reversing long-standing official silence on the subject of organized crime in the Soviet Union, recently charged that a "Narco-Mafia" of organized drug dealers and pushers dominates the illicit trade in drugs in the Soviet Union.[58] Dr. A. A. Gabiani, head of the Georgian MVD's Laboratory of Criminal Sociology, in Tbilisi, estimates that in the republic of Georgia alone this illicit trade approaches 40 million rubles annually.[59]

Not surprisingly, law enforcement officials responsible for combating this illegality—especially local cadres of the MVD—at times are corrupted and find themselves "caught in the clinging web that is the drug trade."[60] This circumstance helps explain how many drug traffickers allegedly can ply their wares openly even when they and their activities are known to the authorities.[61] Consequently, one may be somewhat skeptical about the recent claim that "drug-related crimes" have declined by 25 percent (in comparison to what year remains unspecified).[62]

Responses

The first step in combating drug abuse is to acknowledge its existence, which the Soviet Union is now beginning to do. Since 1986, the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR Supreme Court, and the Procurator General of both the USSR and the Russian republic have each held official sessions on the subject.[63] The Komsomol recently established a commission to combat social pathologies—including drug abuse—among young people.[64] Members of the Institute of Public Opinion of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs even published an open letter which claims that drug abuse represents a "serious latent threat to . . . the physical and moral health" of the Georgian people and calls upon the citizenry "to apply their whole attention, strength, and knowledge" to combat it.[65]

Yet, many personnel in the MVD charged with combating drug abuse are said to still believe that "in some parts of the country there is absolutely no drug abuse whatsoever." This "delusion," as one source characterizes it, helps explain why these personnel work "slowly" and do a "poor job" in the performance of their duties.[66] It is not surprising to hear opinions that the battle against drug abuse has just begun.[67] Reflecting their still nascent state, anti-drug initiatives often are subsumed under institutions and policies concerned primarily with problems of alcoholism and mental health rather than specifically with drug abuse.

Punitive measures predominate among initiatives that have been undertaken. A letter to the editor of *Pravda Ukrainy* expresses the rationale for such initiatives:

Addicts don't need to be rescued, they ought to get properly punished. . . . How long can we go on bending over backwards and "educate" this scum? . . . The place for addicts is on the rubbish heap! [68]

[55] *Zarya Vostoka*, Feb. 20, 1987; and *Izvestiya*, May 13, 1987.

[56] *Izvestiya*, May 13, 1987, information provided by the head of the Main Administration for Criminal Investigation of the USSR MVD.

[57] *Izvestiya*, Feb. 29, 1988. This item suggested that the murders have occurred primarily in Central Asia.

[58] This official stated: "No matter what we call it, the Narco-Mafia or an organized criminal group, . . . coherent professional group crime does exist and has for a long time. See Moscow Television Service, Feb. 19, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 26, 1988, p. 62.

[59] *Sotsialogicheskiye Issledovaniye*, No. 1, 1987.

[60] *Pravda*, Feb. 18, 1988. *Glasnost'* has brought reports of widespread corruption among MVD personnel. The head of the USSR MVD reports that in 1983–85, approximately 160,000 ministry employees were dismissed "for violation of law and order, for their being unable to attend to their duties." See TASS, Mar. 26, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 5, 1988, p. 48.

[61] The head of the Main Administration for Criminal Investigation of the USSR MVD makes this charge in *Pravda*, Feb. 17, 1988. A similar accusation is made in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Jan. 14, 1987.

[62] *Pravda*, Feb. 17, 1988.

[63] See *Izvestiya*, Mar. 5 and Jan. 1, 1988; and *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Dec. 26, 1986.

[64] Moscow Domestic Service, Jan. 29, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 2, 1988, p. 63.

[65] *Zarya Vostoka*, Feb. 10, 1987.

[66] Remarks by the head of the Main Admistration for Criminal Investigation of the USSR MVD. *Izvestiya*, Feb. 29, 1988.

[67] Ibid.; *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, Mar. 3, 1988; and Moscow Domestic Service, Dec. 15, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 18, 1987, p. 41.

[68] *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kiev), Nov. 23, 1986.

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The laws on drug offenses have generally reflected this sentiment. Under the Criminal Code of the Russian republic, the illegal manufacture, acquisition, storage, and transport of narcotic substances with intent to sell, or actual sale are punishable by deprivation of freedom for up to 10 years (with or without confiscation of property). These same acts when committed without intent to sell entail deprivation of freedom for up to three years or, in the case of recidivists, for up to five years. The Criminal Code also specifies criminal liability for the planting or cultivation of forbidden crops that are considered to contain narcotic substances (e.g., poppies and several types of hemp), the setting up or maintaining of places for the use of narcotics, and the habitual consumption of narcotics.[69]

The republic of Georgia specifies even harsher penalties for several of these acts. Thus, activities associated with intent to sell, or the actual sale of, narcotic substances entail deprivation of freedom for up to 15 years with confiscation of property. Persons using or attempting to use narcotic substances without a doctor's prescription are subject to arrest for terms of 10–15 days.[70]

A drug addict is brought to a police station in the Lenin district of Leningrad.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

The criminal codes of Kirgiziya and Uzbekistan contain similar provisions against the use of narcotics, while in all other union republics, drug abuse is an administrative offense usually punishable by fine. In November 1987, Turkmenistan eliminated criminal penalties—which had amounted to prison terms for up to one year or corrective labor for up to two years—for the use of narcotics.[71]

In both 1986 and 1987, criminal proceedings were instituted against approximately 30,000 individuals for sundry drug-related offenses. Without providing precise figures, one source indicates that many of these individuals were indicted for "little things" involving the possession and/or use of illicit narcotic substances.[72] Typically, courts sentence individuals convicted of the illegal manufacture, acquisition, storage, and transport of narcotic substances with intent to sell to deprivation of freedom for 1–2 years.[73]

"Some" 500 individuals also have been indicted "recently" for stealing drugs from facilities of the USSR Ministry of Public Health.[74] In one instance, five nurses who were convicted of this offense with intent to sell received prison terms of up to 13 years.[75]

Some critics attack current legislation and its application as being too lenient.[76] Ironically, other critics charge that judges are overly harsh, particularly in applying criminal sanctions entailing deprivation of freedom to individuals convicted of possession for personal use of small quantities of drugs, including hashish and marijuana.[77]

Official policy appears to be moving toward decriminalization of casual drug use. Reportedly, the USSR MVD no longer institutes criminal proceedings against

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[69]For a detailed discussion of anti-drug legislation in the USSR, see *Meditsinskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Apr. 9, 1986. The relevant articles in the Criminal Code of the Russian republic are Nos. 224–26.

[70]*Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 7, 1987, 67–69. The relevant article in the Criminal Code of the Georgian SSR is No. 252.

[71]See RFE-RL, *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 70/87, Feb. 19, 1987; and TASS, Nov. 19, 1987, cited in ibid., RL 473/87, Nov. 20, 1987.

[72]*Izvestiya*, Feb. 29, 1988.

[73]This figure comes from a survey of court practice reported in *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 7, 1987, p. 69.

[74]*Pravda*, Feb. 17, 1988.

[75]*Meditsinskaya Gazeta*, Apr. 9, 1986.

[76]For example, Dr. A. A. Gabiani reports that courts in Soviet Georgia "frequently" apply to drug dealers (even including "organized criminal dealers of narcotics") the less stringent sanctions intended for those who only use, but do not sell, narcotics. The courts take "the path of least resistance," in Gabiani's opinion, because they do not want "to trouble themselves with the complex procedures for demonstration of guilt in the sale of narcotics." *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 7, 1987, pp. 67–68.

[77]See, for example, the commentary in *Moscow News*, Aug. 19, 1987. Even Dr. Gabiani notes that incarceration can turn casual drug users into hardened addicts by placing them in prison conditions where illicit drugs are readily available and fellow inmates themselves often are addicts. See *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 7, 1987, p. 67.

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people found to possess small quantities of illicit drugs or who voluntarily turn themselves in to the authorities.[78] Further, guidelines issued recently by the USSR Supreme Court imply that judges should treat less harshly individuals convicted of possession for personal use or sale of hashish, marijuana, and other nonnarcotic drugs.[79]

The USSR MVD is candid in admitting "serious shortcomings" in its efforts to combat the illegal drug trade. While uncovering "tens of thousands" of drug-related crimes a year, they admittedly apprehend only a small number of drug dealers and pushers. One official estimated that the police confiscate "no more" than 15 percent of the illicit drugs in the USSR.[80] Enforcement activity suffers from corruption, from inadequate training, and the lack of even the most elementary equipment, including motor vehicles and devices to determine the quantity and type of drug that an individual has consumed.[81]

Extensive and well-publicized efforts to reduce the size of, or limit access to, the poppy and hemp crops have proven particularly ineffective:

We attack it wherever we can; we cut it, burn it, treat it with herbicides, and plow it under. We made all the farmers promise to work to exterminate it. And we created special units to fight it . . . . But all of these measures are not very effective.[82]

Concern for the impact on the environment of plowing under poppy and hemp crops, or spraying huge areas with highly toxic herbicides has impeded efforts to reduce these crops.[83]

The Soviet Union has turned to specialists from the United States to develop a special herbicide that would destroy only hemp plants while leaving surrounding vegetation unharmed, but nothing has resulted so far.[84] And Soviet specialists are seeking, so far in vain, to develop new varieties of hemp with minimal narcotic content.[85] Whether the recent decision to discontinue legal cultivation of certain types of poppies (and rely upon importation to meet demand for culinary and medicinal purposes) will appreciably reduce the availability of illegal drugs remains to be seen.[86]

A number of Soviet specialists have been arguing that drug abuse is a medical, not a legal, problem and should be treated as such. Reflecting this attitude, a senior official in the USSR MVD commented that "society does not gain when, instead of trying to treat a patient, we send him to a corrective labor camp."[87] Hence, the spate of legislation noted above decriminalizing the improper use of drugs.

To encourage users to seek therapy, officials have pledged that those who do so voluntarily are to incur no criminal liability (although they will be registered with the police and must undergo therapy).[88] Authorities in Moscow have established a "hotline" for drug users which dispenses advice and counseling in times of crisis. "If you have a problem or face a difficult moment, telephone us," reads a small advertisement about the service in *Vechernaya Moskva*. "Secrecy is guaranteed," the advertisement asserts.[89] Yet, one still reads of proposals for measures such as prohibiting a user from marrying until successful completion of rehabilitation therapy, a measure that would surely discourage volunteering for treatment.[90]

The USSR Supreme Court recently instructed that courts are "obliged" to "consider" compulsory treatment for drug addicts who refuse voluntary treatment.[91]

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[78] *Izvestiya*, Feb. 29, 1988.

[79] The guidelines instruct courts to consider in such cases not only the quantity of drugs involved but also the "characteristics of the varying kinds of narcotics in terms of the degree of their effect on the human body." *Izvestiya*, Jan. 1, 1988.

Another source reports that recent amendments and supplements to the criminal law on drug addiction establish standards for "smaller quantities of drugs"—although it does not indicate what drugs come under the new standards. See Moscow Television Service, Jan. 11, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 19, 1988, p. 64.

[80] From interviews with the Minister of the USSR MVD and the head of the Main Administration for Criminal Investigation of the USSR MVD published in *Pravda*, Jan. 6, 1987; and *Izvestiya*, Feb. 29, 1988. Also, *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, June 8, 1986.

[81] The head of the Main Administration for Criminal Investigation expresses concern that without proper diagnostic equipment MVD personnel run the risk of committing sundry illegalities in apprehending, and may even charge innocent people with being, drug users. *Izvestiya*, Feb. 29, 1988.

[82] Ibid., June 30, 1986. In one such operation—code-named "Poppy 86"—the police reportedly detained 300 drug traffickers and 4,000 drug dealers and destroyed poppies and hemp growing wild on thousands of acres of land. See *Pravda*, Jan. 6, 1987. For a description of a similar operation—code-named "Black Poppy"—see *Sel'skaya Zhizn'* (Moscow), Aug. 18, 1987.

[83] *Izvestiya*, Feb. 29, 1988. The USSR Minister of the Interior has argued that concern for the environment should not impede efforts to eradicate wild hemp and poppies. *Pravda*, Jan. 6, 1987.

[84] *Izvestiya*, Feb. 29, 1988.

[85] This effort is proceeding "slowly," according to the USSR Minister of the Interior. *Pravda*, Jan. 6, 1987.

[86] TASS, Feb. 16, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 24, 1988, p. 54. Reportedly, this decision was "not reached easily," as several agencies argued that the poppy had too many economic uses to ban its cultivation. See *Izvestiya*, Oct. 6, 1987.

[87] Quoted in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Aug. 20, 1986. For expressions of similar sentiments, see, for example, *Izvestiya*, Aug. 12, 1986; and *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, Jan. 11, 1987.

[88] *Ogonek* (Mosocw), No. 8, February 1988.

[89] As quoted in Agence France-Presse, Aug. 22, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 22, 1986, p. R/6.

[90] This proposal was made in a roundtable discussion of initiatives to combat drug abuse, published in *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 8, 1987, p. 138.

[91] Reported in *Izvestiya*, Jan. 1, 1988.

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Addicts undergoing rehabilitation at a drug clinic in Belorussia receive vocational training.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Addicts undergo such treatment in "closed-type therapy and labor-rehabilitation centers" run by the police. Inmates receive wages for labor performed, but those who attempt to escape are subject to prison terms of up to one year.[92]

Reportedly, in 1987, of the individuals officially registered as drug addicts, 40,000 underwent voluntary, and 4,000 underwent compulsory medical treatment for their addiction.[93] This indicates that in that year, more than 80 percent of the registered addicts underwent either voluntary or compulsory drug addiction therapy. Officials also claim that some 15,000—or almost 40 percent—of the individuals who underwent voluntary treatment have now "stopped using narcotics."[94]

One should assess these claims cautiously. First, the Russian republic's health minister reports that in 1986, only 25 percent of the registered drug addicts in the USSR received any medical treatment whatsoever for their condition.[95] Even allowing for an increase in resources available for drug addiction therapy, it seems improbable that treatment could have extended to such a greater percentage of registered addicts in 1987, or, if it had been, that the treatment rendered was anything but cursory. Second, few if any treatment programs for drug addiction anywhere else in the world can boast of the rate of success that the Soviets claim for theirs. Third, it may be premature to claim that addicts have permanently ended their habits when, as Soviet sources frankly admit, many so-called "cured" addicts soon succumb again to the lure of drugs.[96]

Finally, there is considerable evidence that existing drug treatment facilities and procedures are woefully inadequate to their task.[97] The Russian republic's health minister has been outspoken on the subject. In his opinion, there are "no physicians in the USSR who know how to treat drug addicts properly" (in part, because medical schools offer no training in this area). The addicts who are treated usually receive a "high-speed" treatment of 7–8 days that has proven largely ineffective. The official recommends that treatment extend for "at least" 60 days with continued close supervision of the addict upon completion of formal therapy. And he feels "in no uncertain terms" that the alcohol abuse clinics where drug addicts typically receive treatment have proven unsuited for this purpose. His overall assessment of drug treatment is blunt: "As yet, there is no effective therapy for drug addiction" in the USSR.[98] The head of the Main Administration for Criminal Investigation of the USSR MVD has recommended that drug treatment specialists in the Soviet Union examine—and, wherever feasible, adopt—the practices of their counterparts in other countries.[99]

Efforts to alert the population to the dangers of drugs constitute another body of measures. Typically, these

[92]See *Pravda*, Jan. 6, 1987, for a discussion of the policy for compulsory treatment of drug addicts; also, *The Washington Post*, Jan. 7, 1987.

[93]TASS, Feb. 16, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 24, 1988, p. 54; also, *Izvestiya*, Feb. 29, 1988.

[94]Moscow Television Service, Feb. 19, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 26, 1988, p. 62; and also the TASS report sourced in fn. 93

[95]*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Aug. 20, 1986.

[96]See, e.g., *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 8, 1987, p. 137; and *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Aug. 20, 1986.

[97]Thus, the head of the Main Administration for Criminal Investigation of the USSR MVD, after citing the data on the numbers who purportedly have voluntarily undergone successful treatment for their addiction, has asserted that the "effectiveness of addiction treatment and the monitoring of treatment proper remain urgent questions." *Izvestiya*, Feb. 29, 1988.

[98]From an interview published in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Aug. 20, 1986.

[99]As reported by TASS, Feb. 16, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 24, 1988, p. 55.

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measures have been heavy-handed and overly didactic. Documentaries about drug abuse have appeared on television with such titles as "Children of Vice," "Pain," and "Business Trip to Hell." An article entitled "A Warning," describing the horrors of drug addiction, appeared in a mass circulation weekly. At one point, a young addict calls the individual who supplies him with drugs "my Mephistopheles" and adds that "as a rule, drug addicts are a cowardly but inquisitive lot."[100] Three million copies of an informational pamphlet about drugs, "Beware of the White Cloud," have been prepared for distribution in Soviet schools (see a reproduction of the cover in the adjacent column).[101]

The authorities have encountered resistance to their efforts to speak out about drugs. In one instance, a conference of educators prevented doctors from addressing them about drug abuse "on the pretext that there were more important problems and the topic was not appropriate for a wide audience."[102]

Finally, the USSR has begun to cooperate with both capitalist and communist states to combat drug abuse. This cooperation—although still limited—reverses the traditional official attitude that saw drug abuse as a problem principally of capitalist states and of little concern to the USSR. Although the Soviet Union is a signatory to both the 1961 United Nations Uniform Convention on Narcotics and the 1971 United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances, its fulfillment of their obligations has been, to date, mostly perfunctory.[103]

Now, however, the Soviet Union is apparently contemplating joining Interpol and has concluded a bilateral agreement with Great Britain to combat international drug trafficking.[104] Soviet specialists have visited France, Great Britain, and the United States to coordinate multilateral efforts to this same end. Reportedly, the Soviet Union has shared intelligence with the United States and other Western nations that has resulted in the seizure of illegal drugs and the arrest of traffickers. In response to a Soviet request, the United States Drug Enforcement Agency has begun to train Soviet personnel in drug enforcement skills.[105] The USSR was also an active participant in the 1987 UN-sponsored conference on drug abuse held in Vienna.[106] In May 1987, representatives from all the communist states of Europe (ex-

The cover of a Soviet leaflet on drugs that reads "Beware of the White Cloud! For a Few Minutes' High the Consequences Are Terrifying, Rise Up as One Against Drug Addiction."

—Reprinted with permission from *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), Feb. 11, 1987.

[100]See *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, June 8, 1986. On the television documentaries about drug abuse, see *Izvestiya*, Aug. 12, 1986. The article "A Warning" appeared in *Nedelya* (Moscow), Jan. 12, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 17, 1986, pp. R/2–3.

[101]The contents of the pamphlet are discussed in *Uchitelskaya Gazeta*, Jan. 15, 1987. For a highly critical assessment of the work of educational institutions in alerting their students to the dangers of drugs, see *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Dec. 26, 1986.

[102]*Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Aug. 31, 1986. At times, parents have resisted efforts by teachers to inform them of the drug-related activities of their progeny. See *Sobesednik*, No. 4, September 1986.

[103]For an analysis of these conventions by a Soviet author, see L. N. Anisimov, *Narkotiki: Pravovoy Rezhim* (Narcotics: The Legal Setting), Leningrad, Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo Universiteta, 1974, pp. 34–54, 63–72.

[104]The Secretary General of Interpol in 1986 predicted that it would be "only a short time before the Soviet Union applies to join Interpol. They are beginning to acknowledge that they have a problem." *The Times* (London), April 6, 1986. However, a spokesman for the USSR MVD, while confirming Soviet interest in joining Interpol, said it was premature to think this would occur "soon." TASS, Apr. 22, 1988, cited in *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 77/87, Apr. 22, 1988.

On the "memorandum of understanding" signed in February 1988 by the USSR and Great Britain setting forth provisions of a proposed convention to combat drug trafficking, see *The New York Times*, May 1, 1988.

[105]For details of these activities, see *The Washington Post*, Feb. 21, 1988; and *The New York Times*, May 1, 1988. The latter source recounts Soviet assistance that facilitated the seizure by British authorities of 3.5 tons of hashish.

[106]*Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, Sept. 16, 1987.

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cept Albania and Yugoslavia), plus Cuba and Mongolia met in Sofia, Bulgaria, to discuss cooperative efforts to interdict international drug trafficking.[107]

Despite (and perhaps even as one reason for) the signs of increased Soviet cooperation with international efforts to stem drug trafficking, there have been charges leveled by the United States that the Soviet Union and other socialist states engage in drug trafficking to earn hard currency and undermine the moral fabric of Western societies.[108] One recent study, coauthored by a defector who had been a senior officer in the Czechoslovak armed forces, asserts that the Soviets began to realize the potential efficacy of the "drug weapon" when they discovered widespread use of drugs among US troops during the Korean war. Reportedly, this discovery led Soviet analysts to conclude that drugs could be employed as a long-term strategic weapon to cripple capitalist societies, especially in the United States, Canada, France, and West Germany. Nikita Khrushchev is said to have justified the morality of this strategy by asserting that "anything that speeds the destruction of capitalism is moral."[109]

Not surprisingly, the USSR itself denounces these allegations as falsehood perpetrated by its ideological opponents to embarrass the Soviet Union.[110] A senior official of the US Department of State told a Congressional hearing in 1985 that while there was indication that "certain of the Communist countries have engaged to some degree in facilitating narcotics trafficking," he did not have evidence of a "Communist conspiracy to use drugs to undermine Western democracies or our own society in particular."[111]

What Is To Be Done?

The USSR has taken the necessary first step to combat drug abuse by acknowledging the danger this phenomenon poses to Soviet society. Increasingly sophisticated and realistic initiatives are apparently being undertaken to reduce abuse. Efforts to decriminalize the casual use of (especially non-narcotic) drugs is one example. Another example is the greater willingness of the USSR to cooperate with—and seek assistance from—other states to combat drug abuse.

Overall, however, efforts to combat the drug problem have to date been limited and mostly ineffectual. The present study makes clear that drug abuse has become—and will remain—a serious social problem affecting many segments of Soviet society. There is no assurance that the Soviet leadership will take the necessary steps to mount an effective campaign against this social pathology. These would include improving research and public dissemination of the results, developing distinctive treatment for drug abusers (as opposed to alcoholics or persons with mental health problems), informing the public in sober terms of the dangers of drug abuse, tightening access to drugs, adopting the positive experience of other societies in the battle against drug abuse,[112] and fully cooperating with other governments and international institutions in interdicting international drug trafficking and in peforming research on drug abuse. There is little reason to predict at this moment that the USSR will avoid most of the mistakes of its capitalist counterparts in the fight against "narcomania."

[107]Bulgarska Telegrafna Agentsiia (BTA, May 12, 1987, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Europe* (Washington, DC), May 14, 1987, p. AA/2.

[108]For a discussion of these allegations, see *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Sept. 26, 1984.

[109]Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. and Jan Sejna, "International Narcotics Trafficking: The Soviet Connection," *Journal of Defense and Diplomacy* (McLean, VA), December 1986, pp. 20–25. Before his defection, Sejna was secretary of the Czechoslovak Defense Council and Chief of Cabinet at the Ministry of Defense.

[110]Moscow Television Service, Dec. 18, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 22, 1986, p. R/12. Similar allegations are made in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Dec. 19, 1986.

[111]From the "Prepared Statement" of Clyde D. Taylor, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of International Narcotic Matters, US Department of State, inserted into the record of *International Terrorism, Insurgency, and Drug Trafficking: Present Trends in Terrorist Activity*, Joint Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on the Judiciary of the US Senate, May 14, 1985, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1985, p. 119.

[112]An example would be Poland, where private citizens and public institutions are cooperating in the effort. See Kramer, "Drug Abuse in the USSR and Eastern Europe," loc. cit.

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Notes

Reforms and Civil Society in the USSR

James P. Scanlan

AMONG the more dramatic signs of *perestroyka* or restructuring in the Soviet Union today are the liberalizations in thought and expression that fall under the heading of *glasnost'* or openness. Without question, *glasnost'* has brought some striking changes to the Soviet cultural scene. Soviet commentators speak of an intellectual atmosphere very different from that which prevailed only a few years ago. The outspoken social scientist Tatyana Zaslavskaya has called her earlier professional career and her work under *glasnost'* "two separate lives."[1] Nikolay Shmelev, one of the more ardent champions of economic reform in the Soviet Union, speaks of "a time of true rebirth in our public thinking."[2] "Today," the philosopher Gennadiy Batygin writes, "we are learning to live with diversity of interests and opinions and to accept dissent as a valuable social asset."[3] Be they rebirth or learning experience, such developments as the newly daring editorial policies of *Moscow News, Ogonek,* and *Novyy mir;* the publication of works by Boris Pasternak, Vladimir Nabokov, and Joseph Brodsky; the exhibition of canvases by Marc Chagall, Wassily Kandinsky, and Kasimir Malevich; the more open reporting on crime statistics and disasters; wider access to historical archives; freewheeling discussion of the ongoing economic reforms—all these developments are symptoms of a degree of intellectual freedom unknown in the Soviet Union since the 1920's.

Less obvious, perhaps, than the current phenomenon of *glasnost'* are the conceptual contours of the notion and its place in the broader program of "democratization" advocated by Mikhail Gorbachev. The Russian word *glasnost',* one not frequently encountered in the Soviet Union in the past, has itself occasioned some skepticism, especially among Western observers who note that it can be translated as "publicity" and who wonder whether the now standard translation of "openness" is misleading. These doubts are largely unjustified, however, given the actual use of the term by Soviet speakers and writers. Indeed, some writers now add, in apposition, another Russian word—*otkrytost',* which *literally* means "openness." "Publicity," though sometimes an appropriate rendering of *glasnost',* is generally off the mark because it fails to catch the vox populi dimension of the term which goes back to the Old-Slavonic root *glas,* which in modern Russian is *golos,* meaning "voice" or "vote." Hence the term suggests "having one's say," and means at the very least not just "publicity," which is compatible with rigid information control, but "open publicity" or "public openness," which allows various voices to be heard. For that reason "openness" is still the best single English term for the semantically rich Russian notion. Certainly the usages of the term in the political and theoretical pronouncements on *perestroyka* are consistent with the standard translation, emphasizing as they do the free expression of opinions, candor on the part of public officials, and the ability to criticize both policies and cadres. And it is precisely these features, of course, that connect the concept with democracy.

In his book *Perestroika,* General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev stresses the functions of *glasnost'* in promoting two prime requisites of democratic government—an open quest for truth and the answerability of government to the people. In tones reminiscent of the English champion of liberty John Stuart Mill—whose

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[1]See her interview with *Newsweek* (New York), Sept. 7, 1987, p. 56.
[2]Nikolay Shmelev, "Advances and Debts," *Novyy Mir* (Moscow), No. 6, 1987, p. 142.
[3]Gennadiy Batygin, "Is the Majority Always Right?," *New Times* (Moscow), Oct. 26, 1987, p. 23.

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writings, however, are still unpublished in the USSR—Gorbachev insists that no one can claim a monopoly on truth and that dissenting opinions must be heard out: "Even the most extreme viewpoint," he writes, "contains something valuable and rational." Similarly, publicity concerning policies and the airing of public criticisms of policies are said to be necessary as a form of popular control over the activities of government: "We won't be able to advance if we don't check how our policy responds to criticism, especially criticism from below, if we don't fight negative developments, don't prevent them, and don't react to information from below." In brief, Gorbachev advocates a measure of free expression as an essential condition of democratic government: "There is no democracy, nor can there be, without *glasnost'*."[4]

IN THIS connection, *glasnost'* must be seen as part of a broader concern in the Soviet reform movement with a range of individual rights and freedoms. Although liberalizations relating to freedom of information and expression have received the most attention outside the Soviet Union, other developments of equal potential significance for the expansion of civil rights either appear to be under way or are being discussed—in particular, measures to strengthen legal safeguards of rights and freedoms. These measures include a major overhaul of the country's criminal code which, if approved as drafted, would eliminate the system of internal exile and banishment widely used since tsarist times, reduce the length of maximum prison terms, and lower the number of crimes punishable by death (a category which now includes crimes against property as well as crimes against persons).[5]

Among new laws already enacted, one that took effect on January 1, 1988, gives citizens the right to appeal certain actions by officials that infringe their rights; another law, directed against abuses of psychiatry, gives committed patients and their relatives the right to appeal doctors' decisions in court and makes the commitment of a "patently healthy person" a criminal offense. There is also considerable criticism in the Soviet press and theoretical literature of the "internal visa" or residence permit system, which restricts freedom of movement in the USSR, and of the widespread de facto violation of a fundamental legal right, nominally incorporated in the Soviet legal system, of being considered innocent until proven guilty. In addition to calling for specific legal safeguards, spokesmen for the new thinking also consistently call for a new general spirit toward individual actions on the part of the authorities—for acceptance of the maxim that "whatever is not legally forbidden is permitted" to replace the former pervasive Soviet attitude that whatever is not explicitly authorized by law or administrative decree is forbidden. All such rights of free individual action, like the rights to obtain information and express one's opinions that are comprehended under *glasnost'*, are presented as requisites of sound democratic practice.[6]

Some Soviet observers attribute the weak protection currently given to individual rights and liberties in the USSR to the persistence of the prerevolutionary mentality of "bowing humbly to the tsar-father," as one writer expressed it, but others connect the phenomenon, as Western critics have for decades, with the general disregard of the individual in Marxist-Leninist ideology. The jurist Yuriy Kudryavtsev writes that "it is easy to lose sight of the individual person—the bearer of social and economic rights—behind the concepts of 'the masses' and 'the millions'." Marxism's basic unit of analysis has been the group, not the individual, and its doctrines have been propounded from a group point of view. Batygin writes: "We preferred to speak of the individual only as a member of a collective, a class, or society as a whole," with the understanding that this individual must always yield to the group. But now, he continues, "the ideal of sacrifice and asceticism, the unquestionable priority of the social over the personal are gradually giving way." Such ideas must be replaced, Kudryavtsev argues, by "unconditional respect" for human rights and liberties; "the situation with respect to the rights of the individual is a highly important index of the democratic nature of a society."[7]

One of the most original and penetrating analyses in the Soviet literature of both the origin of ultra-collectivism in the USSR and the means of overcoming it is contained in a discussion of the idea of "civil society" published in the journal *Voprosy Filosofii* by the historian Andranik Migranian. If the socialist revolution were to take place in a fully developed capitalist society (as Marx envisaged), Migranian argues, the socialist system would be supported by a developed "civil society"—that is, by a broad network of nonpolitical

[4]Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World,* New York, Harper and Row, 1987, pp. 82, 78, 79.

[5]"New Soviet Penal Code May Scrap Exile," *The Japan Times* (Tokyo), Nov. 11, 1987.

[6]"Call to Liberalize Laws on Human Rights," *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH—hereafter *CDSP*), Nov. 18, 1987, pp. 6–7; "Defective Laws Impair Citizens' Rights," *CDSP,* Nov. 11, 1987, pp. 13–14, 21; "Soviets Adopt Law to End Psychiatry Abuses," *The Japan Times,* Jan. 6, 1988; "How Rule of Law Has Fared in USSR," *CDSP,* Sept. 9, 1987, pp. 7–9.

[7]"Call to Liberalize Laws on Human Rights," loc. cit., pp. 6–7; Batygin, "Is the Majority Always Right?" loc. cit., p. 23.

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relations among individuals and groups who spontaneously and independently carry out a great many economic and social functions. But if, he states in an obvious reference to the 1917 situation in Russia, it takes place in a country where "not all the possibilities inherent in the old system have been fully developed," the result is quite different. The country's economic and cultural backwardness make it difficult for civil society to develop, and so the state steps in: "The state takes on not only its own functions but those of society. The state in effect 'swallows up' both society and the individual, in the sincere belief that the essentially bureaucratic solutions it has adopted are the most adequate to reflect the interests of individuals and of society." Although a start was made on a civil society in the Soviet Union during the New Economic Policy (NEP) period in the early 1920's, Migranian contends that the way in which the subsequent policies of industrialization and collectivization were carried out led to virtually total regulation of social activity, reducing "almost to zero" the opportunities for spontaneous, nonsanctioned activity. Politically, the result was the loss of democracy: the state controls society rather than being controlled by it.[8]

In such a situation, Migranian continues, the only solution is for civil society to be strengthened and its possibilities for action institutionalized, so that it comes to have a real opportunity to act effectively on the organs of state power. In effect, the state itself must create "a new civil society" by progressively reducing government interference in economic and social life and giving individuals and groups the legal means to act independently of the state. In this light Migranian welcomes the various pieces of economic and social reform legislation already introduced or proposed by the Gorbachev administration. It is through such measures, he believes, that civil society will be activated and democracy established: "The principal task of revolutionary restructuring in the political sphere," he writes, "is the attainment of full control over the state by civil society, with the help of all the means now at its disposal and the means which it acquires as it is progressively strengthened and institutionalized."

The protection of individual rights and liberties is fundamental to this process, Migranian insists. In a remarkable concession to "bourgeois" doctrine, he affirms that "in the West, society's control over the state is largely conditioned by the fact that a civil society consisting of diverse social institutions is under the active control of individuals." Hence, he regrets that in the heat of the Marxist struggle against bourgeois individualism, "we have thrown out the baby with the bath water"; individualism has its positive side, which is as beneficial to democratic socialism as it is to capitalism. Democracy, socialist or otherwise, requires a strong and institutionalized civil society, and the latter cannot be achieved without "radical extension of the autonomous sphere of the personal freedoms of the individual."[9]

This is the vision of a new open society in the USSR, of a state held in check by vigorous social forces, as sketched by some exponents of the "new thinking." To what extent is this concern for individuality and for the establishment of a firmly protected sphere of rights and liberties shared by Soviet policy makers? Can we say that it reflects anything resembling a serious ideological commitment on the part of the Communist party leadership?

CERTAINLY, Gorbachev has spoken favorably not only of *glasnost'* but of individual diversity, of the need to respect individual interests, and of the independent activity of social organizations. One of his favorite themes when addressing citizens' groups is to urge them to become more socially active: "No one will do it for you," he tells them. Moreover, some of the reform measures already introduced do move in the direction of easing restrictions on individual and group activity and expanding the nongovernmental sphere, as Migranian notes.

On the other hand, neither Gorbachev nor his close political associates have waxed lyrical on the subject of "civil society" or elaborated what could be called an ideology of individual rights. Speaking in his book *Perestroika* of "grass-roots activities," Gorbachev says weakly that the democratic process does not rule them out.[10] Though he speaks a great deal about interests, he rarely mentions rights (except in the context of the economic reforms—"the rights of enterprises," etc.) and he hardly ever speaks of liberty or freedom (one word—*svoboda*—serves in Russian for both English words). Thus it is difficult to say how genuine is the commitment of those in power to the assurance of a sphere of "independent activity" on the part of individuals and groups.

Perhaps a more manageable question is this: how genuine could a commitment to individual rights and liberties be given the political circumstances as well as the constraints of other Soviet attitudes and views? How far can one realistically expect *perestroyka* to go toward creating a society in which individual rights and freedoms are held inviolate and powerful social

[8]A. M. Migranian, "The Relations Among the Individual, Society, and the State in the Political Theory of Marxism and the Problems of the Democratization of Socialist Society," *Voprosy Filosofii* (Moscow), No. 8, 1987, pp. 78–80.

[9]Ibid., pp. 79, 87–91.

[10]Gorbachev, op. cit., p. 74.

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organizations restrain the actions of government? Three considerations in particular suggest that expectations cannot be high.

The most obvious problem is the paradox of expecting the state to create civil society—that is, expecting the power that is said to need control to yield its power so that such control can be established. On Migranian's own analysis, it is capitalism that historically has created civil society, in the absence of which the socialist state "swallows up" society and the individual. Without capitalism or a comparable nonpolitical force, how can that omnivorous state be expected to shed its natural inclinations, including its "sincere belief" that it is pursuing the interests of society and its members? Is not *perestroyka* itself—state conceived and state executed—simply one more example of that belief and that dominance? Migranian apparently sees no absurdity in saying in the same breath that society must tear itself from the grip of the state and that "the CPSU as the true leader of the working class and the Soviet people has become the initiator and director of this revolutionary *perestroyka*."[11] His defense, of course, might be that in the USSR there is simply no other way to proceed—given the realities of the political situation, the state is the only power available to do the job. But that regrettable fact does not make the prospects of success any brighter.

A second, more complex problem concerns the meaning that "civil society" can have within a Soviet Marxist theoretical framework. Gorbachev, like other Soviet leaders after Stalin, denies the existence of "antagonistic" interests in socialist society, and the "new thinking" follows this lead in retaining the assumption of a fundamental harmony of interests among all groups and individuals in the Soviet Union. Migranian, for example, contrasts the political theory of Marxism, which he characterizes as aiming at the attainment of consensus on the basis of overriding common interests, with the Western political process, which he describes as being based on "the legitimized conflict of interests" in which one set of special interests either triumphs over others or effects a "temporary compromise" with them.[12]

Migranian admits that in the Marxist model, too, consensus is reached through "conflict," and in the statements of other Soviet theorists as well there are sometimes suggestions of a Western, pluralist model of political life. Gorbachev himself, though rejecting "antagonisms," speaks of diverse and even "contradictory" interests as being unavoidable in socialist society, and he has exhibited such inclinations toward pluralism as scolding trade unions for not defending the interests of workers.[13]

On the other hand, it is said that only "legitimate" interests need defending; and in the new thinking as well as the old, "special" interests are never legitimate. For example, the real, long-term interests of the workers—interests that should be defended—are equated with the interests of society as a whole, and are opposed to "the immediate, narrow, even egoistic interests of separate individuals and groups"; selfish interests and actions must be "resolutely combated," Gorbachev insists.[14] Characteristic of this view is the context of Gorbachev's statement about the worth of even the "extreme viewpoint" quoted earlier: the value of the extreme opinion, Gorbachev goes on to say, is that "the person who upholds it honestly and who cares for the common cause in his own way reflects some real aspects of life." Without a concern for the common cause, the opinion would apparently be "selfish" and valueless. With regard, specifically, to the debate over *perestroyka*, Gorbachev writes that "for us this is not an antagonistic class struggle; it is a quest, a debate on how we can really get going with the restructuring effort." And for Migranian, too, the "conflict" through which Marxist consensus is reached is not really a conflict of interests but "the collision of various approaches to the resolution of problems."[15] Thus, in the new Soviet thinking the political process consists in the expression, on the part of different individuals and groups, not so much of their own interests as of their different ideas as to what is in the general interest—a trace, incidentally, of the philosophical legacy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau as transmitted by Karl Marx.

How does this approach affect the notion of civil society and the likelihood of genuine social control over the state? Chiefly through the fact that in Soviet ideology—new thinking and old—the assumption of a fundamental harmony of interests in society is linked with the case for a one-party political system. As Migranian presents the link, the attainment of socialist consensus through "conflict" is made possible by the absence not only of antagonistic interests but of competing political parties. Competing parties, presumably, can exist and function only by representing divisive "special" interests. A single party, on the other hand, joins all "legitimate" interests into a harmonious whole from which selfishness is eliminated, just as the multinational Soviet Union is said to unite all nationalities and liberate them from their exclusiveness. Since the true interests of society are basically harmonious, they are adequately and properly represented by a single political leadership. Thus a one-

[11]Migranian, loc.cit., p. 87.
[12]Ibid., pp. 81–81.
[13]Gorbachev, *op. cit.*, p. 114.
[14]"Gorbachev Defends Economic Reform," *CDSP*, July 29, 1987, p. 4.
[15]Gorbachev, op. cit., p. 82; Migranian, loc. cit., p. 82.

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party system, far from being incompatible with popular government, is the only way of guaranteeing the dominance of the general interest.

The unanswered question, of course, is whether an active civil society can flourish where a one-party system is enforced. If individuals and groups lack the right to seek alternative political representation of their interests—or even express their ideas as to how best to achieve the general interest—it is uncertain how "institutionalized" their powers can be, or will remain even if once established. It is not clear that civil society can operate effectively on the organs of the state if it cannot threaten to withdraw its political support from the group administering those organs. Thus a conception of civil society that limits society and its components to a single channel of political expression offers little promise of producing effective social control over the state.

A third, related obstacle to the establishment of a viable "civil society" with protected individual rights in the USSR is the Marxist-Leninist view of the nature of rights—a view the "new thinking" gives no indication of abandoning. This view, in deliberate opposition to the "bourgeois" conception dominant in capitalist societies, rejects any notion that individual rights have an extra-social basis; that is, it denies that rights are "absolute," "God-given," "natural," or in any other way independent of society with respect to their origin, scope, or sanction. Rather, rights are held to exist only in society and to change as society changes; they grow out of concrete social relationships and are defined in terms of those relationships. Consequently, their content changes with social development. Furthermore, just as people have no rights independently of social conditions, they have no rights without corresponding social duties and obligations. A distinguishing feature of the socialist conception of the rights of man, according to the Soviet jurist Ye. A. Lukasheva, is "the indissoluble union of rights and duties"—a feature also emphasized in the Soviet Constitution.[16]

A question that naturally arises in connection with the Marxist-Leninist view of rights is this: at a given point in the life of a society, how is it to be determined just what the content of a given right is and what duties go along with it? Soviet jurists insist that this is not an arbitrary or subjective matter but is dictated by impersonal circumstances. Rights are not "a gift of the state," according to Lukasheva: "their scope and content is objectively determined by the economic and social-class conditions of society, by the state of democracy and legality." Thus, as Soviet society advances, the extent of citizens' rights grows: "Each new stage in the development of the Soviet state, the strengthening of its economic basis, the extension of democracy, and the growth of culture create the objective preconditions for enriching the content of the rights and liberties of the individual, for strengthening their guarantees." At the same time, Lukasheva cannot deny that these "objective circumstances" must be identified and assessed by someone—that decisions must be made by flesh-and-blood human beings as to what rights are now appropriate for the citizens of a socialist society. This task she assigns to "the legislator" and she acknowledges that the extent of rights granted not only is but must be confined by his decisions. The legislator, she writes, "may proclaim only those rights for which the real economic, political, and sociocultural preconditions have matured."[17] At this point, of course, it becomes hard to see the distinction between a "gift of the state" and the "objective dictates of circumstances."

Perhaps the most important implication of this view of rights, however, is that the legislator must seek to adjust rights to the state of society, rather than adjust society to the demands of rights. The inevitable result of an approach of this sort is that the rights and duties "proclaimed" by the legislator will be those considered by state authorities to be consonant with the needs of society at a given stage of its development—the needs of its present condition and of its future advance. Rights and freedoms, in other words, are conceived not as independent values that it is the purpose of social and political organizations to serve, but, quite the contrary, as instrumental to society and its progressive advance toward some future condition. Despite the occasional use by Soviet writers now of such expressions as "inalienable rights" and "basic freedoms," the instrumental conception of rights prevails in the theoretical presentations and policy proposals concerning the individual sphere of activity that are advanced as part of the "new thinking."

THIS instrumental approach to *glasnost'* and the whole range of individual rights is indicated from the very outset in the notion that the social and political reforms are "guarantees" of economic *perestroyka*—that is, that they are conceived as strengthening and assuring the success of the transformations in the economic sphere. Like the reforms in economics, they are directed above all to motivational concerns, to acting on the interests of individuals in such a way as to enlist those interests in the creation of a dynamic, more productive economy. Speaking of the need to take personal interests into

[16] "Human Rights: Two Views, Two Approaches," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 13, 1987, p. 111.

[17] Ibid.

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account in re-energizing the Soviet economy, Gorbachev clearly ties political *perestroyka* to economic *perestroyka* in these words: "It is imperative to strike a balance of interests, and we are doing so through the new economic mechanism, through greater democracy, through the atmosphere of openness, and through public involvement in all aspects of restructuring."

In part this attention to individual interests through democratization is counted on simply to energize socio-economic activity by giving people stronger motives for engaging in it. But it is no less an instrument of social control, a way of motivating not only managers, directors, and officials, but workers themselves to work more effectively and responsibly. Thus, Gorbachev calls *glasnost'*, for example, "an effective form of public control over the activities of all government bodies without exception, and a powerful lever in correcting shortcomings."[18]

From this perspective, rights and freedoms are not ends in themselves but instruments to be utilized for a social purpose, and consequently they are constrained by that purpose and its accompanying obligations. No one has stated these constraints more forcefully than Gorbachev himself when he discussed *glasnost'* in the media during a meeting of the Central Committee in June 1987: "There is a political line, there are principles, there are demands, there are criteria—for socialism, for restructuring in the interests of the people, and not against socialism, not against the people. This is what must guide us in debates and in the magazines' work." The continued stress that criticism must be "constructive" and show "party spirit" reflects the instrumentalist approach: what is "constructive" is directed toward the proper end as defined by the party.[19] As the Uzbek Republic prosecutor put it in *Pravda Vostoka*, giving people the opportunity to express their opinions "makes it all the more important to distinguish the voicing of constructive ideas aimed at the improvement of our life from malevolence and all kinds of inflammatory fuss."[20] It should be the job of the press, Gorbachev has written, to "unite and mobilize people," not divide them.[21]

Indeed the instrumentalist conception of rights and freedoms perpetuates the mentality of devotion to the cause that has consistently characterized Soviet Communist party programs since the Bolshevik revolution. It imparts to *glasnost'* and *perestroyka* themselves the style of a military campaign, complete with inspirational exhortations, the servile repetition by lieutenants (even as they extol the virtues of independent thinking) of a stock of catch phrases—"the braking mechanism," "the period of stagnation," "the democratization of all social life," and so on—as well as the repeated assurances from the leadership that "there is simply no alternative, comrades" and "there is no turning back."

All these features of the *perestroyka* atmosphere, plus Gorbachev's insistence that Soviet pluralism must be socialist pluralism, suggest rights and liberties constrained, rather than enriched, by socialism, and suggest that the slogan "more socialism, more democracy" masks a hidden conflict, since in order to have more "socialism" it may be necessary to have more discipline and hence less democracy. For the three reasons cited above, it seems unlikely that *glasnost'* and other expansions of individual and group rights and liberties in the USSR, however dramatically they now affect the climate of Soviet intellectual life, will in themselves proceed far enough to alter fundamentally the existing relationship between society and the state in the Soviet Union.

[18]Gorbachev, op. cit., pp. 97, 75–76.

[19]"Party Meeting Previews Economic Reform," *CDSP*, July 15, 1987, p. 4; "Conviction—The Pillar of Perestroyka. A Meeting in the CPSU CC," *Kommunist*, No. 4, 1987, p. 22; "To Deepen Perestroyka by Practical Deeds," *Kommunist*, No. 12, 1987, p. 7.

[20]"Tatars Keep Heat On in Uzbekistan, Crimea," *CDSP*, Nov. 18, 1987, p. 3.

[21]Gorbachev, op. cit., p. 79.

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The Private Sector in East European Agriculture

Nancy J. Cochrane

DURING the 1960's and 1970's, most of the East European countries in their drive to develop their heavy industry seriously neglected their agricultural sectors. Agriculture's share in total investment during the 1970's was low almost everywhere, ranging from 13 percent in Hungary to just 6 percent in Yugoslavia. The inevitable shortfalls in food production were simply covered by imports, with agricultural imports by Eastern Europe reaching a peak of US$12.4 million in 1980.[1]

The financial crisis of the early 1980's spurred a drive to reform the agricultural sector throughout Eastern Europe. With agricultural imports falling to $9 million in 1982, they no longer sufficed to make up for production shortfalls. Yet, the East European governments lacked any spare investment funds to direct to the agricultural sector. It became apparent that intensive rather than extensive development of the sector was needed, not only in order to maintain domestic food consumption, but also to expand agricultural exports, which for many of the countries were an important source of hard currency.

As a result, most of the countries, to varying extents, introduced measures to reduce the role of central planning, to increase farm autonomy, to link farm income and wages to productivity, to realign prices to improve profitability, and to provide better incentives to workers. At the same time, there was an increasing realization on the part of authorities that a quick and cheap way to boost production was to increase the contribution of the private sector. Thus, the reform in most countries was accompanied by measures providing better incentives to private producers and promoting closer cooperation between the private and socialized sectors.

Nature of the Private Sector

Except in Poland and Yugoslavia, the private agricultural sector in Eastern Europe consists mainly of small plots, usually half a hectare in size, allotted by collective farms to their members. In some countries, there is a very small amount of land that is still privately owned, but this tends to be mainly in the mountains and other areas unsuited to socialized agriculture. It is also common for urban dwellers to be allotted small garden plots outside the cities. Inheritance rights may accompany these allotments, but the land continues to belong to the state, and individual rights to the land continue only so long as it is cultivated.

In Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Romania, private agriculture accounts for a minority share of agricultural production and is intended to complement rather than supplant socialized agricul-

[1]For purposes of this study, Eastern Europe includes Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia, all of which have member or observer status in the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance, headed by the Soviet Union. The figure for 1980 agricultural imports by these countries was calculated from data in Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *FAO Trade Yearbook*, Rome, 1986.

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Table 1: The Private Sector's Share of Arable Land, Gross Farm Output, and Output of Selected Agricultural Commodities

(in percent)

Item	Year	Bulgaria	Czecho-slovakia[2]	GDR[1]	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Yugoslavia
Arable land[3]	1975	12	5	9	15	80	14	83
	1985	13	3	9	13	77	14	80
Gross farm output	1975	n.a.	13	n.a.	31	80	n.a.	76
	1985	25	10	n.a.	34	78	n.a.	69
Wheat[4]	1975	1	3	n.a.	3	81	1	61
	1985	3	2	n.a.	3	70	3	60
Corn	1975	28	16	n.a.	29	23	20	83
	1985	40	9	n.a.	21	38	36	81
Potatoes	1975	45	25	n.a.	73	95	52	99
	1985	53	14	n.a.	78	94	59	98
Sugar beets	1975	0	0	n.a.	0	81	0	33
	1985	0	0	n.a.	5	82	5	25
Vegetables	1975	19	n.a.	7	n.a.	94	43	n.a.
	1985	38	40	11	65	92	40	n.a.
Fruit	1975	40	n.a.	42	n.a.	94	56	n.a.
	1985	41	60	33	63	90	63	n.a.
Cattle inventory	1975	20	8	n.a.	30	78	43	93
	1985	21	3	n.a.	20	80	40	89
Hog inventory	1975	30	12	n.a.	51	80	30	83
	1985	20	9	n.a.	48	73	29	79
Poultry inventory	1975	41	35	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	75
	1985	36	25	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	38	55
Meat	1975	40	15	n.a.	52	75	46	73
	1985	45	15	n.a.	49	75	48	61
Milk	1975	23	12	n.a.	42	87	56	91
	1985	27	4	n.a.	26	85	59	91
Eggs	1975	47	48	n.a.	69	98	62	n.a.
	1985	52	40	36	61	85	57	n.a.

n.a. = Not available.

[1]Taken from *FS Analysen* (West Berlin), No. 3, 1984; and *Wirtschaftswissenschaft* (East Berlin), April 1987.

[2]The figures for arable land, gross farm production, fruits, and vegetables came from Zdenek Lukas, "Special Position of Private Plots in the CSSR," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich), Aug. 25–26, 1985. Figures for the other crops were taken from Czechoslovakia's statistical yearbook (sourced below), which reports data on state farm, collective farm, and "other" production. This "other" category is mostly, but not entirely, production on private-sector plots. Thus, these numbers slightly overstate private-sector production.

[3]For Hungary, these figures represent all agricultural land.

[4]For Romania, the figures represent both wheat and rye.

SOURCES: Unless otherwise noted, from the 1976 and 1986 editions of the following statistical compendia: *Statisticheskiy Yezhegodnik Stran-Chlenov Soveta Ekonomicheskoy Vzaimopomoshchi* (Statistical Yearbook of the Member-States of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance), Moscow, Finansy i Statistika; *Statisticheski Godishnik Na Narodna Republic B'lgariia* (Statistical Yearbook of the People's Republic of Bulgaria), Sofia, Tsentralno Statistichesko Upravlenie Pri Ministerskiia S'vet; *Statistická Ročenka Československé Socialistiké Republiky* (Statistical Yearbook of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia), Prague, SNTL; *Statistisches Jahrbuch Der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik* (Statistical Yearbook of the German Democratic Reublic), East Berlin, Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik; *Statisztikai Évkönyv* (Statistical Yearbook), Budapest, Központi Statisztikai Hivatal; *Rocznik Statystyczny* (Statistical Yearbook), Warsaw, Główny Urząd Statystyczny; *Anuarul Statistic Al Republicii Socialiste Rômania* (Statistical Yearbook of the Socialist Republic of Romania), Bucharesst, Direcţia Centrală De Statistică; and *Statički Godišnjak SFRJ* (Statistical Yearbook of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), Belgrade, SFRJ Savezni Zavod Za Statistiku.

ture. In these countries, the private sector tends to concentrate in the more labor-intensive lines of production, which are less profitable for the socialized sector. Individual farmers own a substantial share of the livestock, often 30 or 40 percent or more, and have similar shares in the production of meat, milk, and eggs (see Table 1). The private sector also tends to produce a large portion (as much as 50–60 percent) of the fruits and vegetables.

In Yugoslavia and Poland, by contrast, agricultural production is dominated by small private farms, which, in 1985, covered 77 percent of the arable land in Poland and 80 percent in Yugoslavia. In the same year, the private sector accounted for 69 percent of agricultural output in Yugoslavia and 78 percent in Poland. In both

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Table 2: Private Sector Production in Hungary

(in percent)

Year	Gross farm output			Meat	Eggs	Vegetables	Fruit
	Total	Crop	Livestock				
1981	32	23	40	48	63	53	n.a.
1982	31	23	39	48	61	58	53
1983	34	26	41	50	61	62	56
1985	34	26	42	51	61	65	60
1986	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	48	60	68	n.a.

n.a. = Not available.

SOURCE: Calculated from data in *Statisztika Évkönyv* (Statistical Yearbook). Budapest, Kközponto Statisztikai Hivatal, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986.

countries, the private sector owns the majority of the livestock and produces more than half of the crops. In Poland, only rapeseed is concentrated in the socialized sector, and in Yugoslavia, the socialized sector dominates in the production of sugar beets and oilseeds.

Incentives to Private Producers

In all these countries, relations between private producers and the socialized sector are formalized in contracts whereby private farmers commit themselves to deliver a given quantity of output to the state or cooperative farms at government-set prices. In return for signing such contracts, the farmers receive improved access to inputs. In a typical livestock-fattening contract, the cooperative farm provides young animals to the plotholder and either provides fodder on favorable terms or allots additional land to the farmer to grow his own fodder. In return, the farmer sells the fattened animal back to the cooperative. Similar contracts are signed by private producers of fruits and vegetables. The cooperative provides seed, fertilizer, and plant protection agents for a reduced price, and the farmer sells a given quantity of his production to the cooperative.

To varying degrees, the socialist governments have had difficulties inducing farmers to sign these contracts. The state-set prices have generally been substantially lower than the prices the farmer could receive by selling his output directly to the public. Furthermore, in many cases, the socialized purchasing organization has failed to provide the assistance promised in the contract.

However, in the late 1970's and early 1980's, the East European governments began to introduce a variety of incentives to induce individual farmers and the socialized farms to cooperate more fully with one another. The Bulgarians, for example, recognized that because socialized farms could not include purchases from private farmers in their own plan fulfillment, they had little incentive to provide aid to the farmers.[2] Thus, in 1981, a decree was introduced that allowed socialized organizations to include production purchased from the private sector in their own mandatory sales to the state. The same decree substantially raised procurement prices, financing this with an increase in state retail subsidies. As a further incentive to private producers, income from sales to state organizations was made tax-free, whereas income from "free market" sales was kept subject to taxation.[3]

The Hungarians have perhaps been most generous to private producers. After introduction of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) in 1968, fodder, fertilizers, and other inputs began to be sold in quantities suitable for private plot production. In 1980, with the renewal of the NEM, came decrees allowing farmers to buy tractors of up to 30 horsepower and providing easier access to credit. The maximum credit available to farmers was raised, and a variety of input subsidies targeted specifically to private farmers were introduced.[4]

The contribution of the private sector is least significant in Czechoslovakia and the GDR. In both countries, the main function of the private sector continues to be household self-supply, and state procurement of private-plot production is quite low. However, even these states have introduced measures—albeit more limited in scope—intended to stimulate production by the private sector.[5]

In contrast, Romania has resorted to what amount to mandatory quotas—private potato growers must deliver 3 tons per hectare cultivated; livestock producers

[2] *Pogled* (Sofia), Nov. 9, 1981.
[3] *Politicheska Agitatsiya* (Sofia), No. 7, 1983.
[4] *Szabad Fold* (Budapest), Feb. 9, 1980.
[5] For Czechoslovakia, see Zdenek Lukas, "Special Position of Private Plots in the CSSR," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich), No. 25/26, August 1985; and *Zemedelske Noviny* (Prague), Jan. 9, 1983. For the GDR, see *FS Analysen* (West Berlin), No. 3, 1984; and *Wirtschaftswissenschaft* (East Berlin), April 1987.

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Table 3: Private Sector Production in Bulgaria

Year	Meat		Eggs		Vegetables		Fruit	
	Production (1,000 t.)	Share (%)	Production (1,000 t.)	Share (%)	Production (1,000 t.)	Share (%)	Production (1,000 t.)	Share (%)
1978	266	37	1,148	53	395	21	799	39
1980	305	39	1,305	54	449	27	745	39
1983	336	40	1,417	54	544	38	808	39
1984	350	41	1,437	54	631	37	875	40
1985	375	45	1,423	52	568	38	755	41
1986	369	42	1,410	50	536	37	834	42

SOURCE: *Statisticheski Godishnik Na Narodna Republic B'lgariia* (Statistical Yearbook of the People's Republic of Bulgaria), Sofia, Tsentralno Statistichesko Upravlenie Pri Ministerskiia S'vet, 1980 and 1987.

must deliver 800 liters of milk for each cow raised, 25 eggs for each hen, and so forth.[6] A 1986 decree requires plotholders to plant wheat on a 500-square-meter area and deliver the entire output to the collective farm. In return, the farmer is to receive the wheat grown on an equivalent area of the collective farm.[7] This policy is presumably intended to generate a net gain for the state, since private-sector yields are higher than those on collective farms; it seems more likely to have the perverse consequence of lowering private-sector yields.

Measures in Poland and Yugoslavia

Until the early 1980's, official policy in Yugoslavia and Poland was aimed at expanding the share of the socialized sector in agricultural production. The resulting neglect of the private sector led to inadequate supplies of capital and inputs to private farmers in both countries. In 1980, private farmers in Poland had only a 34 percent share in agricultural investment, while those in Yugoslavia had a 52 percent share.[8] Private farmers also had difficulties in acquiring fertilizers, plant protection agents, and machinery suited for small farms.[9]

Private-sector efficiency in both countries, as elsewhere, is also hampered by the small, fragmented nature of most private farms. The maximum landholding in Yugoslavia is 10 hectares (it is somewhat larger in hilly, less-fertile regions), and the average farm has only 3.2 hectares and can consist of as many as nine separate plots. There is a 30–50 hectare maximum in Poland, but the average farm there has five hectares, and even in 1986, almost 60 percent had less than five hectares.[10]

During the 1970's, the Polish government attempted to solve the fragmentation problem through measures intended to encourage the consolidation of landholdings. To this end, land sales were prohibited if they would result in farms of less than eight hectares. In addition, retiring farmers were required to turn their land over to the State Land Fund in order to receive a pension. During this period, state and collective farms had first rights to purchase this land. Similarly, the Yugoslav government tried, without much success, to induce farmers to deed their land to the socialized sector in return for a pension.[11]

Despite the economic disadvantage at which they have found themselves, private farmers in both countries have resisted government efforts to increase collectivization. In recent years, both governments have begun to reverse past policies and introduce measures intended to bolster production and promote integration between the private and socialized sectors.

The main thrust of Yugoslavia's policy toward its private sector has been to encourage private farmers to join cooperatives. Ideally, members of these cooperatives pool their machinery and other assets so as to form a larger, more efficient unit. In reality, these cooperatives are mainly marketing organizations, which organize the purchase of their members' production and provide certain services. Farmers also have the option of signing contracts with a cooperative without becoming a member; they can also contract directly with one

[6] *Scînteia* (Bucharest), Mar. 29, 1983, and Jan. 19, 1984.

[7] *Agerpress* (Bucharest), Aug. 19, 1986.

[8] *Rocznik Statystyczny* (Statistical Yearbook), Warsaw, Glówny Urząd Statystyczny, 1986; and *Statistički Godišnjak SFRJ* (Statistical Yearbook of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), Belgrade, SFRJ Savezni Zavod Za Statistiku, 1985.

[9] For further discussion of the problems facing private farmers in Yugoslavia and Poland during the late 1970's, see Nancy J. Cochrane, "Yugoslav Agricultural Performance in the 1980's and Prospects for 1990," and Edward Cook, "Prospects for Polish Agriculture in the 1980's," both in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *East European Economies: Slow Growth in the 1980's*, Vol. 3, Selected Papers, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, Mar. 28, 1986.

[10] Calculated from data in *Rocznik Statystyczny*, 1987.

[11] See Cochrane, loc. cit.; and Cook, loc. cit., for further discussion of these measures.

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Table 4: Agricultural Investment in Private and Socialized Sectors in Poland

Year	Indices (1970 = 100)			Private sector share, in percent
	Total	Socialized	Private	
1975	191.1	211.0	158.9	31
1978	230.9	271.5	165.2	30
1980	184.4	199.4	159.9	34
1982	135.9	110.5	170.1	51
1983	142.0	109.9	185.3	56
1984	147.7	115.3	191.7	55
1985	147.2	118.9	185.2	53
1986	148.1	119.4	186.5	51

SOURCES: Calculated from data in *Rocznik Statystyczny* (Statistical Yearbook), Warsaw, Warsaw, Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1987.

of the large socialized combines. Other Yugoslav policies encourage consolidation and "rounding off" of the fragmented private farms. Attempts have been made to revise inheritance laws, so that one can inherit farmland only if one intends to farm it.[12]

Even though Rural Solidarity was banned in Poland in October 1982, the Polish reforms of the early 1980's included several measures to improve the lot of private farmers.[13] One of the underlying principles of these reforms was the basic equality of all farming sectors —state, cooperative, and private. These reforms guaranteed the permanence of the private sector, along with the right to own and inherit land. Private farmers were given priority in purchasing from the State Land Fund; they were promised equal access to credit and increased supplies of machinery and spare parts. Procurement prices were raised to insure profitability and to put rural incomes on a par with urban.

Results of Reforms

Statistics from both Hungary and Bulgaria suggest a direct relationship between government policies toward the private agricultural sector and the performance of that sector. When the Hungarian government began to back away from its 1968 NEM in the mid-1970's, there was a noticeable decline in private-sector output. Then, during the 1980's, following the return to the principles of the NEM, there was an increase. The contribution of Hungary's private sector rose from 31 percent in 1980 to 34 percent in 1985 (see Table 2). The increases were greatest in private-sector fruit and vegetable production.

Likewise, in Bulgaria, early incentive measures introduced in 1973 brought a marked increase in private-sector production;[14] this was followed by a dip in production when it became evident that the government was not going to deliver on its promises. Then, beginning in 1980, the private-sector contribution once again began to rise (see Table 3). Bulgaria's private sector accounted for the entire increase in meat production between 1980 and 1985, and as fruit and vegetable production by the socialized sector declined, private-sector fruit and vegetable production increased.

Since the implementation of the Polish reforms, there appears to have been some improvement in private sector conditions, as indicated in Tables 4 and 5. The private sector's share in investment has risen significantly, and the number of tractors owned by private farmers has increased accordingly. There has been little change in fertilizer application on private farms; but, by contrast, fertilizer use in the socialized sector has actually fallen since 1980. The main reason for the stagnation in fertilizer use is Poland's reduced ability to import the necessary chemicals.

The most significant change, however, is in the distribution of Poland's private farms according to size (see Table 6). Polish policy has been aimed at consolidating Poland's small, fragmented farms into larger, more efficient units. Between 1980 and 1986, the number of farms of more than 15 hectares increased from 145,000 to 185,000 or 27 percent. There was a much smaller increase in the number of farms of 10–15 hectares, and a decrease in the number of farms of less than 10 hectares. This shift was apparently accomplished in part by an increase in transfers of land from the State Land Fund to the private sector. However, there may also have been some sales of smaller farms to larger farmers.[15]

On the other hand, Yugoslavia's attempts to raise productivity in the private sector have had only limited success. The farmers have maintained a distinct aver-

[12]Cochrane, loc. cit.

[13]For detailed discussion of the 1981 Polish reforms, see Cook, loc. cit.

[14]The 1973 degree was published in *Durzhaven Vestnik* (Sofia), Dec. 21, 1973, pp. 2–4.

[15]The possibility of direct sales of farms is suggested by a decrease in the overall number of farms, as well as a decrease in the number of farms transferred to the State Land Fund.

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Table 5: Agricultural Inputs in Private and Socialized Sectors in Poland

Year	Area per tractor		Fertilizer application	
	Socialized	Private	Socialized	Private
	(hectares)		(kilograms per hectare)	
1975	17.8	86.7	276	152
1980	20.0	27.4	314	152
1982	21.8	28.6	263	152
1984	23.2	23.5	183	154
1985	23.5	19.6	266	148
1986	24.0	17.9	268	157

SOURCE: *Rocznik Statystyczny*, 1981, 19833, 1985, 1986, 1987.

sion to joining cooperatives—there are still only 300,000 members. Peasants are suspicious of these cooperatives, believing they are too much under state control. Although close to 1 million of the 2.5 million private farmers cooperate in some way with the socialized sector,[16] farmers have been unhappy in many cases with the terms of their contracts. They consider the prices they receive to be too low and complain that they do not receive adequate supplies.[17]

Attempts to revise Yugoslavia's inheritance laws have stalled, and efforts toward consolidation and rounding-off of landholdings have run into logistical problems. Yet, pressure toward raising the maximum permissible landholding is intensifying. A series of constitutional amendments is under discussion, one of which would prohibit the republics from setting a land maximum under 15 hectares. Many government officials support this move; it is widely recognized that those farms consisting of 10 hectares (and often more, through leasing —which is technically illegal, but generally tolerated) are highly efficient, more efficient even than the large combines. However, this amendment must be approved by all the republic and provincial assemblies, and some, notably Vojvodina, where the socialized sector is strongest, continue to oppose it.[18]

Problems with Procurement Prices

The most serious obstacle to harmonious relations between the private and socialized sectors is the issue of procurement prices. Despite recent moves to allow more of a role for market forces in setting prices, the East European governments continue to control prices of basic agricultural commodities. The rationale is that it is essential to maintain stable food prices to ensure the welfare of the populace. In almost all cases, input prices have risen much faster than agricultural procurement prices. The result for socialized farms has been severe profitability problems, necessitating the continuation of large subsidies. Unlike socialized farms, which are required to sell to state organizations at state-set prices, private farmers in nearly all the East European countries have the option of bypassing the state purchasing organization and selling in markets directly to the public for prices that are largely unregulated.

Consequently, at least three of the East European countries—Yugoslavia, Poland, and Bulgaria—are experiencing serious problems inducing the peasants to sell to socialized organizations. This problem is endemic in Yugoslavia. Although the Yugoslavs produce enough wheat to meet national needs, in most years they are forced to import wheat because procurements from the private sector are insufficient. The farmers, faced with prices they consider too low, simply feed the wheat to their livestock. Yugoslavia is a surplus producer of corn, but in 1984 and 1985, in anticipation of sharply higher prices in the future, private corn growers held back their crops from the market. As a result, the Yugoslav livestock industry faced severe feed shortages, which led to a large amount of distress slaughter. This year there have been shortages of milk, whose price is under state control, as dairy farmers have chosen to produce more butter and kajmak (a cheese-like product), whose prices are determined by market demand rather than by the state.[19]

Recently, a similar situation has emerged in Bulgaria. Plotholders there complain that procurement prices are too low, and that the socialized sector has failed to provide the fodder, fertilizer, and seed stipulated in their contracts. There have been numerous articles in the press complaining of a "leakage" of private production to the peasant markets, where prices are sub-

[16] *Statistički Godišnjak SFRJ*, 1987.

[17] Such complaints have been reported in several sources, among them, *Privredni Pregled* (Belgrade), Apr. 28, 1982; *Duga* (Belgrade), Jan. 16, 1982; and *Ekonomska Politika* (Belgrade), Apr. 20, 1987.

[18] *Nedelne Informativne Novine* (Belgrade), Jan. 17, 1988.

[19] Ibid.

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Table 6: Private Farm Structure in Poland

Year	Number of farms (thousands)	Share of total agricultural output by size of farm, in percent					
		0.51–2h.	2–5h.	5–7h.	7–10h.	10–15h.	over 15h.
1970	3,224	26.9	32.0	4.4	14.1	9.8	2.8
1980	2,897	30.0	29.5	12.8	13.0	9.7	5.0
1984	2,844	30.1	28.3	12.5	12.8	10.3	6.0
1986	2,756	29.6	28.0	12.2	12.9	10.6	6.7

SOURCE: *Rocznik Statystyczny*, 1987, p. 290.

stantially higher.[20] In the last several years, this problem has apparently become more acute, to the point where there have been actual declines in private-sector production. Private-sector livestock holdings reached a peak in 1983 and have been declining since. As a result, private-sector meat production in 1986 showed a decline, and vegetable production has been falling since 1984. The fall in vegetable production is especially serious, in that the socialized sector has not taken up the slack. The result has been increasing vegetable shortages in the markets.

Polish farmers saw a marked improvement in their profitability in 1982, when, following substantial increases in procurement prices, their income reached 111 percent of the national average. However, the Polish government immediately imposed even larger increases in input prices, wiping out that income advantage. The ratio between farm income and the national average declined to 99 percent in 1983, 93 percent in 1985, and 90 percent in 1986. At the end of 1987, this ratio was only 85 percent. State procurements from the private sector have stagnated as a result, and in 1987 there was reportedly a 20 percent drop in livestock procurement.[21]

With its recent price hikes, the Polish government is now attempting to restore some income parity to farmer incomes. While retail food prices have risen an average of 40 percent, there has been a 48.4 percent rise in average agricultural procurement prices, including a 53.3 percent rise in pork prices and a 56.6 percent rise in milk prices. These price rises are retroactive to January 1, 1988.[22] It is hoped that these will reverse the recent decline in livestock and dairy production.

Nevertheless, the average rise in input prices is 90 percent: tractor prices are up 29-46 percent, depending on the type; fertilizer prices are up 89 percent; fuel prices have risen even more, with gasoline up 60 percent, electricity and natural gas up 100 percent, and coal up 200 percent.[23] Authorities have argued that the rises in fuel and energy prices will not hurt the farmers that much because these comprise a relatively small share of total costs.[24] Yet, with the prices of other inputs also rising, it is difficult to see how farming is to become more profitable.

Continued Official Ambivalence

The East European governments have come to recognize the potential of the private sector to generate rapid increases in output with little cost to the state. To this end, all, with the exception of Romania have taken measures to improve conditions for private farmers. Yet, official ambivalence continues. There is a persistent suspicion of the "rich kulak," and there have been frequent articles in the East European press accusing peasants of enriching themselves to an unwarranted extent, shirking their duties as collective farm workers to devote time to their plots, stealing tools, and usurping land belonging to the collective.[25] For their part, the private farmers in most of the countries continue to complain that purchasing by the socialized sector is disorganized, that the prices are too low, and that the farmers do not receive the fodder, seed, and other materials and services promised in their contracts.

The long-term outlook for private farming in Eastern Europe is uncertain. In this era of Soviet *perestroyka*, many of the countries have taken steps to encourage the development of private or small-scale cooperative enterprises of all types. Since 1985, press attacks on private farmers such as those cited above have been less frequent, and there have been public statements that a more pluralistic economy is essential to reverse the slump of the early 1980's. Yet, it is quite possible that if economic conditions were to improve, government enthusiasm for such policies might wane.

[20] *Kooperativno Selo* (Sofia), Dec. 3, 1987.
[21] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, *RFE Situation Report* (Munich), SR/5, Apr. 11, 1988; and *Sztandar Mlodych* (Warsaw), Jan. 5, 1988.
[22] *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), Feb. 1, 1988.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Author's discussions with visiting Polish officials.
[25] See, e.g., *Pravda* (Bratislava), Nov. 1, 1985; *Novo Vreme* (Sofia), December 1984; *Ikonomicheski Zhivot* (Sofia), Nov. 28, 1984; and *Kooperativno Selo*, Feb. 4, 1985.

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Books

The Lessons of Arms Control

John H. Maurer

BRUCE D. BERKOWITZ. *Calculated Risks: A Century of Arms Control.* New York, Simon and Schuster, 1987.

ALBERT CARNESALE and RICHARD N. HAASS, Eds. *Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight.* Cambridge, MA, Ballinger Publishing Co., 1987.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF. *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan.* Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1985.

DO ARMS control negotiations and treaties really constrain the competition in armaments between great powers? Or does arms control actually heighten this competition by rechanneling it into weaponry that is more difficult to limit by negotiations? Such questions about the effectiveness of arms control in setting limits on the acquisition of strategic weapons by the superpowers are at the heart of a continuing controversy—a controversy that is all too apparent in today's debates over the merits of aiming for major reductions in the superpowers' strategic nuclear forces and the Reagan administration's push for the development of ballistic missile defenses.

One way of grappling with these questions is to examine the historical record of arms control. The past hundred years provide a number of examples of negotiations between great powers to limit the development and deployment of new weapons. The battleship-building rivalry between Great Britain and Germany before World War I—considered by many strategic analysts to be a classic example of an arms race—offers a valuable case study of the failure of two great powers to reach a negotiated settlement or tacit understanding about limiting their competition. Between the two world wars, on the other hand, the Washington Conference (1921–22) averted a costly naval competition between the major naval powers and established a system of arms control that lasted for over a decade. The collapse of this agreement in the late 1930's foreshadowed the outbreak of World War II. In addition to these examples of arms control from the first half of the 20th century, there exists the substantial experience in negotiations between the superpowers in the period after 1963 and the signing of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban agreement. It is thus possible to test various theoretical propositions about arms control by referring to the historical record. Because the three books under review here do this, they represent an important advance in our understanding of the benefits and limitations of arms control in curbing competitive deployments of weapons and in improving relations between great powers. While these three studies approach the subject from differing perspectives, they have in common a concern for analyzing the historical record of arms control,[1] from which they draw lessons for the conduct of future negotiations.

The study by Bruce Berkowitz is a thought-provoking polemic against what he calls traditional forms of arms control, that is, attempts to reach through formal negotiations quantitative and qualitative limits on weaponry. A distinguishing and valuable feature of this book is Berkowitz's emphasis on the pre-1945 experience with arms control.

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[1] This historical approach contrasts with the theoretical writings on arms control from the late 1950's and early 1960's. Based in large part on economics and game theory, these early writings were a-historical. An excellent brief survey of them can be found in Joseph Kruzel, "What's Wrong with the Traditional Approach?" *The Washington Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Spring 1985, pp. 123–25.

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Rather than dismissing the prewar experience as irrelevant in the nuclear age, he shows just how useful history can be in illuminating contemporary problems.[2] For example, Berkowitz uses the international attempts to curtail the competition in battleship building by the great powers between the two world wars to support his arguments that arms control negotiations are relatively ineffective in achieving their goals. Far from seeing the Washington Conference as a successful example of arms control, Berkowitz pronounces it a failure, arguing that it did not halt the great-power competition in naval armaments but only redirected it into new technologies and weapons.

The study edited by Albert Carnesale and Richard Haass of Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government examines the major arms control negotiations conducted by the superpowers that led to agreements over the past 25 years, including the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Accord on Reducing the Risks of Accidental Nuclear War of 1971, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) of 1972, the SALT II agreement of 1979, the 1977–79 antisatellite negotiations, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972. The approach in the study can best be described as a controlled, or focused, comparison. In the discussion of the individual negotiations, the contributors work within a common framework since they address the same 10 key questions, or hypotheses, about arms control including the following: Does arms control redirect the superpower arms competition in counterproductive ways? Can progress in negotiations take place only when neither side has a military advantage? When is arms control effective in constraining the development of new weapons? The value of this methodological approach, when it is done well, is that each of the case studies is clearly related to the others and adds to an understanding of the general problem. In this volume, the editors have succeeded in having the individual authors focus on the common questions, with the result that an excellent analysis of the superpower experience with arms control negotiations has been produced.[3]

Raymond Garthoff's study is different from the other two studies under review because it is not limited to an analysis of arms control; its aim is much more ambitious, namely, to provide an overall account of Soviet-American relations during the past 20 years. An important element of this relationship was, of course, arms control. Garthoff says a great deal on this subject based on his personal experience (he was a member of the US delegation for the SALT I negotiations) and a careful reading of available published accounts. In addition to providing an overall history of the negotiations that led to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement on offensive strategic arms, Garthoff's analysis of the last year of SALT I negotiations—from the diplomatic breakthrough of May 20, 1971, that outlined the scope of an arms control agreement to the May 1972 Moscow summit—is immensely useful in untangling the story of SALT I. He improves on the standard account given by John Newhouse in *Cold Dawn*,[4] and his depiction of the final stages of the negotiations is unlikely to be superseded until historians gain access to documents that are now classified.

IN READING these studies, one is struck by the range of disagreement about the utility of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The generally accepted rationale for the SALT I treaty is the one that was presented by high-level officials of the Nixon administration at the time of the signing of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement in May 1972, and subsequently in their memoirs.[5] This interpretation holds that without SALT I the Soviet Union would have soon outbuilt the United States and achieved strategic superiority. During the three-year period of 1966–69, the Soviet Union had dramatically increased its strategic arsenal, adding about 300 new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silo launchers each year.[6] In addition, the Yankee-class ballistic missile submarines were entering service in 1967 and 34 submarines of this class were scheduled for completion over the next seven years. Henry Kissinger saw the Interim Agreement as a means to break the momentum of Soviet building programs, thereby giving the United States time to carry out its own modernization plans. Without an agreement, Kissinger feared, the Soviet Union might greatly expand its ICBM force and build as many as 80 ballistic missile submarines by 1978.[7] The United States, in effect,

[2]Another valuable study that successfully uses historical examples from the pre-nuclear era is by Joseph Kruzel, "From Rush-Bagot to START: The Lessons of Arms Control," ORBIS (Philadelphia), Spring 1986, pp. 193–95; see also Gerard Smith, *Double Talk: The Story of SALT I*, Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 1985, pp. 446–52.

[3]A new edition, adding an examination of the recently concluded Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, is forthcoming.

[4]John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973.

[5]See, for example, Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown, 1979.

[6]Raymond L. Garthoff, "SALT and the Soviet Military," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1975, pp. 29–33.

[7]Kissinger, op. cit., p. 1245.

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traded its technological superiority in defensive systems for restraint in the Soviet offensive buildup. In Kissinger's words: "We traded the defensive for the offensive limitations."[8]

Berkowitz disagrees with this assessment. He argues that arms control has the perverse effect of halting the development of weapons that are easy to control while freeing resources for those not subject to easy limitation. This is the central thesis of his book. In an insightful analogy, Berkowitz compares arms control to attempts to curb inflation by price controls. He writes:

Most economists today do not believe price controls really solve the problem of rising prices, but for some reason most political analysts seem to believe that arms control can solve the problem of growing numbers and sophistication of arms. They are wrong. So long as the "demand" for weapons remains, arms control will not control arms, but will simply alter the pattern in which nations acquire them. (p. 28)

Moreover, he argues, arms control can spur the development of new, uncontrolled weapons incorporating more advanced technologies. When countries attempt to limit these newer weapons, arms control negotiations become more difficult and contentious. Consequently, arms control is ultimately self-defeating because it channels resources into weapons that are difficult to limit. In Berkowitz's view, "arms control, or at least the kind of quantitative ceilings that most people have come to associate with it, may be a 'self-extinguishing' process" (p. 51).

To illustrate this argument, Berkowitz draws on the experience of strategic arms negotiations between the superpowers. In his opinion, SALT I had the unintended and deleterious side effect of propelling the superpower arms competition into new directions. By setting limitations on the number of ballistic missile launchers, SALT I produced what Berkowitz calls a "ratchet effect" that encouraged the superpowers to deploy multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV's) and develop cruise missiles, which were not constrained by the treaty. Both of these weapons are difficult to limit and have greatly complicated follow-on negotiations, as the SALT II and START negotiations have shown.

Berkowitz agues that great powers are only willing to trade away obsolescent weapons in arms control talks while preserving their options to develop promising technologies into new weapons. Thus, he points to the limited constraints that were placed on the modernization programs of the superpowers by SALT I. The Soviets, for example, agreed to trade in older SS-7 and SS-8 ICBM's in return for an expansion of their SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) forces. He also cites the example of the US Titan II missile, which was kept in service beyond its time so that it could be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations. From this experience, Berkowitz concludes: "the most irrelevant weapons (i.e., the oldest) are the easiest to control, and the most threatening weapons (i.e., those planned for the future) are the most difficult" (pp. 94–95).

Berkowitz also attacks the centerpiece of superpower strategic arms control—the 1972 ABM Treaty—by questioning whether it was really the ABM Treaty that limited the competition between the superpowers in defensive systems. It is Berkowitz's judgment that the United States would not have deployed an extensive ABM network anyway, because there did not exist a political consensus in favor of its construction and serious doubts persisted about its technical effectiveness. The Nixon administration's Safeguard Program of March 14, 1969, calling for a twelve-site ABM system, stirred up substantial opposition in the Congress, and the Senate approval to build two sites passed by only one vote. Thus it was the lack of political support in Congress rather than the treaty that precluded the United States from developing a nationwide system of ballistic missile defenses, Berkowitz concludes. He writes, "in truth SALT I did not avert an ABM race at all; no race could have taken place, simply because the United States was unwilling to participate" (p. 150).

In fact, arms control may have given new life to the administration's program to deploy an ABM system. Critical to the administration's case for ABM was its contention that this program was necessary for arriving at an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union—that is, the administration resorted to the bargaining chip rationale. In his fight with the Congress to preserve the administration's deployment scheme during the summer of 1970, Kissinger even induced Gerard Smith, the director of the the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and chief of the US SALT delegation, to send a telegram to the Senate stressing the importance of ABM for achieving a SALT agreement. In the view of many observers of the Senate's debate on ABM, Smith's telegram was decisive in swinging enough votes to allow for continued deployment.[9]

Of course, it can be argued that the ABM Treaty staved off a country-wide deployment of ballistic missile defenses by the Soviet Union.

[8]Ibid, pp. 1129–30, 1245.

[9]See Smith, op. cit., pp. 148–49.

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Berkowitz admits that it is not possible to determine whether the Soviet Union would have deployed an extensive ABM system were the ABM Treaty not in existence. In his opinion, however, the Soviet leadership was less interested in deploying an ABM system than it was in checking the technological advantage possessed by the United States in ballistic missile defenses. This view is buttressed by Moscow's about-face on the issue of ABM and its strong interest in limiting ballistic missile defenses in SALT I. When Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara initially put forward the idea of sharply limiting ballistic missile defenses at the Glassboro summit in 1967, Premier Aleksey Kosygin retorted: "How can you expect me to tell the Russian people they can't defend themselves against your rockets?"[10] Thus, the Soviet position on ABM changed considerably during the two years between the Glassboro summit and the opening of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in 1969.

Berkowitz's assessment of SALT is not shared by Garthoff, who argues that the negotiations between the superpowers on strategic arms, and especially on the ABM Treaty, represented major arms control achievements. In Garthoff's opinion, SALT I reflected the tacit recognition by the superpowers that an unconstrained arms competition in strategic forces was not in either side's interest because it would be costly and ultimately futile. The ABM Treaty limited ballistic missile defenses to strategically insignificant levels, thereby averting a race between the superpowers in defensive systems and codifying mutual deterrence. Garthoff points to US intelligence assessments made in the late 1960's that projected a countrywide Soviet defensive system, fielding perhaps as many as 1,500 interceptor missiles by the early 1970's.[11] The ABM Treaty and the subsequent 1974 protocol precluded this level of deployment and instead limited each superpower to no more than 100 launchers. Consequently, the ABM Treaty saved the superpowers the heavy expense of deploying massive systems of strategic defense. Garthoff claims that the United States saved at least $5 billion in programmed expenditures as a consequence of the ABM Treaty. Also, by sharply limiting ballistic missile defenses, the ABM Treaty helped restrain the growth of offensive nuclear forces.

Garthoff's criticism is that the SALT I negotiations did not go far enough in limiting the offensive force modernizations planned by the superpowers. In this regard, he considers the failure to achieve a total ban on MIRV's as an important setback for arms control. It is Garthoff's view that the United States should have exercised restraint in the testing of MIRV's, while forcefully proposing a ban on their development and deployment to the Soviet Union. Instead, he laments, the United States adopted a shortsighted approach to the issue, with the untoward result that the land-based leg of the US deterrent became increasingly vulnerable during the 1970's when the Soviet Union followed suit and began deploying MIRV's. Despite this serious shortcoming, Garthoff argues, the SALT experience "does not demonstrate the limitations of arms control or its failure, but rather the failure of the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1970's to give arms control a chance to do more" (pp. 1095–96).

The analysis provided in the volume edited by Carnesale and Haass gives a different answer to this question. The view of the editors is that, rather than rechannel or curtail the superpowers' armaments efforts, SALT effectively codified the existing forces and planned deployments. Under the Interim Agreement, both sides remained free to carry out their extensive programs of adding MIRV's and deploying new weapons while retiring older systems. Similarly, the ABM Treaty may only have codified existing development and deployment plans. The evident lack of political support for the Nixon administration's Safeguard ABM program, which manifested itself in the Senate debates and votes on the issue, made it unlikely that a large-scale anti-ballistic missile defense of the United States would be built. Even if the Soviets had continued to construct a countrywide ABM system, the United States might not have followed suit, much as it has not emulated the Soviet Union in providing for large-scale air and civil defense schemes during the past 30 years (pp. 342–44). Consequently, SALT probably did not alter to any substantial degree the superpowers' building programs for strategic forces.

These conclusions by the editors are supported by the analyses of the other contributors to this volume. Contrary to Berkowitz's assertions, Fen Osler Hampson, in his chapter on SALT I, concludes that there "is little direct evidence that the Interim Agreement redirected arms competition in counterproductive ways" (p. 83). This assessment is shared by Stephen J. Flanigan in his examination of SALT II. He concludes: "SALT II largely codified existing defense plans, with some marginal constraints and redirection" (p. 133). And, in his valuable chapter entitled the "Lulling and Stimulating Effects of Arms Con-

[10]Newhouse, op. cit., p. 94.

[11]Lawrence Freedman, *U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat*, 2nd ed., Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 88–89.

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trol," Sean Lynn-Jones writes:

Arms control negotiations and agreements may have contributed to inadequate or excessive defense spending, but they seem to have reinforced existing trends in most cases . . . . Observers who blame arms control for inhibiting or accelerating defense spending probably exaggerate the impact of the arms control process and arms control in general. (p. 265)

WHAT, then, are the main achievements of arms control? Perhaps the most important benefit is that arms control tends to reduce uncertainties about the weapons programs of an adversary. For the United States in particular, arms control opens a window onto Soviet military programs. While arms control could not prevent the increased vulnerability of the US land-based deterrent, it injected a note of predictability into Soviet building programs. For example, during SALT I the Soviet side's firm rejection of US definitions of heavy ICBM's strongly suggested that at least some of the Soviet fourth-generation ballistic missiles were likely to be substantially larger than the ones they were intended to replace. In fact, the SS-19 was some 50 percent larger in volume than the SS-11 it replaced. This increase in missile size substantially increased the threat posed to the land-based US nuclear deterrent by the Soviet ICBM force and created the so-called window of vulnerability. Although arms control did not prevent this shift in the strategic balance, it gave the United States a clear indication of the likely characteristics of Soviet fourth-generation ICBM's. As Carnesale and Haass put it: "reduction of uncertainty and enhancement of predictability may well be the principal contribution of the arms control experience . . . . A world without negotiations, agreements, and rules to promote verification would be one of far greater uncertainty and far more prone to unrestrained and potentially destabilizing arms competition" (pp. 345–46). Even Berkowitz, who is much more critical of the arms control experience, admits that "negotiations themselves do not seem to hurt. Talks between the Soviet Union and the United States during the past decade and a half have probably improved each side's understanding of the other" (p. 193).

These volumes also highlight the relative paucity of information about Soviet decision-making in the arms control sphere. While the US side of arms control can be told in great detail, Soviet bureaucratic politics and disputes cannot be documented with the same precision. Behind the Soviet Union's declaratory statements on arms control is an intra-governmental political bargaining process that seeks to adjudicate internal divisions of opinion about policy, the West knows little about this process.

Some important observations can nonetheless be made about Soviet intra-governmental politics as it relates to arms control. Harry Gelman has convincingly argued that arms control negotiations have stimulated the Soviet political leadership to play a larger role in strategic planning.[12] And, in the competition for the allocation of resources related to Soviet economic planning, arms control can be invoked as a way to curb military programs. While the story that "Brezhnev had to spill political blood to get the Vladivostok accords" might be overstated,[13] it would be highly surprising if there were not strong disagreements within the Soviet leadership about arms control.

In a more mundane but nevertheless important way, arms control offers an opportunity for the highest Soviet political leadership to educate itself about the technical aspects of weapons procurement and operational doctrine. And, just as arms control can reduce uncertainties for US planners, it makes the strategic problems facing the Soviet leadership more predictable, thereby facilitating the task of managing the allocation of defense resources. This consideration will no doubt be particularly important for Soviet leaders intent on restructuring their country's economy.

A more disturbing observation is that the Soviet political leadership is very complaisant about the military's wishes with respect to arms control. On balance, the Soviet political leadership has only entered into agreements that the military finds quite acceptable. In the words of Thomas Wolfe: "the military leadership has exerted a strong, conservative influence on the negotiations, and the political leadership—whatever its own bent may have been—has tended to eschew agreements that, in the judgment of the military professionals, might adversely affect the Soviet military posture."[14] The cautious deliberation exercised by the Soviet political leadership so as not to tread upon military sensibilities severely limits the substantive possibilities for arms control agreements. This situation still pertains today and Gorbachev's room for maneuver in arms control remains circumscribed by Soviet military doctrine and political realities. This sobering observation must temper Western expectations about what arms control can achieve.

[12]Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1984, pp. 63–70.

[13]Strobe Talbott, *Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II*, New York, Harper and Row, 1980, p. 73.

[14]See Thomas W. Wolfe, *The SALT Experience*, Cambridge, MA, Ballinger Publishing Co., 1979, pp. 75–76.

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East European Dissent: Impasses and Opportunities

Janusz Bugajski and Maxine Pollack

ADAM MICHNIK. *Letters From Prison and Other Essays.* Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1985.

BRONISŁAW MISZTAL, Ed. *Poland After Solidarity: Social Movements Versus the State.* New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction, 1985.

VÁCLAV HAVEL, et al. *The Power of the Powerless: Citizens Against the State in Central-Eastern Europe.* New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1985.

HELSINKI WATCH. *From Below: Independent Peace and Environmental Movements in Eastern Europe and the USSR.* New York, Helsinki Watch Committee, 1987.

IN THE 1980's, East European dissidents have had to adapt to a major setback—the defeat of Poland's Solidarity as a legal mass organization—and devise postures that take advantage of a potential opportunity—the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev with his program of "restructuring" aimed at improving economic performance in the Soviet Union. During this period of flux, several books have appeared in English about the plight of East Europe's opposition movements. Polish dissident Adam Michnik's *Letters from Prison* focuses largely on the social and political traumas resulting from the imposition of martial law. Charter 77 activists, most notably Václav Havel in *The Power of the Powerless,* reflect the Czechoslovak experience of restricted but persistent dissent during the past decade. *Poland After Solidarity,* edited by Polish sociologist Bronisław Misztal, explores the phenomenon of independent social movements since the emergence of Solidarity (*Solidarność*) in 1980. And *From Below,* published by the New York-based Helsinki Watch Committee, traces the evolution of peace and environmental activism throughout the East bloc during the 1980's. Each of these volumes spotlights the urgency and sharpness of dissident criticisms of the communist regimes; a reader is also struck by the variety of the strategies proposed for transforming the regimes.

MICHNIK has been a prominent political tactician and activist since his student days in the turbulent 1960's. Together with peers of various political persuasions, he helped to develop a gradualist approach to loosening the communist stranglehold on power in Poland in the late 1970's. The resulting campaign for "social self-defense" in effect was to consist of a revolution by osmosis, whereby the public would defend its basic interests and gradually reclaim various spheres of civil life appropriated by the Leninist state. The successes and shortcomings of the "new evolutionist" program for rebuilding a "civil society" outside party-state control is deftly captured by Michnik's *Letters From Prison and Other Essays.*

The birth and rapid growth of Solidarity surprised the intellectual opposition, but most dissidents quickly joined, finding in the movement an unprecedented vehicle for testing their theories and pushing for lasting change. Though various pressure groups contributed to shaping the union's objectives, Solidarity had a momentum of its own, fueled by years of repression, frustration, and dissatisfaction with official mismanagement. When the union eventually proved grossly unprepared for the party-army backlash against independent public life, Michnik and other imprisoned strat-

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egists were forced to rethink their positions. Though highly critical of government policy, a majority of them have continued calling for an authentic "national dialogue," in the apparent conviction that General Wojciech Jaruzelski will eventually have to engage in constructive talks with independent public representatives out of sheer economic necessity.

The nagging contradiction between the theory of compromise with communism and the stark reality of party policy since 1981 is reflected in Michnik's writings. For much of the Polish population and numerous Solidarity activists, hopes of constructive dialogue with the authorities were effectively dashed by martial law. Nevertheless, despite the prevalent pessimism and cynicism over the country's political and economic prospects, Poles continue to support the multi-faceted opposition movement and show undiminished hostility toward the regime.

THE ESSAYS compiled by Misztal in *Poland After Solidarity* attempt to interpret the nature of social resistance and state control in the communist bloc, with Poland as the case study. Much of the volume deals at a theoretical level with the issues of power, governmental legitimacy, social movements, and state–society conflict, using Solidarity as a reference point. Despite the authors' often unnecessary and repetitive sociological jargon, and the uneven quality of the contributions, there is consensus on two key elements.

First, the absence of meaningful public participation in national decision-making is consistently pointed to as the cause of periodic socio-economic crises and outbursts of workers' protest in Eastern Europe. In the case of Poland in 1980, it led to a concerted mass movement pressing for institutionalized pluralism and systemic change. Second, the authors agree that an independent mass working-class movement ultimately cannot be integrated into the political structures of state socialism. As evidence, they point out that the political "self-limitations" imposed by Solidarity's "peaceful revolution" were not reciprocated by any meaningful communist self-limitations in reestablishing full control over public life. Poland's burgeoning "civil society," while it was not explicitly politicized or grasping for power, nevertheless became a threat to the interests of the party, which sought to contain and control all meaningful social initiatives.

But certain important questions remain unanswered in the Misztal collection. For example, at what point is the confrontation between a Leninist state and an independently organizing society likely to take place, and what form will it assume? Will any current or future social movement be able to avoid intimidation, cooptation, or comprehensive eradication? The tug-of-war between party and people in Poland reflects these uncertainties; it was resolved neither by Solidarity nor by Jaruzelski's "normalization." The communist establishment, using the strong arms of its military and police, may have gained the upper hand through martial law, but the struggle continues at a more dispersed and less noticeable level. A new round of open conflict cannot be discounted—as the strikes in May 1988 have shown.

THOUGH the Havel collection was written in the late 1970's, its appraisal of political conditions and the role of the opposition still remains pertinent. The 11 articles by some of Czechoslovakia's most eminent dissident thinkers cover a diversity of political positions that coexist within the Charter 77 movement. They range from Petr Uhl's "neo-Trotskyism" and Jiři Hajek's "reform communism," to Rudolf Battek's "independent socialism," Ladislav Hejdanek's "democratic liberalism," and Václav Benda's Catholic-based "radical conservatism." But what unites these activists is apparently greater than what divides them, as evidenced by the Charter's consistent crusade for civil liberties, respect for the rule of law, and the promotion of various citizens' initiatives to limit the suffocating power of the state.

Charter 77 has not mushroomed into a mass Solidarity-type movement, but neither has it suffered any debilitating reversals. Its level of opposition has become stabilized in a particularly repressive political climate, and it has served as a source of inspiration for the plethora of independent cultural, educational, political, and religious initiatives that the Prague regime seems unable fully to stamp out. In some respects, Charter 77 has set the groundwork for any subsequent movement of public opposition; the quality of its political analysis is probably unsurpassed in the Soviet bloc.

Havel pays particular attention to the role each "demoralized" individual plays in the self-perpetuating system of "social automatism." In *The Power of the Powerless,* he argues that practically any person can escape the stranglehold of the system by simply "stepping out of the lie"—a principle upon which the Charter was first established. "Living within the truth" and "supporting the independent life of society" therefore have political as well as practical and moral dimensions because a fundamental pillar of the system is the constant manipulation of truth and reality. In Havel's estimation, myriad varieties of "pre-political activity," such as the writing of protest letters, student demonstrations, work stoppages, election boycotts, and hun-

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ger strikes, can eventually germinate into more substantial social movements not only in the form of social "self-defense" but also in more assertive forms of social "offense" on behalf of critical causes.

ONE OF the most provocative developments in Eastern Europe during the 1980's has been the emergence of autonomous peace and ecology movements. This development has been coupled with a widening public discussion about disarmament, militarism, nuclear power, and the crisis of the environment that was initiated in the civil rights campaigns launched in the 1970's. *From Below,* the final book to be discussed, thoroughly and competently explores a multitude of activities on these fronts in the Chernobyl' era.

East Germany's independent peace movement is the oldest and perhaps the most established in Eastern Europe, and enjoys effective protection from the country's Evangelical Church. The movement also takes an interest in environmental issues. Hungary's smaller peace movement is comprised mainly of student activists and the intellectual democratic opposition, but some pacifist religious sects also participate. Though no distinctive peace movement exists in Czechoslovakia, a variety of debates and policy statements on peace issues have been aired under the auspices of Charter 77. The Chartists have been eloquent in articulating the contention that peace and human rights are inextricably intertwined; hence by campaigning for any "single issue," one inevitably extends the horizon of civil liberties and social liberation.

From Below also looks closely at Polish social activism in the peace and ecology arenas in the "post-Solidarity" era. The group at the forefront of this movement is Freedom and Peace (*Wolność i Pokój*—WiP). Founded in April 1985, WiP is a loose federation of groups in 11 Polish cities; it claims a core of 100 to 200 activists, though hundreds more support and participate in its initiatives. The group has undertaken numerous actions on behalf of conscientious objection, ecological preservation, and human rights, and it has involved a wide spectrum of young people with divergent political views. It has been subject to a government campaign of intimidation and repression.

THE FOUR books reviewed here are predominantly concerned with developments before Gorbachev started to influence international public opinion, and before the thrust of his policies became apparent. Nevertheless, they provide a valuable insight into oppositionist currents, in Poland and Czechoslovakia in particular, during the twilight of Brezhnevism. The reformist moves "from above" initiated by the new Soviet leader since he was elevated to the position of CPSU general secretary in March 1985 have generated various responses in East Europe's dissident circles. Significant patterns of reaction to Soviet developments can be discerned by surveying recent *samizdat* material, published interviews with oppositionist figures, and reports by Western journalists.

Seasoned Soviet-bloc dissidents have grown accustomed to periodic government relaxations and officially sponsored reforms. As a result, many remain understandably suspicious of Gorbachev's *glasnost'* and *perestroyka* campaigns and their repercussions on conditions within the bloc. Indeed, two main areas of concern seem to have materialized. First, there is some apprehension that any reforms initiated by the ruling party elites could prove cosmetic, ineffectual, or a cunning substitute for authentic and far-reaching economic and political concessions. Second, dissidents have pointed out that without safeguarded and institutionalized changes, in which the governments concerned surrender some of their powers and privileges, the current thaw could eventually turn into another freeze. They are clearly fearful that *glasnost'* may be merely a temporary respite preceding another repressive clampdown on independent social activism.

In general, three broad interpretations among East Europe's political opposition regarding Gorbachev's impact in the bloc have emerged. They can be characterized in turn as "positivist," "negativist," and "potentialist." The differences between these positions can be partially accounted for by national peculiarities, specific historical experiences with reform, particular dissident programs and political orientations, and more personalized individual inclinations. Nevertheless, each strand of opinion is present in at least several Soviet-bloc states, and all three can be found to varying degrees in most. Though such responses and expectations may overlap and shift over time, in relation to positive or negative developments in one or more states, they could increasingly set the tempo for the policies and strategies adopted by dissident groups in any future confrontations with the authorities.

Positivists. A renewed optimism—with variable degrees of prudence—is evident among East Europe's "positivists," particularly those who were former Communists, Marxist revisionists, reformers, ex-reformers, and assorted "democratic socialists." "Positivists" believe Gorbachev provides an important opportunity for resurrecting aborted or stalled economic

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and political reforms within and outside the ruling parties. Such reformist-oriented oppositionists believe that Moscow should be given more sympathy and active support by all East-bloc dissenters. In their view, Gorbachev's possible defeat by anti-reformist elements within the Soviet bureaucracy would presage a severe setback for all democratic forces and reformist currents in Eastern Europe.

A number of "ex-Communist" Charter 77 signatories in Czechoslovakia who were active in the "Prague Spring" reform movement—such as the former Minister for Foreign Affairs Jiři Hajek—consider Gorbachev's current course to be a vindication of their own attempts at democratic restructuring during the late 1960's.[1] Czechoslovakia may be unique in this respect, in that reformist currents are still in evidence among sectors of the half-million strong "party of the expelled" 20 years after the 1968 Soviet invasion. For many, the "Prague Spring" remains a cogent symbol of the potential of "democratic communism." In January 1988, 43 ex-members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia who had been expelled in the aftermath of the invasion issued an appeal to their countrymen. In it they asked that activists more forcefully demand political rehabilitation for all purged Communists.[2] They also called for sweeping political and economic reforms instead of the "half-hearted steps" undertaken by the Husák and Jakeš regimes. Communism, they argued, can and must be democratized in order to end 20 years of "bureaucratic stagnation." As former Communist cadres, they have dispatched letters to the official party daily, *Rudé Právo,* asserting that what they had hoped to accomplish during the "Prague Spring" was basically identical to what Gorbachev is now attempting in the USSR.[3] A number of reform communists who have been politically inactive during the past two decades and who eschewed involvement in Charter 77's human rights campaigns, may now increasingly look toward Moscow to rejuvenate their reformist platform both within and outside the CPCz.

Several Charter 77 signatories—particularly the "ex-Communists" and socialists, but also some of the "independents" and Christians within the movement—have directed messages to the Soviet leader and have publicly endorsed his policies. However, their support has contained some notable provisos and reservations. Charter statements have repeatedly called for the removal of Red Army troops and Soviet nuclear missiles from Czechoslovakia as a "positive symbol" of Soviet intentions to restore "normality" between the two states.[4] The withdrawal of Soviet forces, they contend, would "constitute a practical step towards convincing the Czechs and Slovaks that *glasnost',* democracy, respect for human rights, and the desire for peace, are not mere slogans." Charter 77 spokespersons Jan Litomiský, Libuše Silhanova, and Josef Vohryzek, addressed Gorbachev as follows:

Freedom, democracy, and the universal values you spoke of recently are indivisible and therefore cannot be fully and lastingly enjoyed by those who deny them to others. Were the Soviet Union to lift the main barrier which it itself once placed in the way of progress towards democracy in Czechoslovakia, it would give impetus to its own process of democratization, while at the same time strengthening the trust among nations and states without which even the best-intentioned peace initiatives must founder.[5]

Some Charter 77 representatives have reported that since Gorbachev's consolidation of power, more Czechoslovak citizens have taken an active interest in politics, in the hope that Moscow's policies may produce some beneficial changes throughout the bloc.[6] However, the majority of human rights activists also concur that East European populations are fully cognizant that they cannot simply depend on outside factors to introduce reforms. The Czechoslovak opposition therefore continues to underscore the role of independent social forces in various public arenas as a crucial source of pressure on the party leadership to institute reform.

In Poland, by contrast, reliance on inner-party liberalization has few supporters and many critics. Most Polish dissident work since the late 1970's has focused on extending the parameters of independent social action outside party supervision. Since Gorbachev's rise to power, the voluminous underground press in Poland has, however, increasingly covered Soviet events. It now regularly engages in debates over the significance of *glasnost', perestroyka,* and *novoye myshleniye* for Eastern Europe in

[1]According to an interview during Gorbachev's visit to Prague, published in *The New York Times,* Apr. 10, 1987.

[2]AP, Jan. 14, 1988.

[3]Their letters have reportedly not been published by the Czechoslovak party daily; see *The New York Times,* Apr. 5, 1987.

[4]See *Charter 77 Document No. 20/87* (Prague), Mar. 23, 1987. Letters have also been sent by dissidents to the Prague regime to encourage it to initiate genuine reforms, to restore government respect for human rights, and to "develop democracy."

[5]Ibid.

[6]Based on comments offered by Charter 77 signatory Jiři Dienstbier to *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Apr. 9, 1987.

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general and Poland in particular.[7] Public reactions have ranged from approval of Gorbachev's measures as a genuine attempt to democratize the Soviet system, to intense suspicion of Moscow's ulterior motives and maneuvers.

The prominent Solidarity adviser Adam Michnik, who is not easy to pigeonhole in any single category and who is consistently critical of Soviet behavior, nevertheless thinks that evolving Kremlin policies may open up new possibilities by creating opportunities for political compromises that would lessen domestic social conflicts.[8] For example, Moscow may give East European states a freer hand to introduce much needed economic and political reforms, including those initially proposed by the Solidarity movement—such as workers' self-management, local self-government, labor union pluralism, and more tolerance for political diversity. Attempts at economic restructuring to enhance output and performance may indeed produce irresistible internal pressures for politically oriented reforms.

Michnik and other like-minded dissidents consider it essential that any economic reform or "streamlining" be accompanied by full-scale "political reconstruction." They feel that continuing progress in the USSR may indeed provide such opportunities, but remain concerned that the present leadership clique in Poland will try to contain reforms within the framework of the system without significantly remodeling political relations. Poland's cautious "positivists" contend that public pressures should be stepped up on each regime to encourage it to transcend "bureaucratic constraints" and neutralize or remove all "regressive" elements from the administration.

Inner-party reformism has some backers among Hungary's intellectual "semi-legal" opposition, but their numbers are generally small, their proposals enjoy little public resonance, and they have not spawned any wider social movements.[9] A section of Hungary's dissident intelligentsia has, however, recently issued tentatively positive evaluations of East European prospects under Gorbachev. In June 1987, the leading *samizdat* journal *Beszélö* published detailed "prerequisites for resolving the political crisis" which were evidently agreed upon by different groupings in the self-professed "Democratic Opposition."[10] Individuals, groups, and publications which are part of the urban-based "democratic opposition" helped to form the "Network of Free Initiatives" together with various ecological and peace groupings in May 1988. The network is supposed to function as an umbrella organization to coordinate all independent initiatives. In addition to specific reform proposals in the economic, cultural, legal, and political spheres, one section of the document notes that Moscow has become more tolerant of East European reforms, thereby presenting "an opportunity for the satellite countries to increase their relative independence of the Soviet Union." According to the document, Gorbachev has purportedly recognized the need for "changes in mutual relations" and is more amenable to local political reform; external conditions have "never before been so favorable as now." *Beszélö* calls upon Magyar dissidents and all pro-reform forces within the ruling party to avail themselves of current opportunities to push for major changes, including the gradual separation of party from government:

The more we are able to get the Soviet leadership to accept today, the more we would be able to defend later, during a possible backlash. And when we are weighing the force of the possible backlash, we have to take into account the long-term trends of the changes that are weakening Soviet control over the region.

Two hundred Hungarian journalists recently applied to the government to establish a "*glasnost'* club."[11] Their aim is to provide the public with information about important issues in the reform movement which are sorely neglected by the official media, and to "follow up injustices against citizens." In the words of one signatory: "We feel it is ridiculous in the late 1980's for the entire Hungarian media to be state-controlled." The journalists' application has been carefully worded to stress the authors' positive evaluation of Gorbachev's pronouncements and the club's intention to work alongside rather than against the official Journalists' Association. Budapest's response to the *glasnost'* initiative has not been sympathetic. Ernö Lakatos, head of the Central Committee's propaganda department, has put pressure on state media editors to impose sanctions against any staff member signing the "*glasnost'* club" appli-

[7]For a useful compilation of such debates in Poland consult Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty (hereafter RFE-RL), *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), Polish Independent Press Review, 4/87, May 29, 1987.

[8]In an interview for *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), May 11, 1987. Michnik has also suggested that Gorbachev may directly help to improve Polish-Soviet relations by more openly discussing burning historical controversies, such as the Katyń forest massacre, about which the two ruling parties have remained silent or evasive.

[9]See in particular George Konrad, *Antipolitics*, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984.

[10]See the "Social Contract" in *Beszélö* (Budapest), No. 20, June 1987.

[11]Reuters, Mar. 4, 1988.

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cation. The regime clearly intends to introduce reforms at its own pace and discretion.

Degrees of optimism over Gorbachev's reform initiatives may also be found among the small dissident communities in particularly repressive states, such as Romania and East Germany. These individuals may not necessarily view the Kremlin leader as a uniquely democratic force, but they perceive that his programs compare favorably with those of their own regimes, and they thereby aspire to a modicum of Soviet-type liberalization. Some may indeed see Gorbachev as a potential "ally" in their struggles with the entrenched domestic communist *apparat,* and an important external lever for internal change.

About the time of Gorbachev's visit to Bucharest in May 1987, dissident Romanian intellectuals sent two letters to the Soviet embassy proposing various political reforms in the country, in the hope of obtaining Moscow's support and protection against Ceauşescu's unbending dogmatism.[12] Rather than propounding a comprehensive program of democratization in their documents, Romanian dissidents petitioned for a resuscitation of "socialism" and the termination of Ceauşescu's "cult of personality," which they consider to be a throwback to the worst features of Stalinism, including the widespread abuse of power.

A prominent opposition figure and former high-ranking economic adviser, Mihai Botez, has reported that a growing number of Romanian intellectuals, both within and outside the party, are hoping that Moscow will apply pressure on Bucharest to ease its repressions and introduce a "technocratic and rational approach to policy."[13] Botez believes that mounting public discontent in the country could assist Moscow in pushing for appropriate adjustments in the Romanian Communist Party. But despite occasional spontaneous public protests, such as in Braşov in November 1987, opposition in Romania remains embryonic. It is limited to a modest pro-reformist platform, which is not tied to any wider social movement and does not appear to bridge the interests of the intelligentsia and the working class.

Dissidents in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) have initiated campaigns for *glasnost'* in that country, but have tended to avoid calls for *perestroyka*, partly because of the relative success of the GDR economy by East European standards. For instance, members of the group *Frieden und Menschenrechte* (Peace and Human Rights) have issued statements demanding greater openness in the mass media. In their estimation, an independent press is "an essential prerequisite for the development of a country's democracy."[14] They have complained that even in other communist countries, journalists experience more opportunity to engage in factual commentary, whereas in East Germany "mendacious reporting" and "linguistic barbarism" are still prevalent.

More broadly-based expressions of protest against the government's restrictive cultural and information policies were displayed in June 1987 by crowds of East German youth. They reportedly chanted Gorbachev's name when police tried to keep them out of hearing range of a rock concert on the other side of the Berlin Wall.[15] Subsequent youthful pro-*glasnost'* protests have also been staged in East Berlin. The most recent demonstrations were dispersed by security forces in mid-January 1988, and several dozen dissidents were jailed or speedily exiled across the Wall, including the popular singer Stefan Krawczyk.[16] Ironically, but quite clearly, some East German dissidents are using Gorbachev's rhetoric as a weapon against their own intransigent regime, in the hope of spurring wider demands for human rights, especially over the issue of travel to West Germany.

Negativists. A sizable body of independently monitored public opinion about Gorbachev can best be described as "negativist." This term encompasses the majority of "non-engaged" or "apolitical" people who do not actively participate either in government-directed or dissident-sponsored activities. It also includes former reformers now disillusioned about the prospects for democracy in Leninist systems, as well as potential revolutionists who believe that only a full-scale armed insurrection will dislodge or transform the system. (The latter group concedes that the prospects for violent revolution seem extremely remote at the present time.)

The ideas expressed in one Polish *samizdat* publication, *Tygodnik Mazowsze,* early in 1987 may be more widely echoed in East European societies. According to the underground political commentator Karol Grodkowski many, if not most, Poles believe that "everything Gorbachev

[12]For details about the letters, see RFE-RL, *Radio Free Europe Research,* Romanian Situation Report, 11/87, Oct. 15, 1987.

[13]See the interview in *L'Express* (Paris), May 28, 1987. Another prominent Romanian dissident, the veteran National Peasant leader Ioan Puiu, was detained by the security police when found in possession of a memorandum intended for Gorbachev during the latter's visit to Bucharest.

[14]DPA (West Berlin), Aug. 28, 1987.

[15]See *The New York Times,* June 10, 1987.

[16]For fuller reports on the protests and subsequent repressions, see Reuters, Feb. 1, 1988; and *The Washington Times,* Feb. 8, 1988.

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says and does is mere propaganda directed primarily at the West," in order to gain credits, markets, and technology, and to throw Western powers "off their guard."[17]

The underlying assumption among "negativists" is that "the nature of communism will never change; the only thing that does change is its tactics."[18] Such critics do not envisage any meaningful reforms under Gorbachev's rule, irrespective of Moscow's actual intentions. Economic and social problems are so deeply rooted, they feel, that only radical measures by noncommunists with no ultimate stake in the system could prove decisive. In the existing state of "lawlessness" and political arbitrariness, any reforms or innovations introduced in economic, cultural, or political life can be swiftly revoked if it suits the whims and goals of the party leadership. In the final reckoning, "negativists" contend, democratic pluralism and the rule of law can only be institutionalized and protected by independent checks and balances fully outside communist control.

Several Polish oppositionists have cautioned against invoking Gorbachev's policies to buttress their own demands for domestic reform. During a recent discussion between leading dissidents under the auspices of Solidarity's Temporary Council (the independent union's aboveground national leadership between September 1986 and October 1987 when the underground and aboveground Solidarity leadership was unified in the National Executive Commission), Konrad Bielinski and Andrzej Celinski stressed that positive evaluations of Gorbachev by the political opposition could result in their "loss of credibility and social authority" among wide sectors of the Polish public.[19] In the opinion of the respected dissident intellectual Jacek Kuroń, "such misgivings cannot be underestimated" as Poles apparently harbor little faith or trust in Kremlin policies, whatever the avowed goals.[20] The depth of popular suspicion was echoed by Celinski, who opined that:

The question of whether anything is to be gained from changes in the Soviet Union is based on an illusion, [as] any Communist cadre will think entirely in terms of hanging on to power for another six months or a year . . . .[21]

Potentialists. The third broad category of dissident opinion concerning Gorbachev may be termed "potentialist." Independent worker activists, self-proclaimed nationalists, and anti-communist democrats of various political persuasions most often fall into this category. "Potentialists" perceive the Gorbachev phenomenon as a possibly important—though unintentional—spark for far-reaching political change that could ultimately elude party control. *Glasnost'* and *perestroyka* are not viewed as instruments for bringing about genuine democratization. Indeed, the Soviet general secretary and his "faction" are seen principally as communist "realists" or "problem solvers" who are attempting to salvage and strengthen the Leninist system by boosting economic performance under overall party supervision—they are *not* viewed as promoting the development of a "post-totalitarian" society.

In fact, some "potentialists" see in the attempted rejuvenation of communism an inherent danger. During the process of creating a more efficient and stable economy, repression may be eased, criticism may be tolerated, and some tentative gestures may be made toward organizational pluralism, but they see these measures as deceptive and primarily as the means to an end—they are subject to sharp reversal once the state's economic base is consolidated and some political momentum is regained. The ruling party, once strengthened by a streamlined economy, can then bring dissenting elements under tighter rein and outlaw or forcefully co-opt genuine pluralism. Tadeusz Jedynak, the former Solidarity underground leader in Upper Silesia, has warned that "at a certain point it may turn out that *perestroyka* is just a maneuver which will turn against us."[22] In his view, nothing has yet happened in the USSR that cannot be undone practically overnight.

Despite their pronounced skepticism, "potentialists" believe that in the process of "restructuring," Gorbachev's policies could well provoke political instability in the Soviet Union by energizing nationalist forces and democratic movements that Moscow may find increasingly difficult to contain. This scenario in turn could help rekindle and reignite popular pressure, manifested in mass antigovernment campaigns throughout Eastern Europe. At the very least, political confusion and a loosening of central controls could stimulate the emergence of rival political groupings in the party and so allow for more independent social organizations. The "potentialists" are evidently calculating

[17]See the article by Karol Grodkowski in *Tygodnik Mazowsze* (Warsaw), No. 202, Mar. 11, 1987.

[18]Ibid.

[19]For a summary of the views expressed during the discussion, refer to *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, No. 218, translated and reprinted in *Uncensored Poland* (London), No. 18, Sept. 11, 1987.

[20]Lech Wałęsa's former adviser Bronisław Geremek has complained about the "widespread attitude of ignoring events in the USSR in the belief that nothing good can come out of them for Poland." Ibid.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Ibid.

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that the unintended consequences of *glasnost'* will sooner or later surface, setting loose latent pressures within each oppressed society.

According to Václav Havel, the key to change in the Soviet bloc does not rest exclusively with Gorbachev or any other communist leaders. Much depends on social dynamics and the mood of the masses in interpreting and acting upon their perceptions of political change. Havel seems to adopt a "potentialist" stance vis-à-vis Moscow; he neither dismisses the Gorbachev phenomenon outright as a mere tactical ploy nor concurs with the more positive reformist assessments of some of his dissident colleagues. He believes in testing the system by expanding public initiatives, not simply relying on the power apparatus to introduce democratic measures. He concedes that:

Gorbachev is a more enlightened ruler than his predecessors, and Jakeš imitates Gorbachev verbally when he goes on about purported restructuring and democratization in our country; but both of these facts have so far had precious little influence in our lives. If they have an influence at all, then it is perhaps mainly in the way and the degree to which society accepts them as terms of reference ... to the extent that they can be played back into their originators' court.[23]

Though "potentialists" can be found within most of the major dissident movements, their standpoint has perhaps crystallized most forcefully in the Polish opposition, particularly among the non-Solidarity political groupings that have sprouted since the imposition of martial law. For instance, the clandestine organization "Fighting Solidarity" (*Solidarność Walcząca*) campaigns for a complete political transformation, rejects "illusory compromises" with the regime, and dismisses reformism in all its guises as a cosmetic exercise that simply helps to preserve communist party rule. Founded in Wrocław soon after the imposition of martial law, Fighting Solidarity operates outside the mainstream Solidarity structures and regularly criticizes the moderation of leaders like Lech Walęsa and Zbigniew Bujak. It advocates far-reaching political changes based on "solidarism"—a combination of a multi-party parliamentary system, strong local democracy, and workers' syndicalism alongside a market economy. Since 1982 the organization has spread to half a dozen cities; it publishes about 18 periodicals, runs an underground news agency and several clandestine radio stations, promotes a program of self-education, and has even smuggled translations of its material into the Soviet Union.[24]

Despite their pronounced skepticism about any communist party initiatives, Fighting Solidarity spokesmen have recently stressed the potentially opportune side effects of Gorbachev's search for economic improvement throughout the Soviet bloc, including the unwitting motivation of more autonomous movements "from below" that the party *apparatchiki* might eventually be unable to keep at bay.[25] According to such "potentialist" observers in Poland:

We should not invest too much hope in the Kremlin's new course. . . . Our efforts ought to concentrate on sustaining the advantage in the field of democratization and liberalization that we have achieved in the forty years of our resistance and struggle . . . . We see our greatest hopes not in Gorbachev's intentions but in the process that his actions may set in motion.[26]

In "potentialist" estimations, the East European public should prepare itself by all possible means to exploit fully any emerging opportunities presented by Gorbachev's policies or encouraged by any easing of repression in the bloc. Pressures should be exerted on the party authorities in the respective countries by purposively increasing the scope of autonomous private and public initiatives, particularly in the political and economic realms.

SEVERAL statements have been issued by dissident groups in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary in an attempt to formulate some common stance toward Gorbachev's reforms. Following a meeting on the Polish-Czechoslovak border in August 1987, 21 opposition activists distributed a communiqué stressing that it still remained to be seen whether Moscow's program would create more favorable conditions for "self-liberation" in the bloc. Though their assessment was cautiously optimistic, they concluded that the Kremlin's officially proclaimed policy of democratization "cannot

[23]For the translated text of Havel's interview with a Czechoslovak *samizdat* publication, entitled "Reasons for Doubt and Sources of Hope," see Vladimir Kusin, "Vaclav Havel on Doubt and Hope," RFE-RL, *Radio Free Europe Research*, RAD Background Report (Eastern Europe), 33/88, Mar. 1, 1988.

[24]Useful summaries of Poland's independent political movements can be found in Teresa Hanicka, "Political Groups in the Polish Underground," RFE-RL, *Radio Free Europe Research*, RAD Background Report (Poland), 118/85, Oct. 14, 1985, and in Francis Michalski, "The Rise of Political Opposition in Poland," *Poland Watch* (Washington, DC), No. 8, 1986, pp. 87-107. For some evidence of contacts with "Soviet sympathizers of Fighting Solidarity," see *Solidarność Walcząca* (Wrocław), No. 13 (157), June 21-July 5, 1987.

[25]Refer for instance to *Solidarność Walcząca*, No. 13 (157), June 21-July 5, 1987.

[26]Quoted in *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, No. 201, Mar. 4, 1987.

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evoke credibility if it is not translated into concrete actions" including "a more intense and deeper respect for the independent interests, traditions, and hopes of other countries."[27] Participants at the Czech-Polish meeting stated their intention to launch a more comprehensive debate about the effects of Gorbachev's policies and objectives among several independent groupings in Eastern Europe. In order to improve coordination and help forge a coherent joint response to Gorbachev's policies among Soviet bloc dissidents, Michnik and others have called for a "common platform" reflecting the position of Polish, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian oppositionist strands.[28] The precise contours of this venture have still to be specified.

Over the past few years, a number of dissidents have contended that a more consistent "internationalist" approach is essential to initiate changes in each state and to present a "united front" vis-à-vis the Kremlin. In practice, this generally has amounted to little more than sporadic exchanges of documents, joint letters of protest, statements of intent, a degree of mutual support, and occasional secret meetings. However, a joint communiqué, which was something of a landmark in East European dissident solidarity, was issued on the 30th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution. It was dated October 23, 1986, released simultaneously in Budapest, East Berlin, Prague, and Warsaw, and contained the signatures of 120 prominent opposition activists from Hungary, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Several Romanian dissidents later appended their names to the document. Subsequent statements have also been issued in support of East German dissidents jailed or expelled to the West, and in recognition of the right of conscientious objection to military service. On February 1, 1988, another display of inter-dissident solidarity took place when simultaneous demonstrations against severe repression in Romania were held in Prague, Warsaw, Budapest, and Moscow at the request of Charter 77. They included hunger strikes, vigils outside Romanian embassies, and other symbolic protests, in addition to messages of support for any emergent "social resistance" in Romania.[29] Such displays may be repeated if a sufficient degree of international planning, coordination, publicity, and participation can be garnered despite government dissuasion. But consistent contacts have proved difficult to maintain even between individuals in neighboring countries. Each regime has made strenuous efforts to seal off its population from "dangerous" political ideas: the hermetic isolation of Poland during the legal Solidarity period is an extreme example of this policy.

Available evidence indicates that most East European dissidents maintain a reasonably sober and realistic assessment of Gorbachev's tenure and the possibilities for lasting improvements. Their opinions are likely to alter or further crystallize as developments unfold in Moscow and elsewhere in the bloc. The majority seem to consider it premature to draw any final conclusions, whatever their individual aspirations and approaches. Not surprisingly, some have voiced dismay that Western observers may be allured by the symbols rather than the substance of Soviet policy.[30] In the words of Václav Havel:

As far as Gorbachev is concerned, I am neither an optimist nor a pessimist . . . . Concerning his popularity in the West I am rather shocked to find that the "realist" politicians who mock us for our lack of realism allow themselves to be charmed by a few seductive glances in their direction . . . . The fact that all those worldly-wise, long-serving "realist" politicians, who mock us naive dreamers fighting for human rights in Eastern Europe, are unable to see through it is something I find alarming.[31]

[27]The full text of the joint communiqué, issued on Aug. 21, 1987, is available from the Committee for the Support of Human Rights in Czechoslovakia, Washington DC.

[28]AFP (Paris), Aug. 5, 1987.

[29]For details, see news agency reports on Feb. 2 and Feb. 3, 1988. For a useful summary of recent developments, see Jackson Diehl, "East Bloc Dissidents Coordinate Protest," *The Washington Post*, Feb. 2, 1988, and Vladimir Socor, "Independent Groups in Eastern Europe Urge Support for People of Romania," RFE-RL, *Radio Free Europe Research*, RAD Background Report (Eastern Europe), 30/88, Feb. 25, 1988.

[30]Contrary to many Western leftist circles, East bloc democratic socialists "appear more critical about Gorbachev's objectives and skeptical about his prospects." This contrast was evident during an unofficial meeting between Western socialists and "peace campaigners," on the one hand, and a number of Hungarian dissident intellectuals and other Soviet bloc oppositionists, on the other, held in Budapest in late November 1987. For details, see the *Hungarian October Information Centre* (London), No. 135, Nov. 23, 1987.

[31]From an interview for the British Labour Party monthly, *New Socialist*, in London in February 1987.

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Looking Back on the Chinese Cultural Revolution

Anita Chan

GAO YUAN. *Born Red: A Chronicle of the Cultural Revolution.* Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1987.

YANG JIANG. *Six Chapters from My Life "Downunder."* Translated by Howard Goldblatt. Hong Kong, The Chinese University Press, 1983, and Seattle and London, University of Washington Press, 1984.

JUDITH SHAPIRO and LIANG HENG. *Cold Winds, Warm Winds: Intellectual Life in China Today.* Middletown, CT, Wesleyan University Press, 1986.

I was imprisoned for eight years and forced to write nearly a thousand confessions. I need not mention the beatings and personal insults I suffered. A foreign friend suggested that I should describe these experiences.[1]

THE THREE BOOKS to be reviewed here, each covering a different span of years in a very different way, deal with repression in China. The first, *Born Red,* is an autobiographical account penned in the Berkeley hills in the mid-1980's by a graduate student from China. It recounts his experiences of violence and repression as a high-school Red Guard from 1966 to 1969. The second book, *Six Chapters from My Life "Downunder,"* a slim translated volume, also autobiographical, tells of an elderly Chinese writer's life from 1969 to 1972 in one of the thousands of so-called "May Seventh Cadre Schools," a euphemism for the make-shift labor camps set up to "re-educate" urban white-collar personnel. The third book, *Cold Winds, Warm Winds,* in which the above quote appears, outlines the social and political climate of the 1980's, as China moves fitfully but progressively away from the politics of repression. The first and third books are directed to the general Western readership, though the China specialist may also find them quite useful. The second book, *Six Chapters from My Life "Downunder,"* was written for a Chinese readership that had shared or had an intimate knowledge of the author's experiences.

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GAO YUAN'S *Born Red* is the best Red Guard autobiography published in English to date.[2] Since non-fictional depiction of the Cultural Revolution is still largely a taboo subject for Chinese publications, *Born Red,* published twenty years after the turmoil of 1966–69, is not born too late. It bears important new testimony to the havoc that wracked China. In writing it, Gao was able to cast himself back into the frame of mind of a fourteen-year-old. Untempered by hindsight or self justification, his book allows readers to "get inside" the mentality that caused young people to rise up against authority, to battle each other, and ultimately to kill each other.

Gao Yuan was "born red" in two senses. Traditionally, the color red symbolized good fortune or good luck; in the new Chinese communist vocabulary it additionally has

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[1]The elderly dramatist Xia Yan (1979), quoted in Judith Shapiro and Liang Heng, *Cold Winds, Warm Winds: Intellectual Life in China Today,* Middletown, CT, Wesleyan University Press, 1986, p. 23.

[2]Another recently published autobiography of the same genre, Hua Linshan's *Les Années Rouges* (The Red Years), Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1987, is as good, if not better. Other Red Guard autobiographies are: Gordon Bennett and Ronald Montaperto, *Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai,* London, George Allen & Unwin, 1971; Ken Ling, *The Revenge of Heaven,* New York, Putnam, 1972; and Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro, *Son of the Revolution,* New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1983.

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meant "revolutionary," a term embodying all that was "good" in the Mao era. Born in 1952, Gao's formative years spanned the revolutionary years when the Mao cult became established, developed, and reached its pinnacle. Children of Gao's generation were filled with adoration for the great leader and considered themselves lucky to have been born in a period of Chinese history when, they were taught, the nation was emerging as a world power under the omniscient guidance of the Chairman.

Gao was "red" in yet another way—his father had been a communist guerrilla leader in the civil war. In the new social order, as the family of a "revolutionary cadre," Gao's household enjoyed prestige and attendant privileges. Double redness instilled in Gao great self-confidence and unswerving trust in the political system.

Thus far, both inside and outside China, few biographical recollections have been written by former Red Guards who were from "red" parentage.[3] Yet parentage, as Western scholars who have studied the Red Guard Movement agree, was one of the key social factors that underpinned the conflict among student Red Guard factions.[4] The fact that Gao, who was of this rarer breed, writes so candidly about his own experience is of value in providing new source material on the motivations behind Red Guard factional formation.

Western scholars picture the high-school students of "revolutionary cadre" parentage as occupying an anomolous position in the years preceding the Cultural Revolution. Because they were politically favored, they often were admitted to better high schools than their academic performance warranted, and thus tended to find themselves at the bottom of their classes. In an effort to assert their own superiority, they typically downplayed the significance of academic achievement and stressed the importance of inherited "redness"; they insisted that they, by virtue of birth, were pure, whereas the children of middle and bad-class background were politically suspect. In the early months of the Cultural Revolution, the students of "revolutionary cadre" or "red" background took charge of the schools and, as the "natural" leaders of the red working-class students, launched attacks against "bourgeois academics in authority" and bad-class people. They themselves proudly referred to the period as the "Red Terror."

But the tide soon turned against these initial "good-class" Red Guard groups because they were not serving Mao's purposes sufficiently, that is, they were not assaulting those party officials whom Mao wanted to destroy. By the end of 1966, the students of non-red origin had been given the go-ahead to set up their own Red Guard organizations. These new groups, who called themselves "rebels," were able to muster a considerable following, and turned with alacrity to assaults against those party "powerholders" who seemed to lack Mao's blessing. The "rebels" disparagingly labelled the initial Red Guards of "red" origin as "royalist" Red Guards for defending the party officialdom. But when Mao espoused the slogan "to rebel is justified," the initial "red" Red Guards preferred to also call themselves "rebels."

Herein lies one of the confusing elements in the study of the Red Guard movement—how to sort out the thousands of large and small self-proclaimed "rebel" Red Guard groups that had sprung up in 1966–68. The confusion not only befuddles scholars trying to do research on the topic; as Red Guard groups split and re-formed and sought disparate allies in the wider society, those who were caught in the maelstrom similarly became confused as to why they were fighting within the ranks of one of these broader alliances rather than another. Gao is a good example.

To what extent did Gao's behavior fit the pattern that has been ascribed to students of "revolutionary cadre" parentage? The first thing to note is that Gao (from his own convincing account) was not the overbearing, stereotypical cadre offspring—though several of Gao's classmates answered well to the stereotype. Gao was much influenced by his father, who, based on Gao's description, was a devoted and righteous county leader. According to Gao, he took the highly unusual step of firmly instructing his children not to list "revolutionary cadre" in their personal dossiers[5] at

[3]As these good-class Red Guards tended to be the most actively involved in the suppression of people of bad-class origin in the initial phases of the Cultural Revolution, engaging in activities that are now condemned in China, they have not been the most eager group to write or talk about the past. It is no coincidence that in literature and in the reminiscences that have been emerging in the post-Mao era, the writers all write from the perspective of the victim. The oppressors have not found the critical faculty or the moral courage to write openly about themselves.

[4]See Hong Yung Lee, *The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978; Stanley Rosen, *Red Guard Factionalism and the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1982; Jonathan Unger, *Education under Mao: Class and Competition in Canton Schools, 1960–80*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1982; Anita Chan, *Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985; and Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen and Jonathan Unger, "Students and Class Warfare: The Social Roots of the Red Guard Conflict in Guangzhou," *The China Quarterly* (London), No. 82, September, 1980, pp. 397–446.

[5]In China, in the days of Mao, these personal dossiers were kept by all work units. They contained information about one's class origin and a record of one's political history. These dossiers were extremely important inasmuch as the information they held often determined one's life chances—whether one would be well served or mistreated by society.

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school, for fear that they might consider themselves superior. In a political system where party discipline was the iron rule, his father more than once broke with party policy in defense of the interests of the peasants. Twice he had gotten into serious trouble: once he was jailed for four months and another time he was dismissed temporarily from his post.

Second, unlike some of the children of cadres, Gao apparently was an excellent student. He had no cause to feel jealous of or competitive with middle and bad-class schoolmates or to disparage their academic achievements. When the Cultural Revolution began he did what most of his peers from good, and not-so-good class backgrounds did to show themselves revolutionary—he wrote big character posters denouncing bad-class background teachers and the school authorities. In order to find targets for "revolutionary struggle," these posters distorted the benign comments that teachers had made in earlier years. But Gao did not go about physically assaulting bad-class schoolmates. In fact, he argued to include classmates of not-so-good class background in the original Red Guard ranks. He cried when he learned that in the county town's campaign to cleanse itself of "monsters and demons," the house of his best friend and her frail bad-class grandmother had been boarded up and that they had been driven back to their native village. Gao abandoned the stance of his good-class peers.

Gao's father, like so many of the parents of revolutionary-cadre children, eventually came under attack in the county where he was county head. Inasmuch as this county was next to the one where Gao went to school, Gao found himself in a predicament. Since he had great respect for his father, his sympathy naturally lay with the "royalists" in his home county—those who defended his father. He declined to join the newly-formed "rebel" faction at his school, which claimed a majority following and was headed by a good friend of his, and founded instead his own Red Guard organization. His tiny group, composed of a few classmates with whom he had longstanding friendships, soon amalgamated with a group that his elder brother belonged to; before long, the students at his school were divided into two factions contesting for power.

What began as name-calling degenerated into fist-fights, and then violence. This, in turn, rapidly escalated into full-scale street battles when these student Red Guard groups, in search of outside support to extend their strength beyond the school-walls, began allying themselves with factions in other work units in the county town—units from hospitals, factories, government administrative offices, peasants, and even the army, all of which similarly had been split asunder by opposing factions. Based on Gao's description, the only principle on which these alliances were cemented was that of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." The networks of the alliances grew so large, expanding to include out-of-county allies, and the issues became so numerous and convoluted, that participants like Gao soon lost sight of what they were fighting for. He was caught in a most ridiculous situation. The army faction with which his faction was allied became allied in the next county to the one that was attacking his father. At this point, Gao ceased even to attempt to rationalize his own activities. What urged him on was a loyalty to friends and faction and a repressed fear of the disastrous consequences of membership in a losing faction.

The story ends in irony. Gao's father was rehabilitated and became the vice-chairman of his county's "revolutionary committee," whilst Gao's faction was declared counter-revolutionary by the party center; it had been allied to a losing army faction.

After having been set loose for two years, the students were herded back into the schools. The army was moving into civilian units to quell the factional fighting, and two army doctors were dispatched to Gao's school, ostensibly to restore order. However, they had been assigned by the army corps that was allied to the student faction that had been antagonistic to Gao's, and in reality they had come to give the victorious student "rebels" the green light to crush the defeated faction. Normal classes were not resumed. Instead, the "rebels" were allowed to turn classrooms into torture chambers.

Gao recounts in detail some of the gruesome goings-on that took place behind closed doors. In the following months all members of the defeated faction were subjected in turn to maltreatment. A couple of deaths resulted, and a bad-class female teacher was gang-raped. This later stage of the Cultural Revolution (from the latter half of 1968 through early 1969), when conflict between armed camps became transformed into vengeance and vicious suppression, was the most horrifying of the three years of chaos. Nationwide it was titled the Cleansing of the Class Ranks Campaign and the Campaign to Ferret Out May Sixteen Elements, but no hint of the mindless torture that was going on surfaced in the press, which resounded with high-sounding slogans trumpeting the glorious victory of Chairman Mao's proletarian headquarters.

After the ordeal of these so-called "campaigns" a massive scheme was initiated to resettle the students permanently in the countryside. Some lucky youngsters (mostly

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those of good-class background) were allowed to stay in the cities and towns; the most fortunate of all got recruited into the army. Gao and his brother managed to get into the PLA despite their previous connections with the defeated faction. Their "revolutionary-cadre" social status and their father's recently acquired position in the county "revolutionary committee" had, despite their father's non-intervention on their behalf, presumably been of vital help to them.

Born Red adds new information and insights as well as confirms existing knowledge about the Red Guard movement. The Cultural Revolution is often regarded as an essentially urban phenomenon, but Gao's story graphically illustrates how the violence reached out to small county towns and even parts of the countryside to engulf all sectors of society. The book also brings to light how, in forming alliances, army units became important patrons and how, under the umbrella of such patrons, any identifying political platforms of the factions gave way to unprincipled tactical considerations. In the *grande finale,* whether the "rebels" or the "royalists" emerged victorious seems to have depended largely on whether the army unit they had sided with was the more powerful and/or the better connected with top political leaders in the capital. As yet no attempt has been made to map out the interlocking networks of victorious factions in the various parts of China. To further understand the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath, this is one of the areas for primary research that still needs to be attempted. Though the Red Guards occupied a central role in the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution, it is now time to move beyond this focus and conduct research into the complex roles played by other, more important forces in society.

Born Red does not, however, provide explanations and answers. Gao sets himself the task to document, not to explain. An American political scientist, William Joseph, was supposed to undertake this latter task in the foreword. Unfortunately he fails to advance any new analyses of the Red Guard movement or the Cultural Revolution. This is the one major deficiency in an otherwise extremely interesting and valuable book.

AS GAO was getting ready to enter the army in 1969, Yang Jiang, the author of the second book, *Six Chapters from My Life Downunder,* was psychologically preparing herself to be sent with her husband and her colleagues to the May Seventh cadre school run by her work unit, the Institute of Foreign Literature. In China as a whole it was still a time of high tension; people of bad-class origin were subject to severe persecution, and "struggle meetings," witch-hunts, and kangaroo courts were commonplace. A massive dislocation of urban white-collar workers of all age groups was taking place, as people were bundled off to labor in the countryside. Yang's story begins here, covering her two years in a cadre school, a disused labor camp for prisoners.

Before Liberation in the 1940's, Yang had been moderately well-known as a playwright and translator of Western literature.[6] (Her husband, Qian Zhongshu, who appears often in the *Six Chapters,* is a well-known writer and scholar.) This short memoir, written at the beginning of the thaw of the late 1970's, is her first effort to take up the pen again. It is part of a flood of so-called "wounded literature" depicting "the ten years of disaster" that began to appear in print in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Typically works of this genre were consumed avidly and thankfully by the general public who viewed them as finally articulating popular feelings. But *Six Chapters,* which was first serialized in a Hong Kong magazine,[7] did not arouse much enthusiasm within China.[8] It was, however, well-received in the West; in particular, Western scholars of Chinese literature have provided laudatory evaluations of its literary style.[9] Such a difference in response is worth some examination.

My own reaction coincides with that of Chinese readers. As one not trained in Chinese literature I prefer to leave discussions on literary style to the experts.[10] But I must take issue with the praise lavished upon it by Western critics for its subtlety, restraint, and understatement. When the pen is so subtle and so restrained, and the message so understated that it fails to reflect the broader reality and social context, something is wanting. After all, the May Seventh cadre schools were at best a mild form of *gulag.* As late as the late 1960's and early 1970's, China's leadership had used the camps as an effective means to break up any remaining rebellious

[6]For a discussion of some of Yang Jiang's former writings see Edward Gunn, *Unwelcome Muse: Chinese Literature in Shanghai and Peking 1937–1945,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1980, pp. 231–43.

[7]For details of the publication history of *Six Chapters,* see the afterword by the book's translator, pp. 101–02.

[8]This information was communicated to me by Geremie Barme.

[9]One of these Western scholars is Howard Goldblatt, the translator of the *Six Chapters.* Another is Geremie Barme, who has published another translation entitled *A Cadre School Life: Six Chapters,* Hong Kong, Joint Publishing Co., 1982. A third is Simon Leys; see his *The Burning Forest: Essays on Chinese Culture and Politics,* New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1986, pp. 171–74.

[10]Readers who are interested in the literary style of *Six Chapters* may wish to consult Edward Gunn's review of the two translations in *Modern Chinese Literature* (San Francisco State University), Spring 1986, pp. 99–103.

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organizational structures, to crush the dignity and sense of superiority of intellectuals, and to sustain the hysteria of "class struggle" by creating more "enemies of the people." The threat of being sent to one effectively kept those who remained in the cities in their place. In fact, in translating the book's title, Howard Goldblatt employs the word "Down-under" to evoke the image of the "underworld"—hell. In the particular "school" where Yang was sent, the living conditions may well have been worse than a regular prison labor camp. When the "students" first arrived, they had to build their own sleeping quarters, latrines, plus dig a well for water with their bare hands and a few primitive tools before they could settle down to an austere and monotonous existence.[11]

Yang refers to the harsh living conditions only in passing. In a low-key fashion, at times offhandedly droll, her six chapters on life in the camp detail mundane events—she includes one chapter on preparations to go down to the camp, one on how she enjoyed digging the well, one on how she tended the vegetable plots and how the fruits of her labor were constantly being carted off by neighboring peasants from under her nose, another chapter on how she had come to adopt a stray dog, a chapter on how she had lost her way on a couple of occasions, and a final chapter on her anxiety while awaiting her turn to be transferred back to the city. All these "little incidents," she concludes in the last chapter of the book, provided "invaluable experience."

How do we account for this discretion in tone and content? As Simon Leys sees it, Yang excels in the Chinese aesthetic of "knowing how to say less in order to express more."[12] Or as Howard Goldblatt, the translator, writes in the afterword, Yang's low-key account can be read as sarcasm directed at the political system. Some critics, however, interpret it as a style dictated by official censorship and self-censorship.[13]

Yet if we examine the political and cultural situation of 1980, the year that Yang Jiang finished writing the *Six Chapters*, her restraint and lack of strong emotion seem discordant with the times. In that period of post-Mao literary thaw, a large number of novels and short stories that were openly critical of the system had already appeared in print and were enjoying widespread popularity. It was a time when the "democracy movement" was in full swing, and a time when literally millions of people were desperately seeking political rehabilitation (many travelling hundreds or thousands of miles to Beijing) with claims of having been the victims of gross miscarriages of justice. It was, in short, a time of a massive outpouring of bitterness.[14]

Yet Yang stands apart from all of this. Though she alludes to the bleak physical setting of the camp, she breathes not a word about the injustices that existed within the makeshift compounds. Usually run by the PLA or some sort of "workers' propaganda team," with the help of several slogan-mouthing party cadres from the "students" own unit, the camps were cruelly regimented. There were no books to read nor activities that called for the exercise of the intellect, except for writing confessions. Bombardment by and recitations of Maoist slogans were the order of the day. Even worse, incessant witch-hunting put one's moral conscience to the test daily in the criticism and self-criticism sessions. What and how much should I betray about myself and others today? Such closed-off, politically charged enclaves can bring out the worst (and sometimes the better side) of human nature.[15] Yet Yang seems to have seen only the virtues—human warmth, harmonious personal relationships, conjugal love, and collective solidarity.

Oddly enough, this lapse was pointed out by none other than Yang's own husband, Qian Zhongshu. In the opening paragraph of the three-page foreword that he wrote for *Six Chapters*, he notes:

. . . I felt that she should have written one more chapter, which we can, for the moment, call "A Sense of Shame: Participating in Political Campaigns."

Yang's husband went on to say that the real function of the cadre schools was to ferret out "May Sixteen elements"[16] and that their two years in the camp "were spent in an atmosphere of criticism and struggle." Yang's chapters, he thinks, "are but mere adornments to this larger backdrop . . . ." In all political campaigns there emerged

[11]It should be noted, however, that in two respects their situation was far better than a prisoner's—they continued to receive their regular salary, with which they could buy food from the neighbouring villages, and they were also allowed to receive food parcels from the city.

[12]See Simon Leys, op. cit, p. 172.

[13]Ibid. p. 170; and Edward Gunn, p. 100.

[14]See James D. Seymour, Ed., *Fifth Modernization: China's Human Rights Movement, 1978–1979*, Stanfordville, New York, Human Rights Publishing Group, 1980.

[15]A book which gives a much more realistic picture of life in a May Seventh cadre school is by a well-known writer of the younger generation, Dai Houyin's *Shiren Zhi Si* (Death of a Poet), Hong Kong, Jing Zao Publishing Co.; the exact year of authorship is unknown, but from the date given in the author's prologue it must be around 1981 or 1982. This long novel, like the *Six Chapters*, was first published in Hong Kong. It may suffer from a lack of literary sophistication, but certainly should be valued as a historical document.

[16]This effort to ferret out "May Sixteen elements," who were said to be members of a huge clique of "counterrevolutionaries," was a nationwide campaign which claimed thousands of victims. Today, it is said that such a counterrevolutionary clique never really existed.

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various kinds of people. The victims, he thinks, will probably be writing chapters on "grievances" and "resentment." The rest of the people should be writing chapters on "shame": those who should be ashamed for so easily and weakly letting themselves believe trumped-up charges; those who should be ashamed of their cowardice (himself included, he confesses) in not speaking up against injustice; and those who willingly and enthusiastically participated in crushing others. The last category, Qian writes, has the greatest need to write about their shame. But they are the ones who are most forgetful of what they did. Lastly, Qian hopes that these missing chapters will some day be composed, "thereby lessening somewhat the number of defects in the world of man."

Qian's foreword is only indirectly critical of his wife's book; his intention in writing was to seek that which has been expunged from the collective consciousness in China today, including his wife's. Qian wants to discuss what others shun—guilt, shame, remorse, contrition, and moral responsibility. His wife Yang Jiang recently published two short, unequivocally sarcastic, pieces which unlike her *Six Chapters,* are sharply critical of the political system; but they are not the chapters on shame that her husband would so much have liked to see.[17]

The reasons Yang has avoided the topic, I think, can be found in Yang's mind-set while at the camp. Hers was a mentality born out of the accommodating tradition of Chinese culture, interlaced, interestingly, with traces of successful Maoist teachings. Instead of resenting being made to toil like a peasant, in those two years Yang seems to have learned to enjoy hard labor. She found pleasure in having mud oozing through her toes. She was proud of the fruit of their collective labor. She constantly felt uneasy about receiving a higher salary than her colleagues for doing lighter labor because of her age. One hears no urgent yearning for freedom. There is no bitterness, no anger. On the contrary, she was well resigned to her fate: "if you know that the door is securely locked, pushing on it or trying to break it down is an exercise in futility" (p. 88). In short, there was little of the "revolt of the mind" that one might have expected. One observes acceptance, adaptability, stoicism, tolerance, moderation (zhong yong), harmony, self-sacrifice, bountiful patriotism, a coming to terms with reality, a oneness with nature. Indeed, Yang Jiang possesses the very qualities that are so admired by the Chinese themselves—the quintessential virtues of the traditional Chinese intellectual. Among a small elite group of educated Chinese of her generation, *Six Chapters* did succeed in commanding understanding.[18]

However, these are qualities that are not conducive to the development of a critical understanding of oneself and society. Self-dissection, feelings of guilt and remorse, and personal responsibility do not figure prominently in such a mentality. Thus far, Chinese officials and Chinese intellectuals alike have been content to explain away the "ten years of disaster" with a dismissive set of catchwords: "the Gang of Four," "feudal mentality," "the craze of the Red Guards."

THERE ARE a few who want to search deeper for answers. Their voices are just beginning to be heard. As if in support of Qian Zhongshu's call for writings on shame, last year an unusually critical article on the mind-set of Chinese intellectuals appeared in China's equivalent of *The New York Review of Books*. The author, Xu Jilin, iconoclastically departed from the mutual-admiration etiquette that tends to pervade Chinese intellectual writings. After alluding to how Chinese intellectuals have a record of capitulating to political power, he pointed out that they lack a "self-motivated consciousness of guilt" and have a tendency to shirk "moral responsibility" by placing all blame on "inevitable objective conditions." Xu called on the intellectuals to write "memoirs of contrition," of genuine "interrogation of the soul," not the usual "gentle and honest, calm and composed, but evasive and white-washing 'memoirs of famous people'."[19]

Perhaps this is too harsh a criticism of Chinese intellectuals who in the past several decades have, with some justification, come to develop a collective self-image as victims. Because they are educated, we in the West along with Chinese mavericks like Xu expect them to possess a more critical faculty and self-awareness than other less educated social groups. When they have not, we resort to a cultural explanation. Such an explanation has some merit, but may provide only part of the answer.

The Chinese do not stand alone, certainly, in their reluctance to be introspective. It is not generally part of human nature to hold oneself culpable for past acts of persecution, es-

[17]They are carried in a Chinese magazine for intellectuals, *Dushu* (Readings), No. 2, February 1987, pp. 48–54. I am indebted to Geremie Barme for bringing these to my attention.

[18]One example of how these qualities of Yang are depicted as representative of the superior virtues of the Chinese intellectual is found in a Chinese book review of *Six Chapters*. Min Ze, "After Reading Six Chapters," *Dushu*, No. 9, September 1986, pp. 9–13.

[19]Xu Jilin, "Looking at the Mentality and Personality of Intellectuals from Chinese 'Memoirs of Contrition'," *Dushu*, No. 1, January 1987, pp. 11–20.

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pecially when one's participation was due to self-delusion or cowardice. Recognition of collective or personal moral responsibility did not come easily to those who took part in two other major human tragedies of this century, namely, the Nazi holocaust and the Stalinist atrocities. In both Germany and the Soviet Union, after the dismantling of Nazism and Stalinism, the initial psychological state was one of confusion, ideological crisis, and self-delusion. After World War II most Germans, in their attempt to rid themselves of any responsibility or guilt, refused to acknowledge that they had known of the concentration camps.[20] In the decade following Stalin's death, many intellectuals could not easily accept de-Stalinization;[21] even today, more than a third of a century after Stalin's death, there is still considerable resistance to the revelations about Stalinism that *glasnost'* has begun to encourage.

It is now 22 years since the Cultural Revolution erupted and 12 years since Mao's death. Yet, a novel or social-science analysis of the Cultural Revolution that genuinely elucidates has yet to be published in China.[22] Official intervention plays its part in this, to be sure. The Chinese government continues to impose constraints on the free exchange of ideas about what occurred (non-fictional publications about the Cultural Revolution were explicitly banned by the Central Committee in 1986, a ban that was only partially lifted the following year). But it is not just governmental fiat that is at fault. During the past half decade, after the initial outpourings of personal grievances, a large number of Chinese have been trying to forget that period of recent history.[23]

Some tens of thousands of Chinese intellectuals—young, middle-aged, old—have recently studied or are presently studying in the West, an experience one might expect would provide the social distance necessary for looking back with critical objectivity. But the few who do take up their pens stop short of being completely objective.[24] Good documentation is rare, Gao Yuan's *Born Red* being the best documented account to date. Even though members of Gao's generation have been quicker to reject Maoist and Communist party tenets when reality did not measure up to ideology than members of Yang Jiang's generation, as past followers of the personality cult, or as willing or unwilling participants in persecutions, they too prefer to cultivate a blind spot when looking back. Both generations cling to a state of half-awakened consciousness that transcends social class and generational idiosyncracies. Perhaps historical distance is the only cure for historical amnesia.

For the time being, certainly, a great many Chinese agree that the past had best lie quietly buried. The growing presumption is that the events of the preceding decades were a tragic passage in history that will not and cannot be repeated; that China has moved on and should look to the future.

IN THE POST-MAO ERA, liberalization has been repeatedly interrupted by reassertions of iron rule, as the title of the third book under review, *Cold Winds, Warm Winds*, indicates. The authors are a husband-and-wife team, Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro, whose earlier book, *Son of the Revolution*, is a vivid autobiographical account of Liang Heng's coming-of-age amidst the turmoil of the 1960's and 1970's. The material in this newer book, in contrast, comes mainly from documentary research and not personal experience. It is, in fact, a revised and updated version of a 1984 human rights report (written for the Fund for Free Expression, the parent organization of Helsinki Watch and America Watch).[25] The two authors provide a comprehensive survey of the state of civil liberties in China in the

[20]James D. Wilkinson, *The Intellectual Resistance in Europe*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981, pp. 160–61.

[21]A. Zr., "The Conscience of a Generation—A Commentary," in Abraham Brumberg, Ed., *Russia Under Khrushchev: an Anthology from Problems of Communism*, London, Methuen, 1962, pp. 422–40.

[22]The best-known publication thus far has been Gao Gao and Yan Jiaqi's *Zhongguo 'Wenge' Shinian Shi* (A History of the Chinese 'Cultural Revolution' Decade), but it only documents some of the chronological detail, with barely any analysis. After its publication in China in 1986, the government pulled the book off bookstore shelves, but the ban on it subsequently was lifted in 1987.

Two "underground" publications from the 1979–80 "Democracy Movement" are the only probing Chinese analyses of the Cultural Revolution that I know of. They are Liu Guokai, *A Brief Analysis of the Cultural Revolution* (ed. by Anita Chan), Armonk, N.Y., M. E. Sharpe Inc., 1987; and Wang Xizhe, "Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution," in Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen, and Jonathan Unger, Eds., *On Socialist Democracy and the Chinese Legal System*, Armonk, N.Y., M.E. Sharpe, 1985, pp. 177–260.

[23]See the foreword of Feng Qicai's *Yi Bai ge Ren de Shi Nian* (The Ten Years of One Hundred People), Vol. 1, Hong Kong, Xiangjiang Publishers, 1987, p. 1. Feng, who is a well-known Chinese writer of the Red Guard generation, is one of the few who is keenly aware of this problem. Afraid that the memory of the Cultural Revolution will go unrecorded, he has set himself the task of interviewing 100 people on their experiences of those years.

[24]Disappointing in this respect is a series of short reminiscences of Cultural Revolution experiences written in commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of the beginning of the Cultural Revolution by Chinese scholars and students now studying or living in the United States. Carried in several issues of *Zhongguo zhi Chun* (China Spring), a dissident magazine published in New York, these reminiscences give the details of events, but the level of analysis penetrates no deeper and with no greater self-awareness than what was being written in Hong Kong magazines before Mao's death by former Red Guards who had escaped from China to Hong Kong.

[25]Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro, *Intellectual Freedom in China After Mao*, New York, Fund for Free Expression, 1984.

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1980's. They cover freedom of thought, speech, religion, art and the press, with brief histories and explanations of the institutional backgrounds of each. They detail, too, the effects of the alternate tightening and loosening of the party's grip on society. They conclude that despite setbacks in 1980–81, 1983, and 1986, the forces of change are too great for conservative forces to reverse. On the economic front, they maintain that by 1985 China had become a country of vibrant economic activity where private entrepreneurship flourished—once allowed to consume and to have something to consume, the Chinese have been swept up in an irreversible tide of consumerism. It is their view that the difficulty of getting serious literature published is now as much due to the publishers' eye for profitability as to press censorship.

Yet repeatedly, Shapiro and Liang refer to reticence and silence even where restraints no longer exist. They write that such caution "was often quite unnecessary. . . . The nervousness, the lowering of the voice and the quick look around, the pat on the shoulder and the confidential 'don't tell anyone': these had become the habitual gestures of a nation still recovering from a nightmare." (p. 63)

But it is not just residual fear, or the unwillingness to face their own past, that deters the older generation of writers from writing openly. There is also a sense of political loyalty that affects a surprising number of older writers. It is a loyalty that is very openly expressed in Shapiro and Liang's quote from the old dramatist Xia Yan, which opened this review. After briefly mentioning his prison experience, Xia Yan explains in the next breath why he is not willing to put pen to paper to dissect what had occurred:

A foreign friend suggested that I describe these experiences. As a Communist party member and a patriot, I felt that I should not. To reveal that fascism is still strong in China could frighten the people. We must not follow in the footsteps of a certain writer from the Soviet Union who specialized in writing about prison camps and went to Western countries to publish his works. This course of action does not benefit the Chinese people, nor does it strengthen our unity and stability. (p. 23)

This sense of patriotic responsibility, coupled to the *literati* stoicism, discretion, and search for harmony that Yang Jiang cultivates, helps to shape a climate of self-censorship that effectively supplants the censorship of the past. "In future campaigns," Shapiro and Liang write, "the party would use the more restrained older intellectuals to contain the younger ones, and their important mediating role would prove more effective than coarser methods" (p. 24). We may have a considerable wait for a body of Chinese writing that is at once critical and soul-searching.

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Correction

Richard F. Staar of the Hoover Institution of War, Revolution and Peace would like to correct one error in the "Checklist of Communist Parties in 1987," published in the January-February 1988 issue of *Problems of Communism*. The number of representatives of the Brazilian Communist Party in Brazil's Constituent Congress should have been three, not two. This information was given in a "Who's Who in the Brazilian Constituent Congress" published in *Folha de Sao Paulo,* Jan. 19, 1987, Special Supplement, as translated in Joint Publications Research Service, *Latin America Report* (Washington, DC), JPRS-LAM-87-015, Mar. 4, 1987.

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